Glastonbury Co. v. Gillies, 13431

• Decision Date: 15 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13431,13431
• Citation: 550 A.2d 8,209 Conn. 175
• Parties: The GLASTONBURY COMPANY et al. v. Peter W. GILLIES, Insurance Commissioner, et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 8

550 A.2d 8

209 Conn. 175

The GLASTONBURY COMPANY et al. v. Peter W. GILLIES, Insurance Commissioner, et al.

No. 13431.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 5, 1988.

Decided Nov. 15, 1988.

Jane D. Comerford, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellants (named defendants).

Daniel L. FitzMaurice, Hartford, with whom were Harvey A. Katz, Glastonbury, and, on the brief, Allan B. Taylor, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Peter T. Zarella and Steven W. Varney, Hartford, filed a brief for Dept. of Banking as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

This case involves the eligibility of a subsidiary of a lending institution and one of its officers to be licensed to sell insurance under the provisions of General Statutes § 38-72a(b) and (c). Under such provisions the state insurance commissioner cannot issue a license to sell fire, casualty, life or health insurance to a bank subsidiary or to any of its officers or employees. Such organizations, however, lawfully licensed on October 1, 1973, in the case of fire and casualty insurance, and on October 1, 1980, in the case of health and life insurance, are exempt or "grandfathered" from the prohibitions of § 38-72a. ¹ The principal issue raised on appeal is whether the grandfather clauses in § 38-72a(b) and (c) require an exempt bank subsidiary to be licensed continuously in order to remain exempt under the statute.

The plaintiffs, The Glastonbury Company, a subsidiary of the Glastonbury Bank and Trust Company, and its vice president and secretary, Albert S. Birrell, appealed to the Superior Court from a decision of Peter W. Gillies, the state insurance commissioner (commissioner), rescinding their licenses to sell insurance. After a hearing, the trial court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor. The insurance commissioner appealed to the Appellate Court and, thereafter, this court transfered the appeal to itself pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. On appeal, the state department of banking has filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the plaintiffs. ² We find no error.

The facts, as stipulated to by the parties, indicate that the named plaintiff, The Glastonbury Company (company), was licensed to sell fire and casualty insurance as of October 1, 1973, and life and health insurance as of October 1, 1980, thereby making it an exempt or "grandfathered" organization under both subsections (b) and (c) of § 38-72a. In 1974, however, the company sold its entire insurance business and contractually promised not to engage in that business in Glastonbury or in any contiguous towns for at least five years. With the exception of a license to sell life and health insurance, all the company's licenses were, at that time or shortly thereafter, either transferred in the sale, cancelled or allowed to lapse. The company did continue to hold a viable license to sell life and health insurance on October 1, 1980. It allowed that license to lapse, however, on May 1, 1981. ³

In 1983, approximately one year after its license to sell life and health insurance lapsed, the company was relicensed by the insurance commissioner as an agency for both of these lines. In 1984, after approximately a nine year lapse, the company was relicensed by the commissioner as an agency for fire and casualty insurance. The company was also relicensed as a broker in all lines of insurance in 1984. Birrell was licensed as a broker in fire and casualty insurance in 1984, as an agent in 1985, and has been employed by the company since 1985.

On February 24, 1987, the commissioner rescinded all the plaintiffs' insurance licenses stating that they had been "issued in error" as the company was in violation of § 38-72a. The commissioner concluded that, although the company had been, at one time, exempt from the prohibitions of § 38-72a, it had lost its exempt status because it failed to hold its licenses continuously after the dates for exemption set forth in the statute. Since the company was a nonexempt subsidiary of a lending institution under § 38-72a, the commissioner also concluded that Birrell, as an officer or employee of a nonexempt subsidiary, had been issued his licenses in error. In rescinding the plaintiffs' licenses, the commissioner rejected the plaintiffs' claim that his prior issuance of the licenses estopped him from doing so.

