Martin v. Harrah Independent School Dist.

Citation543 P.2d 1370,1975 OK 154
Decision Date04 November 1975
Docket NumberNo. 47689,47689
PartiesMary Jane MARTIN, Appellee, v. HARRAH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Stephen V. Swanson, Courbois, Swanson & Musser, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Ronald L. Day, Larry L. French, Oklahoma City, for appellants.

HODGES, Vice Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the Harrah Independent School District Board of Education and its superintendent from the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus which ordered the reinstatement of appellee, Mary Jane Martin (teacher) as a tenured teacher and to renew her contract for continuing appointment for the 1974--1975 school year.

The teacher's contract specifically required she obey and follow the rules and regulations of the Harrah Board of Education. After several discussions with various board members in 1972, she was given notice in September, 1973, that her failure to comply with the continuing education rule which required teachers with a bachelors degree to earn five semester hours every three years would result in non-renewal of her teaching contract if she did not comply. Thereafter teacher was contacted numerous times during the course of the school year in an effort to obtain her compliance or to determine a reasonable alternative. She appeared at many board meetings and at all times wilfully and without hesitancy declined to follow the rule of the board of education, and at no time offered any alternative solution. On April 10, 1974, she was provided notice of non-renewal. The cause was given as wilful neglect of duty for consistent and wilful failure to comply with the rules and regulations of the board of education.

A hearing before the Harrah Board of Education was held in accordance with 70 O.S.1971 § 6--122. The earlier decision of the board was sustained.

The teacher filed an administrative appeal to the Professional Practices Commission. Concurrently, she filed a Petition in the District Court of Oklahoma County asking for reinstatement and damages. After a hearing, the Professional Practices Commission rendered its decision reaffirming the decision of the local board of education. The teacher did not request a full hearing of the matter before the State Board of Education as provided by 70 O.S.1971 § 6--122, nor did she seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act, 75 O.S.1971 § 318(1)(2). The trial court subsequently entered its order reinstating the teacher and issued a Writ of Mandamus.

It is urged on appeal that the teacher had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and, therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction. We agree.

As a general rule, administrative remedies should be resorted to before recourse is made to the courts. Remedies provided by statute should be pursued before other remedies are sought.

It has long been established in Oklahoma that exhaustion of statutory administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite for resort to the courts. Sanders v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 200 Okl. 366, 195 P.2d 272 (1948); Speaker v. Board of County Com'rs of Oklahoma County, Okl., 312 P.2d 438 (1957). It is only where administrative remedies are not adequate that the courts may take jurisdiction prior to actual exhaustion of administrative remedies, and then a strong showing is required as to the alleged inadequacy of a prescribed administrative remedy. National Indian Youth Council v. Morton, 363 F.Supp. 475 (W.D.Okla.1973). See also 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 173 p. 515.

The rule which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, before one is entitled to relief for supposed or threatened injury, is a well settled rule of judicial administration to aid in the orderly administration of justice and to prevent transfer to the courts of duties imposed by law on administrative agencies. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corporation, 327 U.S. 540, 543, 66 S.Ct. 712, 90 L.Ed. 839, 842 (1946).

The administrative procedure for notice, hearing, and appeal by a tenured teacher is outlined in 70 O.S.1973 Supp. § 6--122:

'The failure to renew a contract by the board of education of any teacher who has completed three (3) years shall not be effective, and such contract shall be renewed unless there is served on such teacher a written statement by such board containing a statement of causes for such action, which must include one of the following: immorality, wilful neglect of duty, cruelty, incompetency, teaching disloyalty to the American Constitutional system of government, or any reason involving moral turpitude. Such teacher shall be afforded an opportunity to appear before such board and confront his or her accusers, having the right to cross-examine and offer any evidence to refute the statements and a reconsideration of the action theretofore made by the board.

'Said notice of nonrenewal and the statement of causes shall be mailed to the teacher prior to the 10th day of April notifying said teacher of the non-renewal and a statement of causes. Said cause shall be set within twenty (20) days after receipt of said notice for a hearing before the board of education.

'Before final decision of the matter the teacher shall be allowed to appeal the action of the board to the Professional Practices Commission. Such commission shall allow the teacher to be heard and after reviewing the facts shall report its recommendation to the State Board of Education. Upon the receipt of the recommendation of the Professional Practices Commission, the State Board of Education, if requested by the teacher, shall fix a date, hour and place for hearing of the matter within ten (10) days and notify the teacher of such time and place. At such hearing both the teacher and the local board of education shall be advised of the action of the Professional Practices Commission and shall be allowed to be heard. Such hearing may be held in executive session if agreed on by all parties concerned.

'After review of the matter the State Board of Education shall issue its decision either confirming the action of the local board of education or issuing the finding that dismissal of said teacher was without sufficient cause and that said teacher was without fault in the premises, which decision shall be final. A finding that a teacher was dismissed without sufficient cause shall automatically extend for one year the contract of the teacher involved, during which period of time the board of education and the teacher shall negotiate in an effort to resolve their differences prior to April 10 of the succeeding year.'

The State Board of Education's decision is the final administrative determination of the matter. It is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. Adams v. Professional Practices Commission, 524 P.2d 932, 933 (Okl.1974). The pertinent statute, 75 O.S.1971 § 318(1), (2) provides:

'(1) Any person or party aggrieved or adversely affected by a final order in an individual proceeding, whether such order is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to certain, speedy, adequate and complete judicial review thereof under this Act, but nothing in this Section shall prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief or trial de novo, available because of constitutional provisions. Neither a motion for new trial nor an application for rehearing shall be prerequisite to secure judicial review.

'(2) The judicial review prescribed by this Section, as to orders rendered in individual proceedings by agencies whose orders are made subject to review, under constitutional or statutory provisions, by appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, shall be afforded by such proceedings taken in accordance with the procedure and under the conditions otherwise provided by law, but subject to the applicable provisions of Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of this Act, and the rules of the Supreme Court. In all other instances, proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition, in the district or superior court of the county in which the agency or institution is located in which the property interest affected is situated or the in district court of the county in which the agency or institution is located, within thirty (30) days after the appellant is notified of the order as provided in Section 12 hereof. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all other parties of record, and proof of such service shall be filed in the court within ten (10) days after the filing of the petition. The court, in its discretion, may permit other interested persons to intervene.'

The United States Supreme Court in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) set forth several reasons for the rule of exhaustion of aministrative remedies before resort to the courts: Agency decisions frequently require expertise or are discretionary in nature. The agency should be given the first opportunity to either exercise discretion or apply expertise. It is generally more efficient to permit the administrative process to move forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages (the same reasons are the foundation of judicial rules which restrict interlocutory appeals). At page 194, 89 S.Ct. at page 1663 of the opinion the court stated:

'* * * In addition, other justifications for requiring exhaustion in cases of this sort have nothing to do with the dangers of interruption of the administrative process. Certain very practical notions of judicial efficiency come into play as well. A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. And notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct...

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