McKee v. State, 1 CA-CV 15-0800
| Citation | 755 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 30,388 P.3d 14,241 Ariz. 377 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 15-0800,1 CA-CV 15-0800 |
| Parties | Marcia McKee, the surviving mother of Grant Quinn McKee, both individually and on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries of Grant Quinn McKee, deceased, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. State Of Arizona, a public entity; and the Arizona State Forestry Division, a public entity, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Knapp & Roberts PC, Scottsdale, By Craig A. Knapp, Dana R. Roberts and David L. Abney, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, By Brock J. Heathcotte and Daniel P. Schaack, Co–Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
and Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Phoenix, By Michael L. Parrish, Co–Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
OPINION
¶ 1 Marcia McKee ("Appellant") appeals from the superior court's order dismissing her claims for wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant argues the court erred in concluding that her son was an employee of the State of Arizona and the Arizona State Forestry Division and, as a result, her claim was barred by the workers' compensation statutes' exclusive remedy provision. Appellant also contends she stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and she should be permitted to sue both the State and the State Forestry Division. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 Beginning in 1997, the State Forestry Division and the Prescott Fire Department entered into a cooperative intergovernmental agreement ("IGA") whereby the two agencies agreed to collaborate their resources to provide fire protection to the Prescott community and surrounding wilderness areas. For his work as a member of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew, Grant McKee ("McKee") was employed by the Prescott Fire Department. However, because McKee worked within the jurisdictional boundaries of the State Forestry Division pursuant to the IGA, he was also deemed an employee of the State. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 23–1022(D) (West 2016).1
¶ 3 On June 30, 2013, Appellant's son, McKee, was a member of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew who died while bravely fighting the Yarnell Hill Fire. At the time of McKee's death, he was unmarried, had no children or dependents, and he was not contributing to the support of Appellant.
¶ 4 Appellant filed a lawsuit against the State and the State Forestry Division seeking damages for wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 The State filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's claims, arguing that her wrongful death claim was barred by the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision and the firefighter's rule, that she failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the State Forestry Division was a nonjural entity that could not be sued. The court granted the motion and dismissed Appellant's claims with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed.
¶ 5 We review the superior court's dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863 (2012). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 218 Ariz. 172, 178, ¶ 5, 181 P.3d 219 (App. 2008). In addition, whether Appellant's wrongful death claim is barred by the exclusive remedy prescribed in the Arizona workers' compensation system is a legal question subject to de novo review. Mitchell v. Gamble , 207 Ariz. 364, 367, ¶ 7, 86 P.3d 944 (App. 2004).
¶ 6 Appellant concedes that if McKee was an employee of the State at the time of his death, her ability to sue for wrongful death is limited by Arizona's workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision. However, as discussed more fully below, Appellant argues that McKee was not a State employee at the time of his death, and therefore not subject to the exclusive remedy provision.
¶ 7 Generally, a plaintiff may bring a wrongful death claim as an "independent claim for damages sustained by the decedent's survivors."
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. , 190 Ariz. 544, 549, 950 P.2d 1165 (App. 1997) ; see also Vasquez v. State , 220 Ariz. 304, 310, ¶ 16, 206 P.3d 753 (App. 2008). However, the right to bring a wrongful death action exists only if the decedent would have been able to maintain an action for damages if death had not ensued. A.R.S. § 12–611 ; Diaz , 190 Ariz. at 549, 950 P.2d 1165 (). Thus, a claim filed by a plaintiff in a wrongful death case is subject to the same defenses as could have been asserted against the decedent if he had lived. Diaz , 190 Ariz. at 549, 950 P.2d 1165.
¶ 8 In Arizona, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for compensation against an employer for the work-related injury or death of an employee. A.R.S. § 23–1022(A). An employee can elect to maintain an action at law for damages in lieu of receiving workers' compensation only where an employer's wilful misconduct caused the employee's injury or death. Id. An employee of a public agency working under the jurisdiction and control of another public agency pursuant to an IGA is considered an employee of both agencies for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation. A.R.S. § 23–1022(D) ; Callan v. Bernini , 213 Ariz. 257, 260, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 737 (App. 2006) ().
