Masters v. Duval County

• Decision Date: 07 March 1934
• Citation: 154 So. 172,114 Fla. 205
• Parties: MASTERS et al. v. DUVAL COUNTY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

154 So. 172

114 Fla. 205

MASTERS et al. v. DUVAL COUNTY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

March 7, 1934

Suit by Wilbur W. Masters and A. W. Williams against Duval County Florida, and others. From an order denying temporary injunctions and dismissing complainants' bill of complaint, complainants appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; A. V Long, Judge.

COUNSEL

P. H Odom, of Jacksonville, and MacWilliams & Upchurch, of St. Augustine, for appellants.

Julian E. Fant, P. L. Gaskins, and Robert R. Milam, all of Jacksonville, for appellees.

OPINION

WHITFIELD Justice.

This appeal is from an order denying temporary injunctions and dismissing the bill of complaint, upon allegations held insufficient to support prayers (1) to enjoin the holding of an election under chapter 16402, Sp. Acts 1933, and (2) to enjoin the collection and use of tolls for passage over the St. Johns River Bridge in the city of Jacksonville, except tolls that may be required for the operation, maintenance, and repair of the bridge and for paying the balance due for construction of the bridge, which was erected by the county as a toll bridge under chapter 7462, Sp. Acts 1917, and chapter 8672, Sp. Acts 1921.

Chapter 7462, Sp. Acts 1917, authorized the county commissioners, upon approval of a majority of the qualified voters of the county, to issue bonds and to construct with the proceeds thereof a tollbridge over the St. Johns river and the proper approaches thereto, the tolls collected to be used: (1) In the operation, maintenance, and repair of said bridge and the approaches thereto; (2) in the payment of the interest on said bonds; (3) in providing a sinking fund for said bonds. State ex rel. Young et al. v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692. Chapter 7462 does not prevent further enactments regulating tolls for passage over the bridge or for the collection and disposition of tolls after the construction of the bridge is paid for by paying the construction bonds.

Chapter 8672, Sp. Acts 1921, authorized Duval county to issue additional bonds to complete the construction of the bridge. It appears that the bridge construction bonds have been paid except a relatively small part thereof and that, though large sums have by statutory authority been used in retiring other bonds of the county, there is still more than enough in the sinking fund to pay the remaining outstanding bridge construction bonds. See chapter 15188, Sp. Acts 1931; State ex rel. v. Duval County, 105 Fla. 174, 141 So. 173; In re Tolls on St. Johns River Bridge, 108 Fla. 172, 146 So. 99.

It is alleged that under chapters 7462 and 8672, Laws of Florida, $1,200,000 of bridge construction bonds were issued; and that from toll receipts since the bridge was first used, July 1, 1921, all such bonds except $90,000 have been paid, $318,000 have been paid to the State Board of Administration to provide a sinking fund for county bonds, $333,000 have been used to purchase other county bonds pursuant to chapter 16400, and $155,250 with the January, 1934, tolls amounting to $25,000, are available to retire the $90,000 of the outstanding bridge construction bonds.

Chapter 16400 provides for a continuation of the collection of tolls on the St. Johns River Bridge, such tolls to be used: (1) For the operation, maintenance and repair of the bridge; (2) for paying the balance of the outstanding bonds issued for the construction of the bridge; (3) for the purchase, cancellation, and retirement of any bonds of the county of Duval.

Chapter 16402 in terms extends the franchise of the Florida Ferry Company, a Florida corporation, to include authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll bridge and approaches thereto, across the St. Johns river at Jacksonville, Fla., at or near the foot of Main street said to be within one-half mile of the St. Johns River Bridge. The statute confers the franchises and privileges stated therein upon the Florida Ferry Company subject to an approving election by the freeholder qualified electors of Duval county.

The assignments of error are: (1) Refusing temporary injunction; (2) dismissing the bill of complaint; (3) holding that chapter 16400 does not violate the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution; (4) holding that chapter 16402 does not violate the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

Questions to be determined are whether chapter 16400 violates organic or other dominant law in authorizing Duval county to continue the collection of tolls for passage over the St. Johns River Bridge, except to pay for operating, maintenance, and repair of the bridge, after payment of all the bridge construction bonds have been provided for by toll collections, and whether such tolls may legally be used to retire other outstanding bonds of the county.

