Manko v. Gabay

• Decision Date: 07 August 2019
• Docket Number: 2014–10523,Index No. 22148/13,2015–11016
• Citation: 106 N.Y.S.3d 130,175 A.D.3d 484
• Parties: Nella MANKO, Appellant, v. David A. GABAY, etc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

175 A.D.3d 484

106 N.Y.S.3d 130

Nella MANKO, Appellant,

v.David A. GABAY, etc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

2014–10523

2015–11016

Index No. 22148/13

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—October 5, 2018

August 7, 2019

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Laura L. Jacobson, J.), dated July 9, 2014, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered October 30, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants David A. Gabay, Law Offices of David A. Gabay, Law Offices of David A. Gabay, P.C., and Gabay Law Group, P.C., which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an amended order of the same court dated October 8, 2014, granting that branch of the motion of those defendants which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants. The notice of appeal from the amended order is deemed to be a notice of appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5512[a] ).

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed, as the order was superseded by the amended order and, moreover, the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647 ); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

In four prior legal malpractice actions commenced by the plaintiff against, among others, the defendants David A. Gabay, Law Offices of David A. Gabay, Law Offices of David A. Gabay, P.C., and Gabay Law Group, P.C. (hereinafter collectively the Gabay defendants), in 2010 and 2011, the Supreme Court issued an order dated May 7, 2012, determining various motions and cross motions made by the Gabay defendants and the plaintiff in each of the four actions. Among other things, the court: (1) directed dismissal of all the complaints insofar as asserted against Law Offices of David A. Gabay, P.C., and Gabay Law Group, P.C., pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action because those entities were not in existence in 2007 when Gabay provided legal services to the plaintiff; (2) directed dismissal of the complaint filed under Index No. 25157/10 insofar as asserted against Gabay pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) for lack of personal jurisdiction based upon the plaintiff's failure to effect proper service of process upon him; (3) denied the plaintiff's motions for leave to enter a default judgment against the Gabay defendants in the actions commenced under Index Nos. 3521/11 and 8549/11; (4) directed dismissal of the complaints filed under Index Nos. 3521/11 and 8549/11 insofar as asserted against Gabay pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as time-barred, "with prejudice"; and (5) directed dismissal of the complaint filed under Index No. 23002/11, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as time-barred. Significantly, the court admonished the plaintiff that "if she commences another action in any court of the State of New York, without prior court approval, against [the Gabay defendants], she will be assessed costs and sanctions pursuant to CPLR 8303–a and 22 NYCRR 130–1.1."

The plaintiff subsequently commenced the instant action against, among others, the Gabay defendants, asserting causes of action against them, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The Gabay defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the Gabay defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, based upon the dismissal, on the merits, of the complaints insofar as asserted against them in the four prior actions. Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, "a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause of action" ( Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 347, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 712 N.E.2d 647 ). "[O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158 ).

This Court takes a "pragmatic approach" to determining what constitutes a single transaction or series of transactions for the purposes of res judicata ( Coliseum Towers Assoc. v. County of Nassau, 217 A.D.2d 387, 390, 637 N.Y.S.2d 972 ). Thus, events are part of the same transaction or series of transactions where their "foundational facts" are related in "time, space, origin, or motivation," where they "form a convenient trial unit," and where "treatment [of the foundational facts] as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations" ( id. at 390–391, 637 N.Y.S.2d 972 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is "a component of the broader doctrine of res judicata which holds that, as to the parties in a litigation and those in privity with them, a judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the issues of fact and questions of law necessarily decided therein in any subsequent action" ( Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 386 N.E.2d 1328 ). Collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of an issue where "the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the...