McQueen v. State, 72--777
| Citation | 304 So.2d 501 |
| Decision Date | 31 October 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 72--777,72--777 |
| Parties | Freddie McQUEEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Bruce J. Daniels, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Frank B. Kessler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
McQueen appeals from his conviction for buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of stolen property in violation of F.S. § 811.16. Because the state did not establish, even prima facie, the corpus delicti of the crime, apart from the defendant's confession, we reverse.
At the trial, the state established that McQueen was in possession, of and succeeded in pawning, for some $30.00, a calculator which had been stolen from someone else two months before. Over a defense objection that the corpus delicti was not otherwise proven, it also introduced McQueens' statement as to how he had come into possession of the calculator. The confession stated that after asking one Paul Holmes whether it was 'hot,' the defendant agreed to pawn the machine for Holmes in exchange for a $10.00 payment, and did so while Holmes waited in the car outside the pawn shop; the statement indicated that Holmes had asked McQueen to undertake this task because Holmes had 'lost' his driver's license and other identification, which are usually required before a pawn shop owner will transact business. This 'explanation' was such as to permit, perhaps impel, the jury to have concluded that McQueen either knew, or should have known, that the calculator had in fact been stolen--an indispensable element of the crime with which he was charged. E.g., Williams v. State, 106 Fla. 225, 143 So. 157 (1932); Lampley v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 515; Mayer v. State, Fla.App.1970, 231 So.2d 540. Thus, there is no difficulty in concluding that All the evidence, including the confession, see Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897), amply supports the conviction. The insurmountable difficulty which Does arise, however, is that Holmes did not testify at the trial, and there is no Other evidence apart from his own statement (the $30.00 figure seems to have been a reasonable one for a pawn of the machine) concerning McQueen's guilty knowledge.
There is no doubt concerning the established rule that no criminal conviction may be based upon an extra-judicial confession by the defendant himself unless there is prima facie evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime independent of the statement. Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939); Jefferson v. State, Fla. 1961, 128 So.2d 132. The issue presented to us--one which is of first impression in Florida, cf. Perez v. State, Fla.App.1969, 220 So.2d 397, and concerning which we have found no clear authority even elsewhere--is whether the 'corpus delicti' of this crime for purposes of permitting the introduction of a confession, as (perhaps) opposed to the elements required to establish guilt of the crime itself, includes the element of actual or implied knowledge of the fact that the goods in question were stolen. Drawing upon the cases which state the General rules applicable to the issue, and the established 'corpus delicti' of other, analogous crimes, we conclude that it does. Since it is admitted that there was no such evidence, apart from McQueen's statement, in the trial below, his conviction must therefore be reversed.
Our resolution of the issue to this effect boils down to the fact that, without guilty knowledge, there would be no evidence that Any crime, let alone the crime of receiving stolen property, had been committed. And it is established Florida law that the corpus delicti of a crime essentially consists of showing Both of (a) The fact that the crime charged has been committed and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it. Sciortino v. State, Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 93. In the case of the analogous crime of larceny our Courts have stated that this definition includes an element of guilty intent. In Williams v. State, Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 548, 549, the Second District said:
'The corpus delicti in the charge of larceny consists of two elements: (1) that the property was lost by the owner and (2) that property was lost by felonious taking or, more explicitly, that property was taken without consent of the owner and With the requisite felonious intent.' (emphasis supplied)
Accord: Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380....
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...rendering it unnecessary to consider Ruiz's claim that, even with the confession, the evidence is insufficient. See, McQueen v. State, 304 So.2d 501, 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. denied, 315 So.2d 193 It is apodictic that, when a confession is relied upon to satisfy the state's burden of ......
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