Lycan v. City of Cleveland
| Decision Date | 23 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 99698.,99698. |
| Citation | 6 N.E.3d 91 |
| Parties | Janine LYCAN, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees v. City of CLEVELAND, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Barbara Langhenry, Director of Law by Jennifer Meyer, Gary S. Singletary, Assistant Directors of Law, Cleveland, OH, for Appellant.
W. Craig Bashein, Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., Paul W. Flowers, Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Cleveland, OH, Blake A. Dickson, The Dickson Firm, L.L.C., Enterprise Place, Beachwood, OH, for Appellees.
Before: S. GALLAGHER, P.J., BLACKMON, J., and McCORMACK, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant city of Cleveland appeals from the trial court's order granting class certification. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
{¶ 2} There has been considerable debate whether red-light cameras serve to make the roads safer or whether their use is about generating revenues for the cities that deploy them. Irrespective of that controversy, we are mindful that the imposition of a $100 civil penalty resulting from a red-light camera violation has significant value to the individual. At issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs may maintain as a class action their claims for unjust enrichment and declaratory relief arising from the enforcement of a red-light camera ordinance against the individuals in the putative class.
{¶ 3} Former Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“CCO”) 413.031 authorized the use of automated traffic cameras to impose civil penalties on “the owner of a vehicle” for red light and speeding offenses. Pursuant to former CCO 413.031(p)(3), a “vehicle owner” was defined as “the person or entity identified by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or registered with any other State vehicle registration office, as the registered owner of a vehicle.”
{¶ 4} On February 25, 2009, plaintiff Janine Lycan filed a class action complaint against the city, alleging that the city unlawfully enforced former CCO 413.031 against her. The action arose following this court's decision in Dickson & Campbell, L.L.C. v. Cleveland, 181 Ohio App.3d 238, 2009-Ohio-738, 908 N.E.2d 964 (8th Dist.). In Dickson, this court found nothing ambiguous about the plain meaning of the word “vehicle owner” and determined that former CCO 413.031 does not impose liability on a lessee of a vehicle.1
{¶ 5} Lycan claimed that she was not the owner of the vehicle depicted in the photograph taken by the automated traffic camera. Lycan sought equitable relief for unjust enrichment, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief against the city.2 Lycan also filed a motion for class certification.
{¶ 6} Thereafter, a first amended class action complaint was filed, which in addition to Lycan included as named plaintiffs Thomas Pavlish, Jeane Task, Lindsey Charna, Ken Fogle, John T. Murphy, and ITW Hobart.3 The amended complaint alleged that none of the plaintiffs was a “registered owner” of the vehicle and that the city unlawfully collected the fines from those individuals. Each plaintiff except Task paid the $100 civil fine without challenging it. Although Task did not pay the fine, she was assessed additional penalties as a result. The city filed an answer to the second amended complaint.
{¶ 7} The city then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted this motion on the basis that the plaintiffs had waived their right to contest the citation by failing to appeal and paying the fines. Because of this determination, the trial court further denied the motion for class certification.
{¶ 8} On appeal in Lycan v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94353, 2010-Ohio-6021, 2010 WL 5075520 (“Lycan I ”), this court reversed the judgment on the pleadings on the claim for unjust enrichment and the claim for declaratory relief, but affirmed on the claim for injunctive relief. In that opinion, the court determined as follows:
While we recognize that [the plaintiffs] had the opportunity to challenge the imposition of the fines before they paid them, this opportunity does not necessarily foreclose any right to equitable relief. * * * We cannot say, on the face of the complaint, that [the plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief. Among other things, the question of whether [the plaintiffs] were induced to pay the fines by a mistake of fact or law and whether they were coerced to pay be a threat of additional penalties may be relevant to this question.
Id. at ¶ 8. The court also reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the question of class certification. Id. at ¶ 11.
