Medlin v. Morris
| Decision Date | 31 May 1912 |
| Citation | 148 S.W. 85,243 Mo. 260 |
| Parties | A. B. MEDLIN et al. v. KATIE E. MORRIS, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. -- Hon. L. J. Eastin, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
James W. Boyd for appellant.
(1) The decree of the circuit court is not sustained by the evidence is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence. (2) This case is here to be tried, if at all, upon the evidence before the court, and not upon a review of errors. It is to be tried de novo, according to the decisions of this court heretofore rendered in such cases. Miller v McCaleb, 208 Mo. 562; Walther v. Null, 233 Mo 110; Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 413; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262. This court, in equity cases, does not defer much to the opinion of the circuit court. Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 287. The circuit court, as a preamble to the decree stated what purports to be some of the facts in the case. This statement as to any material facts in the case, is not sustained by the evidence. A finding of fact has no place in a court of equity, and can have no influence on this court, which is to try the case upon the evidence introduced. Miller v. McCaleb, 208 Mo. 572; Walther v. Null, 233 Mo. 110. (3) As the respondent's case is based upon a pretended oral agreement, his evidence and all the testimony introduced by him does not tend to prove any cause of action in that respect and no trust in real estate can be created by oral testimony. R. S. 1909, secs. 2868-9; Crowley v. Crafton, 193 Mo. 431; Richardson v. Champion, 143 Mo. 538; Hillman v. Allen, 145 Mo. 638; Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 82. (4) It is not certain whether the petition bases the respondent's alleged right of recovery on an express trust or not. There is no evidence in the case sufficient to prove any trust. It is true that the respondent in his testimony claims that in 1892 he was sued. The suit "scared" him, and after he got out of that, and the suit was thrown out of court, he says he concluded to turn over his home to his wife so that his future creditors could not take it away from him. He owned no lot then. This is the only oral arrangement which he claims to have made. He further testified: He says that he and his wife both helped to make that money, and that what he said to his wife was to avoid future liability. A man cannot put his property out of his hands and have it conveyed to a third person in order to avoid present or future debts or financial liability, and then get a chancellor to get it back for him. Such a transaction is fraudulent, admitted to be fraudulent, and therefore no court of equity would assist him in enforcing his fraudulent, illegal and unjust agreement. The respondent in his testimony does not say, or pretend to say, that his wife ever entered into any such agreement, or ever said anything on the subject. Even according to his own testimony, she never entered into any such agreement with him. At least, he does not testify that she ever did enter into any agreement. Of course, he does not pretend to say what the agreement was so far as she was concerned. Green v. Cates, 72 Mo. 123; Sells v. West, 125 Mo. 630; Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 485; McNear v. Williamson, 166 Mo. 365; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 286; Henderson v. Henderson, 13 Mo. 151; Ober v. Howard, 11 Mo. 425. (5) In a suit in equity to set aside a deed, the plaintiff asking such relief must prove his alleged cause of action by testimony so clear, express, strong and unequivocal as to banish every reasonable doubt from the mind of the chancellor respecting the existence of such trust. Reed v. Sperry, 193 Mo. 173; Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 92; Crawford v. Jones, 163 Mo. 583; Brinkman v. Sunken, 174 Mo. 709; Johnson v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 423; Adams v. Burns, 96 Mo. 361; Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo. 591; Burdett v. May, 100 Mo. 13; King v. Isley, 116 Mo. 155; McFarland v. LaForce, 119 Mo. 585; Plumb v. Cooper, 121 Mo. 668. (6) If he furnished any part of said money, the prima facie presumption is that he gave that money or the proceeds to his wife, and that he intended it as a purchase for her. Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 92; Woodward v. Woodward, 148 Mo. 246; Alexander v. Warrance, 17 Mo. 228; Gilliland v. Gilliland, 96 Mo. 522; Schuster v. Schuster, 93 Mo. 438; Kinzey v. Kinzey, 115 Mo. 496.
John E. Dolman for respondents.
