Lutheran Medical Center of Omaha v. City of Omaha, 42193

• Decision Date: 07 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 42193,42193
• Citation: 204 Neb. 292,281 N.W.2d 786
• Parties: LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER OF OMAHA, Nebraska, a Nebraska nonprofit corporation, Appellee, v. CITY OF OMAHA, a municipal corporation and city of the metropolitan class, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 786

281 N.W.2d 786

204 Neb. 292

LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER OF OMAHA, Nebraska, a Nebraska nonprofit corporation, Appellee, v. CITY OF OMAHA, a municipal corporation and city of the metropolitan class, Appellant.

No. 42193.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Aug. 7, 1979.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Prisoners: Medical Services: Municipal Corporations. A city of the metropolitan class is liable for the emergency medical treatment required by a criminal suspect in police custody who is wounded by the police in the process of apprehension.

2. Prisoners: Constitutional Law: Medical Services. Intentional indifference to the medical needs of a prisoner is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as being cruel and unusual punishment.

3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. The judgment of a trial court in an action at law where a jury has been waived has the effect of a jury verdict and it will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly wrong.

Herbert M. Fitle and Richard A. Cerveny, Omaha, for appellant.

Andrew E. Grimm and John H. Cotton of Gaines, Otis, Mullen & Carta, Omaha, for appellee.

Heard before BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, BRODKEY, and HASTINGS, JJ., and FAHRNBRUCH, District Judge.

FAHRNBRUCH, District Judge.

Plaintiff, the Lutheran Medical Center of Omaha, a Nebraska nonprofit corporation, brought this action against the defendant, the City of Omaha, a municipal corporation and city of the metropolitan class, for money due by reason of medical services rendered to (a) a city jail prisoner; and (b) a suspect in an armed robbery who was shot by an officer of the Omaha police division. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appeals. We affirm.

The case was tried to the trial court upon a stipulation of facts and the pleadings.

The city jail prisoner was stricken with severe chest pains while in jail and was taken by defendant's employee to plaintiff's hospital. The prisoner's condition was diagnosed as unstable angina requiring emergency medical treatment, and the prisoner was placed in the intensive care unit. He was dismissed from the hospital after approximately a week, but due to an intervening escape was not returned to jail.

In the case of the suspect, he was delivered to plaintiff's hospital for emergency treatment by defendant's employee. He had been shot by an officer of the Omaha police division while allegedly fleeing from the scene of an armed robbery. Dr. Richard B. Svehla treated the suspect for shock and performed exploratory abdominal surgery as the result of a gunshot wound to the lower back, closed three wounds of the jejunum, and removed the bullet causing the injury. The suspect was placed in intensive care, thereafter in a regular hospital room, and subsequently lodged in jail.

Dr. Svehla duly assigned his claim to plaintiff for services rendered. Proper claims were presented to the defendant and were rejected. Appeal was timely taken to the District Court for Douglas County, which reversed the decision of the city council and entered judgment for the plaintiff.

The parties stipulated that the medical services were necessary and that the charges were fair and reasonable. Stipulated evidence established that the medical services rendered were of an emergency nature in each case.

Defendant claims it is not liable because (1) contracts entirely outside the powers delegated to a municipal corporation are void; (2) the mode of executing a contract with the defendant is a mandatory requirement which was not followed in either case; (3) the sole authority for binding the defendant is a contract by defendant's city council and mayor, which was not done in these cases; (4) where the services are not requested by the proper authority there can be no implied contract; (5) in the absence of some express provision of the law, the public is not liable to a physician or surgeon for services rendered prisoners, even though they are insolvent and unable to pay for such services themselves; and (6) liability, if any, upon the defendant for medical or surgical aid can be imposed only for those services rendered to a prisoner who is actually confined in jail at the time the services are rendered.

It appears that this is a case of first impression in this court in regard to liability for emergency medical services to prisoners. Counsel have cited no cases in this jurisdiction, and we find none, that have dealt directly with the issues here raised. Cases in some jurisdictions tend to support defendant's position. Trinity Hospital Association v. City of Minot, 76 N.W.2d 916 (N.D., 1956); King Cy. v. Seattle, 70 Wash.2d 988, 425 P.2d 887; Windham Community Memorial Hospital v. Willimantic, 166 Conn. 113, 348 A.2d 651. Those cases rested on lack of express or implied contract and upon the lack of a statutorily imposed obligation on imprisoning authorities to provide medical attention to prisoners. Other jurisdictions have held the imprisoning governmental subdivisions liable. City of Tulsa v. Sisler, 285 P.2d 422 (Okl., 1955); Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291; Lamar v. The Board of Commissioners of Pike County, 4 Ind.App. 191, 30 N.E. 912. Those cases rested upon the statutory obligation of the imprisoning authority to supply medical needs to prisoners. In the Spicer and Lamar cases, the formalities of governing body approval prior to rendering emergency medical treatment were not required.

The concept that an imprisoning authority has a legal obligation to supply medical services to prisoners is not of recent origin, nor was it originally based on statutes. At common law, it was stated: "The rule that where a person requests the performance of a service, and the request is complied with, and the service performed, there is an implied promise to pay for the services, does not apply where a person requests a physician to perform services for a patient, Unless the relation of that person to the patient is such as raises a legal obligation on his part to call in a physician and pay for the services, or the circumstances are such as to show an intention on his part to pay for the services * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) Spicer v. Williamson, supra ; 30 Cyc. 1597. This rule has been interpreted to apply to authorities operating jail facilities since they have the Legal obligation to their prisoners to supply the prisoners' medical needs. Citing the common law, the Supreme Court of the United States has said: "* * * 'it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for...