It is in effect argued that the bridge tolls collected under the statute, after the bridge is paid for by tolls, are taxes, and as such are not authorized by the state Constitution; and that a county cannot operate a tollbridge as a public utility, at least after the bridge has been paid for by tolls collected for passage over the bridge.

Tolls collected by statutory authority for passage on foot or in vehicles over a bridge constructed to afford a passageway over a river are not taxes within the meaning of article 9 of the Florida Constitution. Bridge tolls are collected from every one who uses the bridge as a passageway whether a resident or a nonresident of the taxing unit, state, county, or municipality, wherein the bridge is located, while taxes may be levied upon residents or upon property having its situs in the taxing unit, state, county or municipality. The Constitution recognizes the distinction between a 'tax, assessment, or toll.' Section 11, art. 5. Tolls are not taxes. See Day v. City of St. Augustine, 104 Fla. 261, 139 So. 880; Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 8 S.Ct. 113, 31 L.Ed. 149; Ruler v. York County et al., 290 Pa. 427, 139 A. 136. Tolls in this case are collected for passage over a bridge, which is a special facility furnished by the county under statutory authority. Counties are subdivisions of the state and they may exercise such powers and privileges as may be prescribed by statutes which are not in conflict with organic law. See sections 1 and 2, article 8, and section 24, article 3, Constitution.

The power of the Legislature to authorize the collection of tolls is expressly recognized by the provision of the Constitution which gives to the circuit courts exclusive original jurisdiction of cases 'involving the legality of any tax, assessment, or toll.' Section 11, article 5.

There is no express or implied provision of organic law which forbids a statute to authorize a county to construct, maintain, and operate a tollbridge and to collect reasonable, nondiscriminatory tolls for passage over a bridge, State ex rel. Young et al. v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692; and to use the tolls collected for any duly authorized county purpose, even though tolls already collected be sufficient to pay for the construction of the bridge, State ex rel. Landis et al. v. Duval County Fla., 105 Fla. 174, 141 So. 173; In re Tolls on St. Johns River Bridge, 108 Fla. 172, 146 So. 99. In providing for public highways, statutes may authorize tollbridges to be constructed and maintained as a part of a highway system and may determine whether bridges shall be free or toll and when tollbridges shall become free bridges, there being no organic regulation of the subject. Day v. City of St. Augustine, 104 Fla. 261, 139 So. 880. The matter is one of statutory policy, not of legislative power, when the subject regulated is not controlled by organic law. If the toll bridge franchise granted to the county by chapter 7462 has expired, it has been renewed by chapter 16400.

If, as seems to be conceded, a statute may authorize a county to erect a bridge over a navigable river and to charge tolls for its use until it is paid for, there is nothing in the Constitution which forbids a statute authorizing the collection of tolls for passage over the bridge after it is paid for, and the use of the proceeds for county purposes. State ex rel. Landis et al. v. Duval County, Fla., 105 Fla. 174, 141 So. 173. The bridge being the property of the county, it may be used for county purposes authorized by statute and such use does not convert the tolls into taxes. The Constitution does not forbid to the counties other sources of revenue than taxation.

'Tolls collected from operation of toll bridge on highways are not 'taxes,' though tolls collected may be used in relief of taxation.' Ruler v. York County, 290 Pa. 427, 139 A. 136, 137.

Whether the St. Johns River Bridge is a free or a toll bridge is determined by the statutes which expressly make it a tollbridge.

The evolution by continued use and gradual improvment from an Indian trail or a cow path to a public highway, or the construction of a highway for common use, and the rights of the general public as to passage over such highways, have relation in general to roads requiring no special facilities differing from the requirements of a roadway on the ground and may not include special facilities such as a bridge over a navigable river to connect with highways on each side of the river constructed by authority of law at great public or private expense, for the use of which bridge as a passageway statutory authority is given to collect a reasonable and uniform toll. Passage over the roads as constructed on the ground, and over the river by means other than a legal tollbridge, may be free to all the public, while the duly authorized tollbridge, a special facility, may be...