Maloney v. Singas

• Decision Date: 22 May 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 03 CV 786(PKC).
• Citation: 106 F.Supp.3d 300
• Parties: James M. MALONEY, Plaintiff, v. Madeline SINGAS, in her official capacity as Acting District Attorney of Nassau County, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

106 F.Supp.3d 300

James M. MALONEY, Plaintiff,

v.Madeline SINGAS, in her official capacity as Acting District Attorney of Nassau County, Defendant.

Case No. 03 CV 786(PKC).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed May 22, 2015.

James M. Maloney, Law Office of James M. Maloney, Port Washington, NY, for Plaintiff.

Liora M. Ben–Sorek, David Adam Tauster, Mineola, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & OPINION

PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge:

Since 1974, New York has banned the possession of chuka sticks, a martial arts weapon consisting of a rope or chain between two sticks. Under New York law, possession of chuka sticks constitutes a class A misdemeanor. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01 ("A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when: (1) He or she possesses any ... chuka stick...."); id. at § 265.00(14) (defining chuka stick).¹ Plaintiff James Maloney, an attorney and martial arts practitioner, filed this action in 2003, seeking a declaration that New York's ban on the possession of chuka sticks is unconstitutional. Though the Honorable Arthur D. Spatt dismissed Maloney's constitutional claims relating to the ban in 2007, and was affirmed on appeal in 2010, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case later that year for further consideration in light of its decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). See Maloney v. Rice, 561 U.S. 1040, 130 S.Ct. 3541, 177 L.Ed.2d 1119 (2010).

Upon remand, Maloney filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding a Section 1983 claim to his constitutional challenge to the chuka stick ban. The parties now cross-move for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies summary judgment to both parties on Maloney's Second Amendment claim (Count One), dismisses Maloney's claim based on the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count Two), and grants summary judgment to Singas, the Acting Nassau County District Attorney ("the District Attorney"), on Maloney's Section 1983 due process claim (Count Three).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the parties' submissions and prior proceedings in this case, which are not altered by the vacatur of Judge Spatt's 2007 decision dismissing Maloney's Second Amendment claim.²

A. Second Amendment Challenge to New York's Chuka Stick Ban

Maloney is a long-time practitioner of the martial arts.³ (Dkt. 136, Declaration of James M. Maloney ("Maloney Decl."), ¶ 6; see also Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 13–14). He asserts, and the District Attorney does not dispute, that chuka sticks are an integral part of his martial arts practice and his philosophy of home defense. (Maloney Decl., ¶ 6). In 2000, he was charged with a violation of New York Penal Law § 265.01 (" Section 265.01") for possessing chuka sticks in his home. (Dkt. 134, Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement ("Pl. 56.1"), ¶ 1).⁴ The charge against him was ultimately dismissed in 2003.⁵ (See also Second Am. Compl., ¶ 11).

Maloney filed this action shortly after the dismissal of the charge against him. Maloney initially challenged New York's prohibition against in-home possession of chuka sticks under the First, Second and Ninth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (See Dkt. 1, Complaint). In 2007, Judge Spatt granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, disposing of Maloney's constitutional challenges to the ban. Maloney, 470 F.Supp.2d 205.⁶ Of relevance to the cross-motions currently pending before this Court, the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of Maloney's Second Amendment challenge to the ban because, at the time, the Second Amendment applied only to limitations the federal government imposed on the right to bear arms. Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58–59 (2d Cir.2009).

Though the Supreme Court had recognized an individual right to bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court had not yet applied that right to the States at the time of Maloney's challenge. See id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) ).

Maloney petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. While Maloney's petition was pending, the Supreme Court heard and decided McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), which applied the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms to the States. The day after the decision issued in McDonald, the Supreme Court granted Maloney's petition, vacated the Second Circuit's 2009 decision, and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of McDonald. See Maloney, 561 U.S. 1040, 130 S.Ct. 3541. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Maloney's claims, and remanded Maloney's case to this Court for proceedings consistent with McDonald. Maloney v. Rice, 390 Fed.Appx. 29 (2d Cir.2010).