¶ 9 Appellant argues the IGA between the City of Prescott and the State Forestry Division was not effective because it was not approved in compliance with A.R.S. § 11–952(F). Appellant argues that McKee remained an employee of the City of Prescott, and was never an employee of the State, because the resolution purporting to approve the IGA did not comply with A.R.S. § 11–952(F). This statute provides:
[a]ppropriate action by ordinance or resolution ... approving or extending the duration of the agreement or contract shall be necessary before any such agreement, contract or extension may be filed or become effective.
¶ 10 Appellant interprets A.R.S. § 11–952(F) as requiring an agency to specifically approve the duration of an IGA. Here, Appellant claims the IGA is ineffective because the City's resolution does not expressly approve the duration of the IGA. As a result, she argues McKee never became an employee of the State.
¶ 11 Our goal in interpreting a statute is to "ascertain the legislature's intent." Lyons v. State Bd. of Equalization , 209 Ariz. 497, 499, ¶ 8, 104 P.3d 867 (App. 2005). To do so "we look first to the [statute's] language and will ascribe plain meaning to its terms unless the legislature assigned a special meaning to one or more terms." Id. (internal citations omitted). " ‘We construe the statute as a whole, and consider its context [.]’ " People's Choice TV Corp., Inc. v. City of Tucson , 202 Ariz. 401, 403, ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 412 (2002) (quoting State ex rel. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Phoenix Lodge No. 708, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 187 Ariz. 242, 247, 928 P.2d 666 (App. 1996) ). "[W]e will not interpret a statute in such a way as to produce ‘absurd results,’ or ‘render [any word, phrase, clause, or sentence] superfluous, void, insignificant, redundant or contradictory.’ " TDB Tucson Group, L.L.C. v. City of Tucson , 228 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶ 9, 263 P.3d 669 (App. 2011) (quoting Patterson v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff's Office, 177 Ariz. 153, 156, 865 P.2d 814 (App. 1993) ).
¶ 12 We find no textual basis for Appellant's reading of A.R.S. § 11–952(F). Section 11–952 addresses agreements or contracts that two or more public agencies can enter for services or for joint or cooperative action. A.R.S. § 11–952(A). Under canons of statutory construction, we read the "or" separating "approving" and "extending the duration" to be disjunctive. State v. Piotrowski , 233 Ariz. 595, 598, ¶ 16, 315 P.3d 1252 (App. 2014). Thus, we read the language of subsection F as simply requiring appropriate agency action approving (1) the agreement, or (2) the duration of any extension of the agreement.
¶ 13 This construction is also consistent with the context of the statute. In addition to duration, an IGA must specify a number of matters, including the purpose, financing/budget, and methods to be employed in accomplishing its purpose.
A.R.S. § 11–952(B)(1)–(4). However, absent from subsection F is any language requiring that a public body expressly and separately approve any of these requirements. Additionally, A.R.S. § 11–952(G) provides that an IGA may be extended as many times as the public agencies wish but the "extension may not exceed the duration of the previous agreement." Reading section F and G together, the initial IGA must be approved by a public agency, and if it has a finite duration, and the agencies wish to extend the agreement beyond its initial duration, any extension must be approved in the same manner as the initial IGA.
¶ 14 Here, the IGA between Prescott and the State Forestry Division directs that it "will continue in force from year to year unless terminated by either party." The resolution passed by the City of Prescott approves all the terms of the IGA, including its duration. Because the IGA has a perpetual duration, there is no need for the City to pass a resolution "extending the duration of the agreement." A.R.S. § 11–952(F).
¶ 15 Accordingly, the resolution approving the IGA complies with A.R.S. § 11–952. The IGA is effective. Thus, McKee was an employee of the State pursuant to the IGA at the time of his death.
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