Lynch v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 20 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 44,44
• Citation: 35 N.Y.3d 517,159 N.E.3d 213,134 N.Y.S.3d 297
• Parties: Patrick LYNCH, as President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., on Behalf of the Police Officers Who Have Been or May in the Future Be Aggrieved, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

35 N.Y.3d 517

159 N.E.3d 213

134 N.Y.S.3d 297

Patrick LYNCH, as President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., on Behalf of the Police Officers Who Have Been or May in the Future Be Aggrieved, et al., Appellants,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Respondents.

No. 44

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 20, 2020

OPINION OF THE COURT

FAHEY, J.

The Appellate Division order should be reversed and Supreme Court's judgment declaring that defendants violated the second subdivision (h) of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 13–218 by excluding police officers in tier 3 of the state retirement system from the retirement benefits conferred by that subdivision reinstated. Applying longstanding, basic rules of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the relevant part of Administrative Code § 13–218 renders officers of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) who are members of the tier 3 retirement system eligible for credit for certain periods of unpaid childcare leave, and that the grant of such benefits for those officers is consistent with the Retirement and Social Security Law.

I.

In July 1976 the legislature adopted, and Governor Carey approved, legislation that fundamentally reformed the state pension system (see Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO v. Regan , 71 N.Y.2d 653, 657, 529 N.Y.S.2d 461, 525 N.E.2d 1 [1988] ). Included in those changes was the rule that any public employee hired on or after July 1, 1976 would be enrolled in the newly-created tier 3 system (see id. ; see also Retirement and Social Security Law article 14 [containing Retirement and Social Security Law 500 – 520 and creating the tier 3 retirement system] ). We previously characterized that program as one "designed to ‘provid[e] uniform benefits for all public employees and eliminat[e] the costly special treatment of selected groups ... inherent in the previous program’ " ( Lynch v. City of New York , 23 N.Y.3d 757, 765, 992 N.Y.S.2d 726, 16 N.E.3d 1204 [2014], quoting Mem from Robert J. Morgado [Secretary to the Governor] to Judah Gribetz [Governor's Counsel], Bill Jacket, L 1976, ch 890).

An exception to that pension reform allowed all police officers and firefighters who subsequently entered or reentered a public retirement system to continue as tier 2 members (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 440[c] ; Lynch , 23 N.Y.3d at 766, 992 N.Y.S.2d 726, 16 N.E.3d 1204 ; see also Retirement and Social Security Law article 11 [containing Retirement and Social Security Law 440 – 451 and embodying the tier 2 retirement system]; L 1973, ch 382, § 47 [creating the tier 2 retirement system in 1973] ). That exception, maintained by regular two-year extender bills, eventually was terminated by veto of Governor Paterson in 2009 (see Lynch , 23 N.Y.3d at 767, 992 N.Y.S.2d 726, 16 N.E.3d 1204 ). Thereafter, as relevant here, all NYPD officers appointed between July 1, 2009 and March 31, 2012 were placed in tier 3 of the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF)¹ (see id. at 765, 992 N.Y.S.2d 726, 16 N.E.3d 1204 ); all officers appointed after April 1, 2012 were placed in revised but functionally similar tier 3 plans of the same pension fund (see Retirement and Social Security Law 501[26], [28] ).

At issue on this appeal is the policy of defendant City of New York that tier 3 officers are not eligible for certain benefits indisputably available to officers in tier 2 of the PPF retirement plan, including the "credit for service" mechanism that allows police officers to obtain credit for certain periods of absence without pay for childcare leave. Administrative Code § 13–218 contains two subdivisions (h). That mechanism is embodied in the second of the two subdivisions (h) of section 13–218, which was part of a series of pension initiatives intended to ensure that members who became parents and temporarily left service were not pressured to "rush back to the workplace without properly caring for their children" (Bill Jacket, L 1999, ch 646, at 9; see id. at 3, 8) and later were "not punished in their retirement for their willingness to play an active role in their child's growth" (id. at 9).² At its core, that subdivision provides that any PPF member absent without pay for childcare leave permitted under NYPD regulations shall be eligible for a limited amount of credit for that leave if certain filing and reimbursement requirements are met (see Administrative Code § 13–218[h] ).

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, among other things, judgment declaring that all police officers hired by the NYPD, including those hired on or after July 1, 2009, are eligible for the benefits afforded by the second subdivision (h) of section 13–218. That is, plaintiffs contended that, even in the absence of the extender bill vetoed by Governor Paterson, all members of the PPF—regardless of hire date—may purchase pension credit for time spent on unpaid childcare leave.

