Mcconville v. Ft. Pierce Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 29 May 1931
• Citation: 135 So. 392,101 Fla. 727
• Parties: McCONVILLE v. FT. PIERCE BANK & TRUST CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

135 So. 392

101 Fla. 727

McCONVILLE v. FT. PIERCE BANK & TRUST CO.

Florida Supreme Court

May 29, 1931

Commissioners' Decision.

Error to Circuit Court, St. Lucie County; Elwyn Thomas, Judge.

Action by Paul B. McConville against the Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Company, a corporation. To review a final judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

COUNSEL

Alto Adams, of Fort Pierce, for plaintiff in error.

F. L Hemmings, of Fort Pierce, for defendant in error.

OPINION

ANDREWS C.

This case is here upon writ of error to the circuit court of St Lucie county. Paul B. McConville, as plaintiff below, filed his declaration against the defendant Fort Pierce Bank &amp Trust Company, defendant in error here, which contained four common counts, attaching bill of particulars, 'for money deposited in defendant's bank $493.72.'

To this defendant filed a special plea setting up that on August 20, 1927, the state comptroller took possession of the defendant bank and trust company and continued in possession until March 26, 1928, when the comptroller, upon the petition and consent of the representatives of 75 per cent. of the total deposits, issued his formal order under authority of chapter 11849, Laws of Florida 1927, freezing all deposits of said bank, which order set forth that the bank shall pay 5 per cent. of the deposits in cash on reopening, 45 per cent. in certificates of deposit due and payable on or before three years after date of reopening, and that the remaining 50 per cent. of deposits of any nature whatsoever to be paid on or before three years from opening from the proceeds obtained from slow and doubtful paper assets, to be classified and set aside for the benefit of such deposits.

The plea further alleges that the defendant is ready at any time to pay the 5 per cent. in cash and deliver certificates of deposit and comply with other provisions of the order and the statute authorizing such order.

A demurrer to the plea was filed by plaintiff, which attacks said chapter 11849, Laws of Florida 1927, as being unconstitutional in that the title of the act contains more than one subject-matter, and does not contain a brief statement of the subject-matter of the act; that it deprives the plaintiff of his property without due process of law; that it impairs the obligation of contracts; and that the plea does not allege that the deposit was made by the plaintiff subsequent to the time said chapter 11849 went into effect.

The demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiff having elected to stand upon the demurrer, a final judgment was entered dismissing the case.

Reverting to the first points raised by the demurrer, it will be observed that the title to chapter 11849 reads as follws:

'An Act to Amend Section 13, Chapter 6426, Acts of the State of Florida, Approved June 7, 1913, the Same Being Section 4167 of the Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, Granting Additional Powers to the State Comptroller, Imposing Additional Duties on the State Comptroller, Conferring Additional Powers Upon Certain Municipal Officers and Special District Commissioners Relating to Public Moneys on Deposit in Banks, and Declaring an Emergency.'

As section 13 of chapter 6426, Acts of 1913, became, by revision, section 4167, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920, it is clear that under the rule in such cases any defect in the original title was cured by such revision. Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 So. 273.

The act of 1927 may therefore be considered merely as an amendment of section 4167 of the Revised General Statutes.

Where the title of the amendatory act gives merely the number of the Revised General Statute intended to be amended, it is defective and an insufficient compliance with section 16 of article 3, Constitution. Webster v. Powell, 36 Fla. 703, 18 So. 441.

In the case of the State v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104, 26 A. L. R. 735, it was held that: 'Where the title of an act amendatory of the Revised General Statutes, gives the numbers of the sections of the law designed to be amended, and also briefly expresses the general subject embraced in such sections, if they have a common connection with the general subject, it is sufficient notice to the Legislature and to the public, as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill to ascertain what changes are proposed in the existing law, and anything germane to the general subject expressed in the title may be included in the act.' See, also, Stokes v. Galloway, 61 Fla. 437, 54 So. 799.

The title here in question gives the section of the original act also its number in the Revision, and it can hardly be said that the substance of the act wholly fails to show a common connection with the general subject expressed in the title.

Similar questions have frequently come before this court, and it is deemed unnecessary to enter into an extensive treatment of the subject.

We have examined the title and body of the original chapter 6426, Acts of 1913, section 13 of which, by revision and readoption, became section 4167, Revised General Statutes of 1920, also examined chapter 11849, Acts of 1927, which specifically names both the original and the revised section by number, and while the title of said chapter 11849, Acts of 1927, is loosely constructed and requires some inquiry as to the subject-matter covered by it, yet we think that it may reasonably be held that its terms are not so deficient as to render it voidable or inoperative; in fact, it does put on notice that additional powers are being conferred upon the comptroller, such as may embrace the subject relating to money deposited in banks as where an emergency arises. See State v. City of Jacksonville (Fla.) 133 So. 114, decided this term; In re DeWoody, 94 Fla. 96, 113 So. 677. The title cannot be said to be misleading, as it confers additional powers on the comptroller, who as a matter of general knowledge is known to have had charge of the administration of state banks mentioned in the title to the act.

This court is committed to the rule that it should not declare statutes void as violative of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution relative to titles and subjectmatter properly connected therewith except in clear cases free from every reasonable doubt (Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406); and that although under this section the subject of a statute should be briefly expressed in the title, a title which does not briefly express the subject of an act does not render the act void 'if the title does not mislead.' Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; State v. Vestel, 81 Fla. 625, 88 So. 477.

In the case of Posados v. Warner, Barnes & Co., 279 U.S. 340, 49 S.Ct. 333, 334, 73 L.Ed. 729, it was held that the purpose of this constitutional requirement 'is to prevent the inclusion of incongruous and unrelated matters in the same measure and to guard against inadvertence, stealth and fraud in legislation.'

In this case suit was brought against the bank by the plaintiff April 29, 1929, at which time said chapter 11849 was in effect. On June 6, 1929, said chapter was amended by chapter 14487, by adding the following:

'Provided further, that before such 'freezing' order shall become effective the Comptroller shall give ten days' notice by publication of his intention to apply to the Circuit Court where the bank is located or of Leon County to have such order confirmed, at which time any person interested may appear and present objections why such order should not be confirmed.'

The declaration was filed June 3, 1929, over a year after the freezing order was made, and the plea here questioned was filed July 1, 1929, at which time the act of 1929 had been in effect since June 6, 1929. In the instant case the comptroller did not give the ten days' notice by publication of his intention to apply to the circuit court to have such order of the comptroller confirmed; in fact, at the time the comptroller issued his freezing order on March 22, 1928, the provision for giving notice as provided above in the proviso of the act of June 6, 1929, was not in effect.

The general rule seems to be that where administrative orders are issued under statutory authority by the officer having direct supervision of such administrative department, they are deemed to be prima facie reasonable and just. See Amos v. Conkling, 99 Fla. 206, 126 So. 283; State v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 64 Fla. 112, 59 So. 385; 22 R. C. L. 491, § 171; United States v. Chemical Foundation 272 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131.

It has been well said that it must be presumed that the Legislature has considered and discussed the constitutionality of all measures passed by it. 1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 82.

There can be very little doubt, if any, that the comptroller had...