Meads v. Iowa Dept. of Social Services

• Decision Date: 17 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-333,84-333
• Citation: 366 N.W.2d 555
• Parties: Grace MEADS, Appellee, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES and Iowa Merit Employment Commission, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 555

366 N.W.2d 555

Grace MEADS, Appellee, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES and Iowa Merit Employment Commission, Appellants.

No. 84-333.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 17, 1985.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Julie F. Pottorff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Michael E. Hansen, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and McCORMICK, SCHULTZ, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ.

WOLLE, Justice.

Iowa Code chapter 19A, entitled "State merit system of personnel administration," provides generally that appointments and promotions of state employees designated in the statute shall be made solely on the basis of merit and fitness. The Iowa Merit Employment Commission (commission) promulgates rules to accomplish that laudatory purpose, hears and decides appeals concerning state employees who are dissatisfied with personnel decisions, and generally represents the public in the improvement of personnel administration. See Iowa Code § 19A.7 (1983).

The petitioner Grace Meads, an employee at the Glenwood State Hospital School (Glenwood) which is operated by the Iowa Department of Social Services (department), appealed to the commission contending that Glenwood's supervisory personnel had failed to comply with the commission's rules in selecting another person and not herself for the position of physical therapy aide at the hospital. Although the commission did not grant her the relief she sought, the district court on judicial review reversed and remanded the case by directing Glenwood to redetermine who should be promoted. The department and commission have appealed the district court's decision. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the commission with directions.

The commission rules set out a relatively complex procedure to govern hiring and promotion of state merit employees. In order to be considered for a particular position, an applicant must first apply to take a qualifying examination for a given class of jobs. The application provides information about the applicant's education, training and experience and is an integral part of the examination itself. 570 Iowa Admin.Code 5.4. Those applicants who meet minimum qualifications for the job classification are allowed to take the exam, and they are ranked according to score and placed on an eligibility list. 570 Iowa Admin.Code 6.3. When a vacancy arises, a merit employer must first obtain a certified current listing of the top six persons in the pertinent job classification who are interested in that vacancy. 570 Iowa Admin.Code 7.6. The employer is to hire one of those six after considering each of them on the basis of specified selection criteria. 570 Iowa Admin.Code 10.1(1).

The facts are essentially undisputed. Meads, a resident treatment worker at the Glenwood facility, learned of a vacancy in the position of physical therapy aide and sought to interview for the position on October 8, 1981. The supervisor informed her that she had already interviewed ten to twelve people and that she and Harold Adams, the treatment program administrator, would make a decision within the week. Meads heard nothing after a week but noticed that another employee, Diane Severn, was being trained for the position. Meads immediately complained to the personnel director that Glenwood was attempting to fill the vacancy without first obtaining from the commission a list of eligible merit employees. After Glenwood secured the list six weeks later, Adams conducted telephone interviews with the top six interested applicants including both Meads and Severn. Adams ultimately hired Severn, who ranked sixth among the interested applicants while Meads ranked first.

Meads filed a grievance with the commission, alleging that Glenwood had failed to comply with a commission regulation requiring posting of job vacancy notices and consideration of objective factors in promoting merit employees. 570 Iowa Admin.Code 10.1(4), 10.1(1). On appeal of an initial adverse decision and following a contested case proceeding, the commission concluded that Glenwood had not violated the rule but directed Glenwood to give Meads serious consideration for any future vacancy in a physical therapy aide position. The commission also required Glenwood to document all steps in the selection process and requested that the Commissioner of Social Services investigate and file a report concerning employment practices at the hospital. Meads sought judicial review of that portion of the commission's decision which held that Glenwood had not violated rule 10.1(1).

The district court on judicial review reversed and remanded the case to Glenwood for reselection of a physical therapy aide on the basis of information and applicants available to Glenwood on the date of Mead's initial application. The court also required Glenwood to forward to it a report documenting the steps followed in the selection process. In their appeal of the district court's judicial review decision, the commission and the department contend (1) that Glenwood did not violate rule 10.1(1), and (2) that even if the rule was violated, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in finding two other violations not addressed by the commission's decision, in selecting the remedy it deemed appropriate, and in retaining jurisdiction to supervise Glenwood's choice of a person to be promoted into the position.

I. Scope of Judicial Review.

Our review of this contested case decision, like that of the district court, is governed by section 17A.19(8) of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Taylor v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 362 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Iowa 1985); Mount Pleasant Community School District v. Public Employment Relations Board, 343 N.W.2d 472, 476 (Iowa 1984). Meads contended and the district court found that there was not substantial evidence to support the decision of the commission. We therefore must determine whether the agency's decision is "unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f); Messina v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 341 N.W.2d 52, 59 (Iowa 1983). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a given conclusion. Iowa Health Systems Agency, Inc. v. Wade, 327 N.W.2d 732, 733 (Iowa 1982).

II. Did Glenwood Violate Rule 10.1(1)?

The threshold issue before the district court and now before us on appeal is whether substantial evidence in the record supports the commission's determination that Glenwood did not violate rule 10.1(1) governing promotion of merit employees. That rule provides:

As far as is practicable and feasible, vacancies should be filled by the promotion of permanent, qualified employees based upon individual job performance evaluations, personal observation of work behaviors, promotional examination scores and due consideration for length of service and capability for a new position. Promotions may be either interagency or intra-agency.

570 Iowa Admin.Code 10.1(1).

The commission argues that the rule does not require the employer to apply the enumerated criteria mechanically to each applicant. It contends that the language "as far as is practicable or feasible" in the first clause of the rule contemplates that the listed criteria will serve only as flexible general guidelines to assist the employer in making its promotion decision. We disagree.

A. Construction of the Rule. Generally, we give administrative tribunals a reasonable range of informed discretion in the interpretation and application of their own administrative rules. Dameron v. Neumann Brothers, Inc., 339 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Iowa 1983). We may turn to the agency's construction of its own regulations if the meaning of the words is doubtful. We will not, however, give weight to an agency interpretation of its rules if that interpretation is erroneous or inconsistent with the enabling statute. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 337 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 1983).

We conclude that the commission's interpretation of rule 10.1(1) is inconsistent with the language of that rule as well as the enabling statute. We are not persuaded that the phrase "as far as is practicable or feasible" permits the commission to ignore the selection criteria set forth in the rule. Rather, that phrase as used in this rule only gives the employer limited discretion to determine whether to fill a vacancy by promotion or instead by such alternative means as transfer, demotion, reinstatement, or original appointment. See 570 Iowa Admin.Code 7.1 (authorizing vacancies to be filled through such alternative methods). When a state employer decides to fill a vacancy through promotion, it must apply the listed criteria in rule 10.1(1) in selecting the person to be promoted.

This reading of the rule mirrors the statutory mandate to promulgate rules

[f]or promotions which shall give appropriate consideration to the applicant's qualifications, record of performance, and conduct. Vacancies shall be filled by promotion whenever practicable and in the best interest of the system.

Iowa Code § 19A.9(4) (1983).

While the statute does not define precisely what constitutes "appropriate consideration" of the listed criteria, that language clearly stops short of authorizing an employer to consider or not consider the criteria as it chooses. Had the legislature intended to vest the commission with discretion to itself determine the criteria for hiring merit employees, it would not have set out the selection criteria with such specificity. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(13) ("In construing statutes the court searches for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said."). Finally, the legislature's use of the word "and"...