Mayor v. Harris, A16A0945
Decision Date | 15 November 2016 |
Docket Number | A16A0945 |
Parties | The MAYOR and Aldermen of the City of Garden City v. HARRIS et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Patrick T. O'Connor, David Bobo Mullens III, Savannah, for Appellant.
Christopher Dorian Britt, Jeremy Springer McKenzie, Savannah, for Appellee.
Willie and Kristy Harris, individually and on behalf of their minor daughter, Riley Harris, sued The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Garden City, Georgia (the "City") seeking to recover damages arising from injuries Riley suffered when, while attending a youth football game at a stadium owned and operated by the City, she fell through the bleachers. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that it was immune from liability under the Recreational Property Act, OCGA § 51–3–20 et seq. (the "RPA"), because the stadium was available to the public for recreational purposes. The trial court denied the City's motion, finding that, because the stadium was not open to the general public at no charge, the RPA did not protect the City from liability. This Court granted the City's application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the trial court and affirm.
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we construe the evidence most favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and possible inferences. The party opposing summary judgment is not required to produce evidence demanding judgment for it, but is only required to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Our review of the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C. , 298 Ga. 75, 82 (3), 779 S.E.2d 334 (2015).
So viewed, the record shows that on November 10, 2012, the Harris family, including Willie and Kristy Harris and their daughter, Riley, attended a youth football game at the Garden City Stadium, a facility owned and maintained by the City. The only entrance to the stadium, which was surrounded by a gate on which was placed a "no trespassing sign," was through a gate adjacent to the ticket booth. Spectators over the age of six were charged an admission fee in the amount of $2 for an adult and $1 for a student. The Harrises paid the fee for themselves and one of their older children. As Riley and her sister were then six years old, they were admitted without charge.
During the game, Riley and her siblings left their seats on the upper section of the stadium's bleachers to visit the concession stand. Riley bought a pickle and walked back toward her seat. As she was walking across the bleachers, she slipped and fell between the bench seats and to ground below, suffering injury.
The Harrises, individually and on behalf of Riley, filed this personal injury action against the City asserting claims for premises liability, negligence, and negligence per se. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that, among other things, it was shielded from liability by the RPA. The trial court denied the City's motion, but certified its order for immediate review.
OCGA § 51–3–23. As relevant here, the charge exception to the RPA, OCGA § 51–3–25 (2), provides that "[n]othing in this article limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists ... [f]or injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof[.]"
Generally, "whether the RPA applies to limit the liability of the owner of a certain property at a certain time is a question of law for the trial court." (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson , 270 Ga.App. 265, 267 (1), 606 S.E.2d 323 (2004). Here, the parties agree that the spectators at the football game, including the Harris family, were using the stadium for a recreational purpose within the meaning of the RPA. See Spivey v. City of Baxley , 210 Ga.App. 772, 774–775, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993) ( ). At issue is whether the charge exception to the RPA, OCGA § 51–3–25 (2), nevertheless precluded application of the RPA under the facts of this case. The City contends that the charge exception applies only to a guest who is charged to enter the property and that, as it is undisputed that Riley was not assessed a fee to enter the stadium, the charge exception does not bar the City's immunity under the RPA. The City further contends that its collection of nominal fees from the other entrants was not a disqualifying charge for purposes of the RPA.
We first address whether the fee imposed by the City to access the stadium was a charge for purposes of the RPA. Under the RPA, a "charge" is defined as "the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land." OCGA § 51–3–21 (1). Although the amount was nominal, the City nevertheless required members of the public to pay to enter the stadium, and so the fee imposed falls squarely within the statutory definition of a "charge." The City argues that its collection of "incidental revenue from the recreational area" does not deprive it of the protection of the RPA. While we have found that some fees paid by users of recreational property do not constitute a "charge" under the RPA, in those cases the payment of the fee was not, as here, a requirement for entry onto the facility where the injury occurred. See, e.g., South Gwinnett Athletic Assn. v. Nash , 220 Ga.App. 116, 117–118 (1), 469 S.E.2d 276 (1996) ; Quick v. Stone Mountain Mem. Assn. , 204 Ga.App. 598, 599, 420 S.E.2d 36 (1992) ( )(citation and punctuation omitted); Hogue v. Stone Mountain Mem. Assn. , 183 Ga.App. 378, 380 (1), 358 S.E.2d 852 (1987) ( ). The City also argues that the fees it collected from use of the stadium were used to defray the maintenance cost of the facility, and that it was not in the business of recreation or entertainment. The charge exception,...
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