{¶ 9} Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming all of the elements of their unjust enrichment claim were met. The city opposed the motion and filed its own motion for summary judgment. On February 8, 2013, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
{¶ 10} The trial court conducted a hearing on February 19, 2013. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on February 26, 2013. The trial court found that all of the requirements for class certification were met and certified the following class:
All persons and entities who were not a “vehicle owner” under CCO 413.031, but were issued a notice of citation and/or assessed a fine under that ordinance, prior to March 11, 2009, by/or on behalf of Defendant, City of Cleveland.
{¶ 11} Excluded from the class were the following:
1) Any of the above described class member[s] who filed a lawsuit involv[ing] any of the claims included in the class; 2) Immediate families of class counsel, the judge of this court, defendant's counsel of record and their immediate families; and
3) All persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the class for the 23(B)(3) claim.
{¶ 12} The city timely appealed the trial court's ruling on class certification. While the city's brief lists an assignment of error relating to the trial court's granting of partial summary judgment, this ruling is not yet appealable and is not addressed in the substance of appellant's brief. Rather, the issues raised on appeal pertain to whether the Civ.R. 23(A) class action requirements were met and whether the action is barred by res judicata.
{¶ 13} We first address the issue of res judicata. As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether Lycan I established the law of the case insofar as the court determined that the plaintiffs' failure to pursue administrative review before paying the fine “does not necessarily foreclose any right to equitable relief.” However, Lycan I did not address the issue of res judicata.
{¶ 14} In Carroll v. Cleveland, 522 Fed.Appx. 299 (6th Cir.2013), a “copycat” lawsuit raising constitutional takings challenges, the federal court found that where the appellants paid their fines rather than contesting their citations through the administrative process provided under CCO 413.031, claim preclusion barred their claims. See also Foor v. Cleveland, N.D. Ohio No. 1:12 CV 1754, 2013 WL 4427432 (Aug. 14, 2013). We are not inclined to follow such an expansive view of res judicata.
{¶ 15} The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), syllabus. The plaintiffs in this matter paid the civil fine assessed by the city for a red-light camera violation. Res judicata does not apply because there was never an actual “judgment” rendered by a court, or administrative tribunal, of competent jurisdiction.4 Even if an administrative decision had been rendered, the claims for unjust enrichment and declaratory judgment were not claims that could have been litigated or decided by the parking violations bureau.
{¶ 16} Finally, we recognize that the Ohio Supreme Court found the civil hearing process provided by CCO 413.031(k) to involve the exercise of quasi-judicial authority. State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 15. We are also aware that in certain situations, res judicata has been found to apply to quasi-judicial decisions of administrative agencies. See Grava. However, “[t]he binding effect of res judicata has been held not to apply when fairness and justice would not support it.” The State ex rel. Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231, 2009-Ohio-786, 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30.
{¶ 17} While we have found no authority in Ohio on the issue, courts in other states have generally declined to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel with regard to traffic infractions. State v. Walker, 159 Ariz. 506, 768 P.2d 668, 671 (Ariz.App.1989); Hadley v. Maxwell, 144 Wash.2d 306, 312–313, 27 P.3d 600 (2001). As a practical matter, traffic infractions tend to be minor in nature, are informally adjudicated, and are often uncontested. With limited civil sanctions, there is little incentive to contest a citation or to vigorously litigate the matter. Under CCO 413.031, the maximum penalty that may be imposed is $200. Late penalties are authorized if the penalty is not paid within 20 days and 40 days from the date the ticket is mailed to the offender. If the penalty is not timely paid, the recipient is subject to the additional penalties and collection efforts. There was evidence presented at the class certification hearing that the cost to exercise the right to appeal was as much as the $100 fine itself.
{¶ 18} Further, the administrative procedure provided by CCO 413.031(k) is designed to provide a simple and expeditious means of disposing of literally thousands of such citations every year. To allow res judicata or collateral estoppel to apply to such proceedings would circumvent the purposes in creating the expedited dispositional procedures for civil traffic violations.
{¶ 19}...
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