B. Addition of Section 1983 Claim

Maloney amended his complaint after the Second Circuit remanded his case back to this Court, adding a claim asserting a deprivation of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Three of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that, in a brief to the Second Circuit, the District Attorney unlawfully disclosed the fact that Maloney had been listed on the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register ("the Register"). (Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 54–61; Pl. 56.1, ¶ 4).⁷

The District Attorney does not dispute that the "disclosure" was made, but notes that her brief made such "disclosure" by citing to a 2007 decision by the Honorable Sandra L. Townes in a separate case filed by Maloney in this Court. (See Dkt. 138, Defendant's Rule 56.1 Counterstatement ("Def. 56.1") at ECF 2 ¶ 4; see also Dkt. 102–1 at ECF 11, Brief of District Attorney Rice, Maloney v. Cuomo, No. 07–5081–cv, 2007 WL 6424864 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2007) ). Maloney's own complaint in that case, Maloney v. County of Nassau, No. 03 CV 4178 (E.D.N.Y.), included a claim directly challenging his listing on the Register. See Maloney v. County of Nassau, 623 F.Supp.2d 277, 283 (E.D.N.Y.2007), order clarified on reconsideration, No. 03–CV–4178, 2009 WL 922064 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009).⁸

The District Attorney points out that Maloney's complaint in Maloney v. County of Nassau explicitly stated that he "was investigated by the State of New York Office of Children and Family Services for alleged maltreatment of his two infant sons" and that "said investigation was deemed ‘Indicated,’ which creates a permanent record ... indicating that Plaintiff has been investigated for possible child abuse." (Def. 56.1 at ECF 3 ¶ 1 (citing Verified Complaint at ¶¶ 32–33, Maloney v. County of Nassau, No. 03 CV 4178)). Judge Townes dismissed Maloney's due process challenge to his listing on the Register, finding that his claim was conclusorily pled. See Maloney, 623 F.Supp.2d at 299. Furthermore, Judge Townes noted that Maloney could not adequately plead a due process claim because he had a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available to him through an Article 78 proceeding in State court. Id. at 300. Upon reconsideration of the decision in 2009, Judge Townes noted that Maloney's claim based on his listing had become moot because he had received an administrative hearing before OCFS, which resulted in the amendment of the report against him, from "indicated" to "unfounded." See Maloney, 2009 WL 922064 at *1.⁹ Maloney does not dispute any of the facts regarding the proceedings in Maloney v. County of Nassau.

Upon the District Attorney's filing of the brief to the Second Circuit containing the information about Maloney's listing in the Register, Maloney sought to have the brief retracted, first by requesting that the District Attorney voluntarily retract it and then by filing a motion before the Second Circuit to strike the District Attorney's brief. (Pl. 56.1, ¶¶ 5–6; Def. 56.1 at ECF 4 ¶ 5). The Second Circuit denied Maloney's motion on November 19, 2008. (Def. 56.1 at ECF 4 ¶ 5).

C. Proceedings on Remand

On October 24, 2013, the Court held a pre-motion conference and granted leave to the parties to file cross-motions for summary judgment on Maloney's Second Amendment claim and Section 1983 claim. With respect to Count Two of the Second Amended Complaint, which asserts a challenge to the chuka stick ban under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court ruled that the vacatur of the prior judgment in this case did not disturb Judge Spatt's findings with respect to the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, and directed the parties not to reargue the dismissal of Count Two. (See Transcript, 10/24/2013 Hearing at 5). Indeed, McDonald does not bear on Maloney's ability to challenge the chuka stick ban under those provisions, and so Judge Spatt's prior determination on those points continues to govern.¹⁰ Thus, the Court formally dismisses Count Two of the Second Amended Complaint.¹¹

The Court now considers the parties' motions for summary judgment on Counts One (Second Amendment challenge to chuka stick ban) and Three (Section 1983 due process violation) of Maloney's Second Amended Complaint.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes concerning any material facts, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Harvis Trien & Beck, P.C. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P.), 153 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

"The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests on the party seeking summary judgment." McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.1997) ; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "In assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be...