Manko v. Lenox Hill Hospital

• Decision Date: 02 July 2021
• Docket Number: 20-CV-9928 (LTS)
• Parties: NELLA MANKO, Plaintiff, v. LENOX HILL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

NELLA MANKO, Plaintiff, v. LENOX HILL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

No. 20-CV-9928 (LTS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 2, 2021

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants have violated her rights. Plaintiff paid the filing fees to bring this action.^[1] The Court dismisses the action for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), that it fails to state a claim, Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).

The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has filed numerous personal injury, medical malpractice, and other tort and common law claims in the New York State courts, including claims against many of the defendants named in this action. See, e.g., Manko v. Broome, 175 A.D.3d 482 (2d Dep't Aug. 7, 2019) (affirming Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's motion to vacate an order in her legal malpractice action because she filed it in violation of Supreme Court's order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing further motions in the action without leave of court); Manko v. Gabay, 175 A.D.3d 484 (2d Dep't Aug. 7, 2019) (noting that Plaintiff had filed four legal malpractice actions against, among others, Gabay and his law firm, and affirming dismissal of various claims brought by Plaintiff on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel); Manko v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 118 A.D.3d 678 (2d Dep't June 4, 2014) (affirming Supreme Court's determination that Plaintiff's attempt to assert same causes of action was barred by res judicata); Manko v. Mannor, 68 A.D.3d 497 (1st Dep't Dec. 10, 2009) (affirming Supreme Court's finding that Plaintiff's claims were untimely and that she failed to state a claim against Strauss, and that her claims against Mannor, Lubin, and Tikotsky were barred by res judicata).^[2]

Plaintiff has also filed numerous federal actions against many of the same defendants in this Court and in the Eastern District of New York. See, e.g., Manko v. Schlesinger, ECF 1:12-CV-9059, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2013) (discussing Plaintiff's litigation history, dismissing her claims for the same reasons as stated in No. 11-CV-7725, and ordering to show cause why she should not be barred under § 1651); Manko v. Abdus-Salaam, ECF 1:11-CV-7725, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (dismissing Plaintiff's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, judicial immunity, and lack of state action, among other reasons, and warning Plaintiff); Manko v. Finkelstein, No. 11-CV-5054 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011) (denying IFP status, directing payment of fee, warning that case will be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman, judicial and sovereign immunity); Manko v. Steinhardt, No. 11-CV-5430 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 28, 2011) (denying IFP status and directing payment of fee).

As a result of Plaintiff's pattern of frivolous and abusive litigation, both the Eastern District and this Court have barred Plaintiff from filing new IFP actions without prior permission from the court. See Manko v. Schlesinger, ECF 1:12-CV-9059, 11 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2013); Manko v. Ruchelsman, No. 12-CV-4100 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012). Because Plaintiff paid the filing fees to bring this action, the bar order does not apply.

In the 390-page complaint, Plaintiff asks the Court “to reverse all Court of Appeals orders and all Appellate Divisions orders related to all plaintiff's Supreme Court cases (including (but not limiting) cases: Kings Co. Index No. 30972/2004, New York Co. index Nos, : 113306/2006, 109296/2007), including (but not limiting) orders: Court of Appeals order, dated November 20, 2017, Mo. No. 2017-746; Court of Appeals order, dated November 20, 2017, Mo. No. 2017-847).” (ECF 1, at 1-2.) Plaintiff seeks reversal of these state-court decisions based on: “(1) excusable default; (2) newly-discovered evidence has arisen; (3) the presence of fraud; or (4) because orders are ‘arbitrary and capricious' and not supported by ‘substantial evidence.'” (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff sues 39 defendants, including the New York State Unified Court System, the New York State Court of Appeals, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First and Second Departments, the City of New York, and numerous private defendants, many of whom are doctors, lawyers, or law firms.

DISCUSSION

As in her previous actions that have been dismissed by this Court and other courts, Plaintiff asserts claims in this action that arise from her state court litigation. She sues private parties and defendants that are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and she asks this Court to reverse the decisions of the state courts.

A. Rooker-Feldman doctrine

As courts have repeatedly advised Plaintiff, her claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine - created by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) - precludes federal district courts from reviewing final judgments of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state-court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiff filed this action after she lost in state court, complains of injuries caused by state-court judgments, and expressly asks the Court to “reverse” the state court judgments. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

B. Claims against private parties

A claim for relief under section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Absent special circumstances suggesting concerted action between an attorney and a state representative, see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), the representation of a defendant by private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference necessary to establish a claim under section 1983, regardless of whether that attorney is privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. See Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that legal aid organization ordinarily is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against the private parties - including the many doctors, lawyers, and law firms - that she sues.

C. Eleventh Amendment immunity

Plaintiff's...