Defendants, by contrast, asserted that the relevant provisions of the Retirement and Social Security Law conflict with the Administrative Code and that the pension rights of tier 3 police officers are exclusively governed by article 14 of the Retirement and Social Security Law. Specifically, according to defendants, Retirement and Social Security Law 513(h) "addresses the issue of service credit for [childcare] leave," overrides any like provision of Administrative Code § 13–218, and "limits the eligibility for such credit to New York City correction officers hired before April 1, 2012."

Following motion practice, Supreme Court, in relevant part, awarded plaintiffs judgment declaring that the affected police officers are entitled to the childcare leave benefit ( 56 Misc.3d 433, 56 N.Y.S.3d 785 [Sup. Ct., New York County 2017] ). That court reasoned that Administrative Code § 13–218(h), on its face, renders any member of the PPF eligible for the childcare leave service credit benefit, and that the Retirement and Social Security Law does not conflict with or preempt that part of the Administrative Code (see 56 Misc.3d at 442–443, 56 N.Y.S.3d 785 ).

The Appellate Division reversed, denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting defendants' cross motion for accelerated relief ( 162 A.D.3d 589, 589, 80 N.Y.S.3d 249 [1st Dept. 2018] ). The Court reasoned that because the Retirement and Social Security Law expressly makes the childcare leave service credit benefit in question available to correction officers, but does not expressly confer the same benefit upon police officers, the legislature meant to nullify the part of the Administrative Code allowing the buyback to police members of the retirement system (see 162 A.D.3d at 591, 80 N.Y.S.3d 249, citing Retirement and Social Security Law 513[h] ).

We subsequently granted plaintiffs leave to appeal ( 32 N.Y.3d 915, 2019 WL 690996 [2019] ), and we now reverse the Appellate Division order and reinstate Supreme Court's judgment.

II.

Our review begins with reference to longstanding, basic rules of statutory interpretation. In such matters our "primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the [l]egislature" ( Samiento v. World Yacht Inc. , 10 N.Y.3d 70, 77, 854 N.Y.S.2d 83, 883 N.E.2d 990 [2008] ). "The starting point" in that exercise "is the language of the statute itself" ( Yatauro v. Mangano , 17 N.Y.3d 420, 426–427, 931 N.Y.S.2d 36, 955 N.E.2d 343 [2011] ). The rule of statutory interpretation relevant here is that the literal language of a statute controls "unless the plain intent and purpose of [the] statute would otherwise be defeated" ( Matter of Anonymous v. Molik , 32 N.Y.3d 30, 37, 84 N.Y.S.3d 414, 109 N.E.3d 563 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Administrative Code § 13–218 is entitled "Credit for service," and the second subdivision (h) of allows PPF members to obtain credit for certain periods of absence without pay for childcare leave. It provides, in relevant part, that

"any member who is absent without pay for child care le[a]ve of absence pursuant to regulations of the New York city police department shall be eligible for credit for such period of child care leave provided such member files a claim for such service credit with the pension fund by December [31, 2001], or within [90] days following termination of the child care leave, whichever is later, and contributes to the pension fund an amount which such member would have contributed during the period of such child care leave, together with interest thereon. Service credit provided pursuant to this subdivision shall not exceed one year of credit for each period of authorized child-care leave. In the event there is a conflict between the provisions of this subdivision and the provisions of any other law or code to the contrary, the provisions of this subdivision shall govern" (§ 13–218[h] [emphases supplied herein], added by L 2000, ch 594, at 12).

None of the pertinent parts of that statute is ambiguous. "Any member" can mean only what it says. The reference to "any member" is unbounded and unfixed to employees of a particular tier, and the absence of an exception applicable to tier 3 employees cannot reasonably be attributed to carelessness or mistake (cf. Administrative Code §§ 13–234[i][4]; 256.1[b] [expressly excluding tier 3 members of the PPF] ). Although there were no tier 3 police officers when this part of the Administrative Code was passed, that fact is irrelevant. Inasmuch as it does not distinguish between tiers of officers, and simply provides that "any member," regardless of retirement tier, is eligible for the childcare leave service credit benefit, the second subdivision of Administrative Code § 13–218(h) necessarily opens that benefit to tier 3 officers.

In view of that plain language conclusion, there is no need to consider the legislative history of Administrative Code § 13–218(h) (see Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Monaghan , 9 N.Y.2d 293, 304–305, 213 N.Y.S.2d 729,...