(1) The trust sought to be enforced in this case is an implied or resulting trust arising out of "an agreement not made by one owning and having the legal title to real estate by which an express trust was attempted to be created, but it was an agreement prior to the vesting of title, an agreement which became a part of and controlled the conveyance, and evidence of its terms is offered not for the purpose of establishing an express trust, but of nullifying the presumption of an advancement and to indicate the disposition which the real owner intended should be made of the property." Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 409; Freeman v Freeman, 153 F. 337. All of the property in controversy in this case was acquired subsequent to the agreement between the parties and in accordance with that agreement and by virtue of which the conveyance was made to the wife in each instance. Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266. It is the collateral agreement prior to the payment of the purchase money, coupled with the ownership of the purchase money and the acts of the parties that determines the character of the trust. Shaw v. Shaw, 86 Mo. 594; McMurray v. McMurray, 180 Mo. 526. The proposition of law is undoubtedly true that the presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the purchaser is rebutted in case the conveyance is made to one to whom he is under some moral or legal obligation, as wife or child, but "this rebutter of the presumption of a resulting trust, arising from the relation of the parties to each other, will itself be overcome when all the facts and circumstances antecedent to or contemporaneous with the transaction point clearly to an intention on the part of the purchaser to create a trust." Whether this conveyance carried with it a resulting trust depended altogether upon the defendant when he bought the land, paid the purchase money and directed the name of plaintiff to be inserted in the deed as grantee." Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo. 109; Richardson v. Champion, 143 Mo. 538; Butler v. Carpenter, 163 Mo. 597; Crawford v. Jones, 163 Mo. 577; Gray v. Jordan, 87 Me. 140; Williams v. Wagner, 64 Vt. 326; Bibb v. Huter, 79 Ala. 351; Keller v. Keller, 45 Md. 269; Gilchrist v. Brown, 165 Pa. St. 282; Lorensbuhy v. Purdy, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 376; Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426. (2) Such an agreement must be proven by such clear and convincing evidence as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the chancellor of its existence. Where, however, the question of the veracity of the principal witness is in doubt, and which must be judged very largely by her manner on the stand and her various contradictory statements, her falsehoods, if any, and all the circumstances attending the giving of her testimony, the chancellor who sees it all is the better judge, and this court should defer entirely to the finding of facts by the chancellor, if the evidence discloses the fact that this element entered into such finding, especially where her testimony is uncorroborated. Where any finding of fact in an equity case depends on the credibility of oral testimony the reviewing court should be satisfied that the finding is against the preponderance of the evidence before reversing it. Short v. Taylor, 137 Mo. 525; Trust Co. v. Browne, 177 Mo. 424; Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 479. (3) Appellant makes the further point that the agreement or arrangement was void because made for the purpose of delaying, hindering or defrauding creditors and therefore equity will not relieve him of the position in which he has placed himself. There is no evidence that he had any creditors at the time the agreement was made. His only property consisted of a little four-room house, which he called his home. He wanted to save that. He never knew whether he would ever have anything else or not, and when he got out of his liability to an injured employee he concluded to turn this home over to his wife, so that if another accident happened that home could not be taken away from him. "That was the beginning of that arrangement." He did not know that the law guaranteed him a home and that his statutory exemption amounted to more than his little home amounted to. That was only the beginning of an arrangement, the inducement to enter into an arrangement, that was thereafter acted upon and carried out for fifteen years. The beginning of the arrangement was brought about by a fear that another accident might deprive him of his home. A conveyance to wife of a homestead can in no sense hinder, delay or defraud the creditors. Reed v. Nicholson, 189 Mo. 396. Even though it could be said that the arrangement between the parties hereto had its inception in a fraudulent conveyance, it is valid as between the parties thereto. Jacobs v. Smith, 89 Mo. 673. And defendant herein cannot allege its illegality for the purpose of avoiding it. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. 242; Hall v. Callahan, 66 Mo. 316; Thomas v. Thomas, 107 Mo. 459. If the arrangement in question was made for the purpose of defrauding future creditors none but the creditors themselves and those in privy with them can avoid it. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. 242. And if this action were by a creditor and the arrangement were held to be in fraud of him the court would simply hold that there was a resulting trust in the plaintiff for the...
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