Lss Kammo LLC v. Ecolab Inc
| Decision Date | 14 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-10923 |
| Parties | LSS KAMMO, LLC, Plaintiff, v. ECOLAB INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Pending before the court is "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." On March 8, 2010, Plaintiff LLS Kammo, LLC, commenced the instant case in this court against Defendant Ecolab Inc. alleging negligence by an employee of Defendant. Discovery proceeded without incident and concluded. Final witness lists were filed with the court.1 On October 19, 2010, Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, asserting that Plaintiff cannot prove its negligence claim. Plaintiff filed a response on November 16, 2010, and an amended response on November 18, 2010.2 On December 7, 2010, Defendant filed a reply.3 Having reviewedthe briefs, the court concludes a hearing on this motion is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated below, the court will deny Defendant's motion.
The parties agree on the material facts. In October 2008, Plaintiff hired Defendant to perform work on the water system of its hotel. From the hotel, unmarked water pipes ran to an unoccupied house on the property. During the course of performing work, Defendant's employee, Don Posgate, attached equipment to the water system in the hotel. Plaintiff alleges that Posgate also opened various valves, including those controlling water flow to the house, and did not close the valves upon completion of the work. (Def. Mot. Ex. E, Shawn Arnaout Dep. 56-57.) Secondary shut-off valves in the house were loose or detached when the valves were opened, or they became loose or detached before the valves were closed. While the valves were open, water escaped into the house, flooding it. After some time, the water began to spill out of front door of the house. This was the first point at which Plaintiff noticed the leaking water. Following the discovery of the flooding, Plaintiff closed the valves, and the water connection to the house was eventually removed. The house, however, was never repaired or cleaned, nor was the water removed from the house. (Def. Mot. Ex. E, Arnaout Dep., 99.) Plaintiffs filed suit in this case on March 8, 2010, and Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment on October 19, 2010, following the conclusion of discovery.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2003). "Where the moving party has carried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, entry of summary judgment is appropriate." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
The court does not weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but rather, to determine if the evidence produced creates a genuine issue for trial. Sagan, 342 F.3d at 497 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). The moving party discharges its burden by "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party must put forth enough evidence to show that there exists "a genuine issue for trial." Horton, 369 F.3d at 909 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). Summary judgment is not appropriatewhen "the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
The existence of a factual dispute alone does not, however, defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment—the disputed factual issue must be material. See id. at 252 . A fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
Defendant's motion argues that Plaintiff is unable to prove negligence by Posgate for which Defendant could be held liable. As jurisdiction in this case is solely based upon diversity of citizenship, the court must apply the law of the State of Michigan. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Stalbosky v. Beleu, 205 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2000). Under Michigan law, negligence comprises four elements: 1) duty, 2) breach of duty, 3) causation, and 4) injury. Bialick v. Megan Mary, Inc., 780 N.W.2d 599, 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Case v. Consumers Power Co., 615 N.W.2d 17 (Mich. 2000)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's case necessarily fails for lack of a breach of the duty of ordinary care, lack of proximate causation, and failure to mitigate damages.
The existence of a duty upon which Plaintiff may base its negligence action must be determined as a matter of law. Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Mich. 1981). Michigan courts look to a number of factors in determining whether a duty exists, including:
foreseeability of the harm, existence of a relationship between the parties involved, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of connection between the conduct and injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of preventing future harm, and the burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach.
Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). A legal relationship between the parties and foreseeability of the harm are necessary, though insufficient, for the court to find the existence of a duty. In re Certified Question 14th Dist. Ct. Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Mich. 2007). Here, "foreseeability 'depends upon whether or not a reasonable man could anticipate that a given event might occur under certain conditions.'" Moore v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 79 F. App'x 130, 135 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Samson v. Saginaw Prof'l Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Mich. 1975)). In the instant case, there can be no doubt that there was a legal relationship between the parties and the type of harm the occurred was foreseeable. In performing work upon Plaintiff's water system, Defendant had a duty to use care to avoid water damage to the property by its own acts.
A breach of a duty occurs when a party does not exercise "reasonable care" under the circumstances. Case v. Consumers Power Co., 615 N.W.2d 17, 18 (Mich. 2000). "What constitutes reasonable care must be determined from the facts of the case, " and thus is generally a question for the jury. Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Mich. 1992). Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Posgate exercised reasonable care in opening and leaving open the valves. Although Defendant offers an expert opinion that it would not be reasonable to expect valves in the hotel to control water flow to the house, such statement misses the point. (Def. Mot. Ex. I, Listvan Report 2.) Whether the damage occurred in the hotel or a nearby structure, a reasonable jury could find that Posgate failed in using "reasonable care" when he opened the water valves without knowing what such action would do. Defendant's expert suggests as much in his deposition. (Pl. Resp. Ex. A, Listvan Dep. 30.) Even if opening the valves was reasonable under the circumstances, a reasonable jury could nonetheless find that negligence lay in not returning the valves to their original, closed position when the work was complete. Had the valves simply been connected to a leaky fixture within the hotel that subsequently caused substantial water damage, a jury might reasonably find negligence. The fortuitous connection of the valves to another structure does not relieve Defendant of its duty to exercise reasonable care. Nor is the lack of markings or labels on the valves dispositive, as reasonable care may require investigation of known unknowns such as the probable effect of opening a valve.
Defendant also moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs cannot establish proximate cause. The causation requirement in negligence comprises two distinct parts: causation in fact and proximate causation. Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Mich. 1994) (citing Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Mich. 1977)). Causation in fact must be decided as a factual matter, determining whether the negligent action was a sine qua non of the injury. Moning, 254 N.W.2d at 765. As such, it is a question for the jury. Proximate cause analysis requires the determination of whether the results were a "natural and probable result of the negligent conduct." O'Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 487 Mich. 485, 496 (Mich. 2010) (citations omitted). Where...
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