Loomis v. Bowers
| Decision Date | 05 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | WD 84424 |
| Citation | 645 S.W.3d 633 |
| Parties | Garrett LOOMIS, Appellant, v. Scott BOWERS and Lea Booker, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Aiman Askarovna Dvorak, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
Kyle B. Russell, Overland Park, KS, for respondent.
Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Thomas N. Chapman Judge, and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge
Garrett Loomis ("Loomis") appeals from the trial court's entry of judgment granting Scott Bowers and Lea Booker's ("Defendants") motion to dismiss Loomis's petition which asserted claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Loomis argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims because they are not preempted by the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA")2 , because they are not barred by the statute of limitations or doctrines of res judicata or judicial estoppel, and because his petition sufficiently stated cognizable claims. Because the claims in Loomis's petition are preempted by the MHRA, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
On December 25, 2017, Loomis spent 30 minutes to an hour inside of the Ameristar Casino ("Ameristar") in Kansas City, Missouri. Loomis was approached by Defendants, two on-duty security guards employed by Ameristar. Defendants accused Loomis of being intoxicated and told him to leave Ameristar. Loomis explained that he had not been drinking, but that he suffered a brain injury
which partially impaired the use of one side of his body. Despite Loomis's explanation, Defendants forced him to leave Ameristar. As a result of this interaction, Loomis experiences anxiety and panic attacks when he attempts to visit public places, for fear that his physical impairment will be mistaken for intoxication.
On May 15, 2018, Loomis filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR") alleging that Ameristar discriminated against him in public accommodation because of his disability. On March 1, 2019, the MCHR issued Loomis a "right to sue" letter, and on May 28, 2019, Loomis filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, alleging one count of "Disability discrimination and/or Harassment in Public Accommodations" against Ameristar in violation of the MHRA ("MHRA Petition"). On August 22, 2019, Loomis amended his MHRA Petition to include Defendants (whose identities were then unknown to Loomis) as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2.
On November 18, 2019, Loomis served Ameristar with a copy of a summons and his MHRA Petition. On December 16, 2019, Ameristar removed Loomis's case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ("Federal Court"). Ameristar then filed a motion to dismiss Loomis's MHRA Petition. The Federal Court granted Ameristar's motion to dismiss Loomis's MHRA Petition for insufficient service of process. The case was dismissed without prejudice. Loomis appealed, and then voluntarily dismissed his appeal.
On July 23, 2020, Loomis initiated a second lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Clay County asserting common law claims of negligence and of negligent infliction of emotional distress (collectively "common law claims") against Defendants. The common law claims were based upon the same incident raised in the dismissed MHRA Petition. Loomis contends that amendments to the MHRA in 2017 eliminated individual liability for discrimination in public accommodation, permitting him to assert the common law claims.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Loomis's petition. Defendants alleged that Loomis's common law claims are preempted by the MHRA, barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and untimely under the MHRA. In supplemental pleadings in support of the motion to dismiss, Defendants also allege that Loomis's petition fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted because the common law claims are not cognizable.
On February 22, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Loomis's common law claims ("Judgment"). The Judgment expressly relied on State ex rel. Church & Dwight Co. v. Collins , 543 S.W.3d 22 (Mo. banc 2018). In Church , a plaintiff brought claims for sex discrimination and retaliation against her former employer under the MHRA, and the defendant moved to dismiss the claims because they were barred by the MHRA's statute of limitations. Id. at 24-25. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it permitted plaintiff to amend her petition to include common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge "[b]ecause the MHRA fully provides for all remedies available at common law" and because her "common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge [were] fully encompassed and comprehended by the MHRA." Id. at 28. The Supreme Court held, "The MHRA, therefore, supersedes and displaces [the plaintiff's] common law claims, and the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing [the plaintiff] to amend her petition against Church to include common law claims preempted by the MHRA." Id. In its Judgment, the trial court concluded:
The same is true here. [Loomis] initially brought his claims as MHRA claims for disability discrimination. However, those claims were dismissed without prejudice on procedural grounds, and the statute of limitations has expired. [Loomis] now seeks to bring his claims as common law negligence claims. However, the MHRA expressly prohibits disability discrimination in public accommodations. It provides a fully comprehensive remedial scheme for any violations .... As noted by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Church , [Loomis's] common law negligence claims "are fully encompassed and comprehended by the MHRA." Plaintiff is thus "not entitled to any other remedies for common law claims of negligence."
(Citations omitted).
Loomis appeals.
We review the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Hartman v. Logan , 602 S.W.3d 827, 835 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (citation omitted). We are to affirm the trial court's dismissal on any meritorious ground stated in the motion to dismiss, "even if that ground was not relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the claim." Copeland v. City of Union , 534 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (citation omitted). "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is solely a test of the adequacy of the petition."
Hartman , 602 S.W.3d at 835 (quoting Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Ctrs., Inc. , 590 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Mo. banc 2019) ). "The Court does not weigh the factual allegations to determine whether they are credible or persuasive." Hill v. Freedman , 608 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (). "We review the petition ‘to determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that meet the elements of a recognized cause of action or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.’ " Hartman , 602 S.W.3d at 835-36 (quoting McDonald v. Chamber of Commerce of Independence , 581 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) ).
Loomis raises six points on appeal, each addressing a basis for dismissal of his common law claims that was raised by Defendants' motion to dismiss. In his first point on appeal, Loomis argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the amended version of the MHRA does not preempt his common law claims. In his second, third, and fourth points on appeal, Loomis argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the MHRA statute of limitations does not apply to his common law claims, and the claims are not barred by the doctrines of res judicata or judicial estoppel, respectively, arising out of dismissal of the MHRA Petition. In Loomis's fifth and sixth points on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because he sufficiently pled a duty owed for the common law claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, such that his claims are cognizable.4
Each of Loomis's points on appeal is premised on the central contention that 2017 amendments to the MHRA eliminated individual liability for discrimination in public accommodation, permitting common law claims to be pursued against individuals for conduct that would have been subject to the MHRA (and to the Supreme Court's holding in Church ) prior to 2017. Loomis's premise is flawed. Loomis incorrectly presumes (without analysis or citation to authority) that 2017 amendments to the MHRA eliminated individual liability for discrimination in public accommodation.
Individual liability for discrimination in public accommodation following 2017 amendments to the MHRA
Section 213.065 prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation, and describes unlawful discriminatory practices as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Section 213.010(16) defines "places of public accommodation"...
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