Mayo v. People

• Decision Date: 06 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06CA2375.,06CA2375.
• Citation: 181 P.3d 1207
• Parties: Steven MAYO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

181 P.3d 1207

Steven MAYO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 06CA2375.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

March 6, 2008.

John S. Tatum, P.C., John S. Tatum, Aurora, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Donald Quick, District Attorney, Michael J. Milne, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee.

Opinion by Judge MÁRQUEZ.

Petitioner, Steven Mayo, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition to discontinue sex offender registration and Internet posting and to enter a declaratory judgment that he is not required to register as a sex offender under Colorado law. We affirm.

Mayo was indicted in Illinois for an offense which if committed in Colorado would be a crime of sexual assault on a child. After stipulating to the state's evidence, he was remanded to the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) under a civil commitment procedure. He was later discharged, and the indictment was quashed, but he was required to register under the Illinois sex offender registration statute. He then moved to Colorado. The question here is whether he must register as a sex offender in Colorado. We conclude that he must register.

I. Background

In 1988, Mayo was indicted in Illinois for aggravated criminal sexual assault on a person alleged to be under the age of thirteen years. According to an order from the Illinois court dated March 13, 1989, a hearing was held on the state's petition to have Mayo declared a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/0.01 to 205/12 (2007) (formerly Ill.Rev. Stat.1991, ch. 38, ¶¶ 105 to 105-12; transferred from Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, ¶¶ 820.01 to 825e). The order states that Mayo waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the reports of two psychiatrists and the state's evidence.

Following the stipulated evidence, the Illinois trial court found that Mayo (1) had a mental disorder that had existed for a period of not less than one year, (2) had criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and (3) demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children. The court did not specify what act demonstrated Mayo's propensity, and the record contains no transcript of the hearing. The court ordered Mayo remanded to the custody of the Illinois DOC, appointed the Director of Corrections (Director) as Mayo's guardian pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/8 (2007), and dismissed the indictment on the state's motion.

According to an August 1995 Illinois court order, Mayo filed an application for recovery, and a hearing was held. The court found that Mayo no longer appeared to be dangerous but it could not determine that he had fully recovered. Mayo was permitted to go at large subject to certain conditions and supervision by the Director.

In 2001, Mayo filed a petition for termination of release conditions pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/9 (2007). Following a hearing in 2002 and as case law at the time required, see People v. Trainor, 196 Ill.2d 318, 256 Ill.Dec. 813, 752 N.E.2d 1055, 1065 (2001), the court found that the state had not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mayo was still a sexually dangerous person. (As amended, the statute, 725 Ill.Comp.Stat. 205/9(a), (b), (e) (2007), now requires the state to show this by clear and convincing evidence.) The court ordered Mayo unconditionally discharged, quashed the original indictment, and sealed the report pursuant to section 205/9. It is undisputed that Mayo is still required to register for life under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 Ill.Comp.Stat. 150/7 (2007) (formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, ¶ 227).

Mayo relocated to Colorado in approximately May 2002, has continued to register in Colorado with the proper municipalities pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, §§ 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2007, and has complied with other notice provisions of the Illinois registration act.

In February 2006, pursuant to section 16-22-113(2)(a), C.R.S.2007, Mayo informed the following agencies by certified mail of his intent to file a petition to discontinue the sex offender registration and Internet posting required in Colorado: Office of the District Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District, Colorado; Northglenn Police Department, Colorado; Peoria County State's Attorney, Illinois; and the Illinois State Police. Two weeks later, Mayo filed his petition to discontinue sex offender registration and Internet posting or for declaratory judgment in the Adams County District Court in Colorado. Only the district attorney filed a trial brief and appeared at the hearing.

Mayo contended that he was entitled either to an order discontinuing any sex offender registration requirement in Colorado pursuant to section 16-22-113, C.R.S.2007, and Internet posting pursuant to section 16-22-111, C.R.S.2007, or to a declaratory judgment decreeing that he was not subject to sex offender registration under the laws of Colorado and thus Internet posting would not be applicable. He argued that (1) he had not been convicted of an unlawful sexual offense in Colorado as defined in section 16-22-103, C.R.S.2007, or in Illinois; (2) Colorado does not have statutory provisions for a civil commitment and does not impose any sex offender registration requirements upon residents as a result of civil commitment; and (3) the only lifetime reporting requirements mandated by Colorado are for sexually violent predators "convicted" as adults of certain sexual offenses, see § 16-22-108(1)(d)(I), C.R.S.2007, and this provision does not apply to him.

Alternatively, Mayo argued that if the trial court disagreed with his interpretation of Colorado law, his civil commitment could only be analogous to a deferred judgment and sentence that had been dismissed, and that he would still be eligible for an order to discontinue registration. In support, he argued that (1) his Illinois case was dismissed in 2002 when he was unconditionally discharged; (2) he had not subsequently been convicted of any unlawful sexual offense; (3) the Illinois court determined he was not a dangerous person as of August 1995 and discharged him from his custodial commitment; (4) he has received thousands of hours of therapy, has received determinations of his rehabilitation, and has cooperated with all pertinent agencies; and (5) he is not a danger or threat to the public.

In a verbal order, the Colorado trial court determined that the Illinois civil commitment was the functional equivalent of a deferred judgment, compared the two states' statutes, and found that a person civilly committed in Illinois would have the responsibility to register in Colorado. At the request of his counsel, the court gave Mayo sixty days to file a supplemental petition and request a hearing for removal from the sex offender registration requirement as provided by Colorado statute.

Three months later, the trial court entered a written order finding, among other things, that Mayo (1) had been indicted for an offense in Illinois substantially similar to the offense of sexual assault on a child under the Colorado criminal code, (2) was civilly committed pursuant to the SDPA, (3) was unconditionally released from civil commitment under the SDPA, and (4) relocated to Colorado where he has registered as a sex offender for all times relevant to the proceeding. The court also found that the mere fact that the Illinois statute places a civil label on its proceedings is not dispositive and that the Colorado registration statute "refers to various circumstances where persons must register as sex offenders that may not traditionally be considered `conviction,' such as ... a deferred judgment and sentence." It found that his commitment and subsequent unconditional release were "the functional equivalent of a deferred judgment and sentence under Colorado law" and that Mayo must register pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act. The court denied with prejudice Mayo's claim to discontinue sex offender registration and for declaratory judgment, and, because Mayo failed to file his supplemental petition, denied without prejudice his alternative request to discontinue sex offender registration on the ground that he was rehabilitated. Mayo appeals this order.

II. Registration Requirements

Mayo contends that the court erred in denying his petition to discontinue sex offender registration and Internet posting in violation of the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

The question of statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Harrison, 165 P.3d 859, 859 (Colo. App.2007). Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly by looking first at the language of the statute. Arnold v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 978 P.2d 149, 151 (Colo.App. 1999). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretive rules and statutory construction. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo. 1992). Courts should give effect to all parts of the statute and avoid constructions that would render a part of the statute meaningless. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo.1990). Courts must not follow a construction that would lead to an absurd result. Town of Erie v. Eason, 18 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo.2001).

B. Civil Commitment and Registration in Illinois

Before the Colorado trial court, Mayo's counsel noted that there are some differences in the current SDPA and the version in 1989 when Mayo was adjudicated, but they did not appear materially different. In his brief on appeal, Mayo notes that the registration provision of the Illinois statute was changed in or about 1997, but does not contend that the earlier version applies to him. Therefore, we refer...