The plaintiffs appealed the commissioner's decision to the trial court asserting that the "[commissioner's] construction of the grandfather clauses in ... § 38-72a was substantively and procedurally improper; and [the commissioner] improperly denied [the plaintiffs'] claim of estoppel." Relying on its interpretation of § 38-72a(b) and (c), the trial court reversed the commissioner's decision and held that the grandfather clauses of the statute do not impose a requirement of "continuous licensure."

The principal claim raised by the commissioner on appeal is that the trial court erred in reversing his decision to rescind the plaintiffs' licenses to sell insurance. He argues that § 38-72a(b) and (c) are ambiguous because their grandfather clauses fail to provide for the situation at hand. According to the commissioner, the failure of the statute to mention the effect of the lapse or expiration of an insurance license creates an ambiguity. This ambiguity, the commissioner argues, compels the court to construe § 38-72a in light of its purpose and legislative history and apply a narrow interpretation to its grandfather clauses that requires continuous licensure. We disagree that the statute is ambiguous and refuse to adopt a construction that would create such a requirement.

It is our duty to "interpret statutes as they are written." Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980). "Courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated." Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 314, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986); Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251-52, 363 A.2d 121 (1975). "[T]he intent of the legislature is to be found not in what it meant to say but in what it did say." Federal Aviation Administration v. Administrator, 196 Conn. 546, 549-50, 494 A.2d 564 (1985); State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 222, 479 A.2d 814 (1984); Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523, 526, 409 A.2d 1006 (1979); see also Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 325, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981); Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 452, 364 A.2d 167 (1975). A statute "does not become ambiguous merely because the parties contend for different meanings." Luttrell v. Luttrell, 184 Conn. 307, 310-11, 439 A.2d 981 (1981); Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 571, 440 A.2d 767 (1981); see also State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 721, 546 A.2d 830 (1988). Given an unambiguous statute, "it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature ... and there is no need to construe the statute." (Citations omitted.) Federal Aviation Administration v. Administrator, supra, 196 Conn. at 549-50, 494 A.2d 564; State v. Smith, supra, 194 Conn. at 221, 479 A.2d 814; Bell v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 223, 226, 377 A.2d 299 (1977); Houston v. Warden, supra, 169 Conn. at 251, 363 A.2d 121; Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 375-76, 279 A.2d 561 (1971).

The commissioner conceded in both his brief and at oral argument that § 38-72a(b) and (c) "offers no guidance as to whether a lapse in licensing would operate to subsequently divest one of a previously conferred exemption from the bank affiliation licensure disqualification." (Emphasis added.) Instead, he cites both Board of Trustees v. Commissioner, 1 Conn.App. 22, 25, 467 A.2d 925 (1983), and Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 550, 436 A.2d 266 (1980), for the proposition that where the words of a statute fail to provide for a particular situation, it is necessary to look beyond the literal wording of the statute. In both Board of Trustees v. Commissioner and Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, however, we were seeking to interpret a statute by defining words in the statute. The instant case involves a very different scenario; the grandfather clauses in § 38-72a(b) and (c) say absolutely nothing about the consequences to an exempt organization if it allows its insurance licenses to lapse. Absent such language by the legislature, this court cannot "engraft amendments onto the statutory language." Burnham v. Administrator, supra, 184 Conn. at 325, 439 A.2d 1008; State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, supra, 208 Conn. at 727, 546 A.2d 830. If the legislature had desired a continuous licensure requirement under § 38-72a(b) and (c) it could have inserted it into the statute. It is not the prerogative of the insurance commissioner or the court to do so. As we have stated in numerous other cases, "it is not the province of a court to supply what the legislature chose to omit. The legislature is supreme in the area of legislation, and courts must apply statutory enactments according to their plain terms." Federal Aviation Administration v. Administrator, supra; In re Petition of State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois, 179 Conn. 102, 107, 425 A.2d 588 (1979); Weingarten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 169 Conn. 502, 507-508, 363 A.2d 1055 (1975).

The commissioner insists, however, that the silence of the statute concerning the effects of the lapse of licensure on a grandfathered organization makes the statute at least latently ambiguous. To support his claim, the commissioner maintains that cases from other jurisdictions interpreting similar grandfather clauses, which do not have explicit language requiring continuous licensure,...