Long, In re

• Decision Date: 21 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 7510SC41,7510SC41
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re Imprisonment of Michael H. LONG.

Page 626

214 S.E.2d 626

25 N.C.App. 702

In re Imprisonment of Michael H. LONG.

No. 7510SC41.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 21, 1975.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten, by Asst. Atty. Gen. Parks H. Icenhour, Raleigh, for the State.

Jerry W. Leonard, Raleigh, for petitioner appellee.

MARTIN, Judge.

We have before us the serious question as to whether the admission and the continued confinement of Michael Long in a state hospital, pursuant to G.S. § 122--56.5 and Article 4, Chapter 122 of the General Statutes, constitutes a deprivation of his liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.

Effective 2 April 1974, the General Assembly of North Carolina rewrote Article 4 of Chapter 122 of the General Statutes concerning voluntary admissions to mental health facilities. G.S. § 122--56.5 as thereby enacted reads:

'In applying for admission to a treatment facility, in consenting to medical treatment when consent is required, in giving or receiving any legal notice, and in any other legal procedure under this Article, a parent, person standing in loco parentis, or guardian shall act for a minor, and a guardian or trustee shall act for a person adjudicated non compos mentis.'

The initial and most obvious question is whether Michael Long comes within the protection of the Due Process Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In recent years the rights of minors under the Federal Constitution have received increased attention. Referring to earlier cases, the Supreme Court of the United States in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), stated, 'Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.' Again in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), the Court recognized certain basic rights of children by saying, 'Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.'

The State contends that In Re Gault is not applicable to the present case. Instead, it is argued that the minor, Michael Long, is subject completely to the control and supervision of his parent in the matter of receiving proper mental health treatment.

Our courts regard with great deference the parent's right to bring up a child as he or she so chooses, yet this parental authority is not viewed as absolute. In Spitzer v. Lewark, 259 N.C. 50, 129 S.E.2d 620 (1963), the Court said, 'As a general rule at common law, and in this State, parents have the natural and legal right to the custody, companionship, control, and bringing up of their infant children, and the same being a natural and substantive right may not lightly be denied or interfered with by action of the courts. However, the right is not absolute, and it may be interfered with or denied, but only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interest and welfare of the children clearly require it. (Citations omitted.)'

Parental authority continues to enjoy this special deference, and rightfully so. 'This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).

However, we disagree with the State when it asserts that In Re Gault is not applicable to the present case. In Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968), the following observation is made: '(L)ike Gault, and of utmost importance, we have a situation in which liberty of an individual is at stake, and we think the reasoning in Gault emphatically applies. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled 'civil' or 'criminal' or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration--whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent--which commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process.' See Melville v. Sabbatino, 30 Conn.Sup. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (1973).

It must be kept in mind that where the interests of minor conflict with those of the parent the courts have not deferred as readily to the judgment of the parent. See Strunk v. Strunk, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 145, 35 A.L.R.3d 683 (1969); See, e.g., White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959). The parent's admission of a child to a treatment facility may result from a variety of factors, and it is possible that not all of these factors stem from a legitimate concern for the child. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 Calif.L.Rev. 840 (1974) (hereinafter referred to as Ellis, Volunteering Children).

Having determined that Michael Long is entitled to the protection of due process procedures, we now consider the State's contention that Article 4 of Chapter 122 provides adequate safeguards against the unnecessary admission and confinement of a minor by his parent. First, it is argued that a voluntary patient must be discharged within 72 hours of his written request for release pursuant to G.S. § 122--56.3. The procedure for voluntary admissions is set out in G.S. § 122--56.3 as follows:

'Any person who believes himself to be in need of treatment for mental illness or inebriety may seek voluntary admission to a treatment facility by presenting himself for evaluation to the facility. No physician's statement is necessary, but a written application for evaluation or admission, signed by the person seeking admission, is required. The application shall acknowledge that the applicant may be held by the treatment facility for a period of 72 hours subsequent...