Parker v. Blauvelt Fire Co.

• Citation: 712 N.E.2d 647,93 N.Y.2d 343,690 N.Y.S.2d 478
• Parties: KIMBALL PARKER, Appellant, v. BLAUVELT VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 29 April 1999
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

93 N.Y.2d 343

712 N.E.2d 647

690 N.Y.S.2d 478

KIMBALL PARKER, Appellant, v. BLAUVELT VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued March 25, 1999.

Decided April 29, 1999.

James M. Rose, White Plains, for appellant.

Ann K. Kandel, Nesconset, for respondents.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges BELLACOSA, SMITH, CIPARICK, WESLEY and ROSENBLATT concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LEVINE, J.

Plaintiff appeals from an Appellate Division order dismissing this 42 USC § 1983 civil rights action on the grounds that it was barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. His claims arise out of his dismissal as a firefighter following disciplinary action taken against him by defendant Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Company, Inc. The disciplinary action was based upon a confrontation with a superior officer during which he cursed at and physically threatened the officer, and his subsequent defiance of orders by the Chief of defendant Blauvelt Fire Department to refrain from responding to alarms on Fire Department apparatus. The Fire Company brought written disciplinary charges against plaintiff for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a member of the Blauvelt Fire Department in violation of standards of good conduct and the by-laws of the Fire Company (see, General Municipal Law § 209-l). A hearing officer found plaintiff guilty of the charges but recommended that he not be expelled from the Fire Company. Nevertheless, based upon the findings of the hearing officer, the Town Board of the Town of Orangetown passed a resolution dismissing him.

Plaintiff first challenged the Board's determination in a CPLR article 78 proceeding in which he joined as respondents all of the defendants in the instant action. The petition alleged that the Board's determination should be annulled because it was not supported by substantial evidence and violated plaintiff's statutory and constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleged that defendants violated his due process rights in that they suspended him without a hearing to determine probable cause, brought charges that were impermissibly vague, failed to give proper notice of the charges and enforced rules in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The petition further averred that plaintiff was deprived of due process because the Board in discharging him considered matters beyond those considered by the hearing officer, considered ex parte communications, made no findings of fact and unduly delayed its final decision. Also, defendants allegedly violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by punishing him for the way he expressed himself in front of his superior officer. In addition to seeking a vacatur of the dismissal and reinstatement as a member of the Fire Company, the article 78 petition set forth several causes of action in which plaintiff sought damages under 42 USC § 1983, based upon the same allegations of violations of his constitutional rights.

In the CPLR article 78 proceeding, Supreme Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the 42 USC § 1983 causes of action for damages "without prejudice to [plaintiff's] commencement of the appropriate plenary action." Supreme Court severed and dismissed those claims for damages because they were not incidental to the primary relief sought of reinstatement as a firefighter (see, CPLR 7806). Since the remaining claims in the petition raised a substantial evidence issue, Supreme Court transferred the petition to the Appellate Division (see, CPLR 7804 [g]). The Appellate Division confirmed the Board's determination (Matter of Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 222 AD2d 437, lv denied 87 NY2d 812).

Plaintiff commenced the instant plenary action under 42 USC § 1983 in order to litigate the civil rights claims for damages that were severed from the prior proceeding. Supreme Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff's "action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel" (251 AD2d 389). We now affirm, but solely because all of the issues raised in the complaint are precluded by collateral estoppel.

Contrary to the view of the Appellate Division, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar plaintiff from bringing this action. Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause of action (Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24, 27; see also, Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [Cardozo, Ch. J.]). As a general rule, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" (O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357; Matter of Reilly v Reid, supra, at 30). Thus, where a plaintiff in a later action brings a claim for damages that could have been presented in a prior CPLR article 78 proceeding against the same party, based upon the same harm and arising out of the same or related facts, the claim is barred by res judicata (Pauk v Board of Trustees, 111 AD2d 17, 20-21,aff'd68 NY2d 702).

The plaintiff in Pauk, for example, in his prior unsuccessful CPLR article 78 proceeding, had sought rescission of a letter terminating his employment as a college professor, restoration to that position and a declaration that he had achieved tenure status (id., at 20). The Appellate Division held that the relief sought in the second, plenary action, of an adjudication renewing his employment contract and declaring that as a result of the renewal he became tenured, was "essentially the same as that sought in the article 78 proceeding * * * and * * * the claims ar[o]se out of the same or related facts" (id., at 20). Hence, claim preclusion applied to the plenary action (id.). In Pauk, both this Court and the Appellate Division held that it was immaterial for purposes of the application of res judicata that in the second action plaintiff sought monetary relief by way of restitution of lost salary and financial fringe benefits, since under CPLR 7806 they could have been claimed and awarded in the first proceeding as "incidental to the primary relief sought" (Pauk v Board of Trustees, supra, 68 NY2d, at 704).

In the instant case, by contrast, plaintiff's 42 USC § 1983 civil rights claims do not seek the restoration of any economic benefits derivable from his status as a member of the Blauvelt Fire Department (cf., Pauk v Board of Trustees, supra, 111 AD2d, at 20). Rather, his prayer for relief seeks one million dollars in damages plus attorneys' fees for embarrassment, loss of reputation and mental anguish. It is noteworthy that while in Pauk, restoration of lost salary could have been sought and awarded as incidental relief in the plaintiff's prior article 78 proceeding, the Court contrasted that claim with a cause of action for damages under 42 USC § 1983 (Pauk v Board of Trustees, supra, 68 NY2d, at 705 [citing Davidson v Capuano, 792 F2d 275]). Thus, we have impliedly indicated our agreement with the Second Circuit's holding in Davidson v Capuano. In Davidson, the court held that a section 1983 damage claim could not have been joined as part of an article 78 proceeding because it was not "incidental to the primary relief sought" (CPLR 7806); therefore, although arising out of the same operative facts as the prior proceeding, the subsequent section 1983 action was not barred by res judicata (Davidson v Capuano, supra).

So too here. In plaintiff's prior article 78 proceeding, Supreme Court correctly dismissed his section 1983 civil rights damage claims as not incidental to the primary relief of reinstatement he sought. Therefore, the termination of the prior article 78 proceeding on the merits was not res judicata as to the section 1983 damage claims. Our holding in this regard is also consistent with the position of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments that res judicata is inapplicable where the plaintiff "was unable to * * * seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain * * * multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action, and the plaintiff desires in the second action * * * to seek that remedy or form of relief" (Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 26 [1] [c]; see also, Burgos v Hopkins, 14 F3d 787, 790 [2d Cir]; Antonsen v Ward, ...