Mega Child Care, Inc. v. Tdprs
| Decision Date | 28 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-99-01243-CV.,01-99-01243-CV. |
| Parties | MEGA CHILD CARE, INC., Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTIVE AND REGULATORY SERVICES, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Booker T. Morris, III, Houston, for Appellant.
Raymond Charles Winter, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices MIRABAL, JENNINGS, and DUGGAN.*
Appellant, Mega Child Care, Inc., sought, judicial review of a decision issued by an administrative law judge from the State Office of Administrative Hearings. Appellee, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (TDPRS), filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The district court granted TDPRS's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Mega Child Care's suit. We reverse and remand.
TDPRS is the state agency charged with: (1) providing protective services for children and elderly and disabled persons; (2) providing family support and family preservation services; (3) regulating child-care facilities and child-care administrators; and (4) implementing and managing programs intended to provide early intervention or prevent at-risk behaviors. TEX. HUM. RES.CODE ANN. § 40.002(b) (Vernon 2001).
Bonita Odutayo is the owner and operator of Mega Child Care, a child-care facility. After finding that Mega Child Care had not complied with TDPRS rules and standards, TDPRS revoked Mega Child Care's license to operate.1 An administrative law judge (ALJ) from the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) upheld the revocation of Mega Child Care's license.
Mega Child Care sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision. In its plea to the jurisdiction, TDPRS contended that Mega Child Care did not have any statutory right to judicial review. The district court granted TDPRS's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Mega Child Care's suit.2 This appeal followed.
In issue one, Mega Child Care contends that it has a statutory right to judicial review. We agree.
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Subaru of America, Inc., v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc. d/b/a David McDavid Subaru, No. 00-0292, slip op. at 8-9, ___ S.W.3d ____, ____ - ____, 2001 WL 1898454 (Tex. June 27, 2002); Mayhew v. Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). When conducting a de novo review, an appellate court exercises its own judgment and redetermines each legal issue, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.1998).
District courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Subaru, No. 00-0292, slip op. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ____; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). The Texas Constitution provides that a district court's jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions except cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by the constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal or administrative body. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; Subaru, No. 00-0292, slip op. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ____. Thus, there is a presumption that a trial court has jurisdiction unless the legislature has mandated that a party present its claims elsewhere. Subaru, No. 00-0292, slip op. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ____; Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75.
Administrative agencies, however, have no authority to resolve disputes unless they are given that authority in clear and express statutory language. Key W. Lift Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839, 848 (1961). Courts will not imply additional authority to agencies, nor may agencies create excess powers for themselves. Key W. Life, 350 S.W.2d at 848.
The legislature may expressly grant authority to an agency to make the initial determination in a dispute, thus giving the agency "exclusive jurisdiction" for initial determination purposes. Cash Am. Int'l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex.2000); see Conn Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.1996). However, even if a state agency has such exclusive jurisdiction, a party may generally seek judicial review of that agency's findings once the party has exhausted all administrative remedies. Subaru, No. 00-0292, slip op. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ____; See Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 15; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 2000).
The TDPRS is subject to chapter 2001 of the Texas Government Code, commonly known as the Administrative Procedure Act. TEX. HUM. RES.CODE ANN. § 40.006 (Vernon 2001); TEX. GOVT.CODE ANN. § 2001.002 (Vernon 2000). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, SOAH conducts hearings in contested cases. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058 (Vernon 2000).
Mega Child Care is subject to Chapter 42 of the Human Resources Code, which governs the regulation of certain facilities, homes, and agencies that provide childcare services. Section 42.072 provides, in part, as follows:
(a) The department [TDPRS] may suspend, deny, revoke, or refuse to renew the license, listing, registration, or certification of approval of a facility or family home that does not comply with the requirements of this chapter, the standards and rules of the department, or the specific terms of the license, listing, registration, or certification. The department may revoke the probation of a person whose license, listing, or registration is suspended if the person violates a term of the conditions of probation.
(b) If the department proposes to take action under Subsection (a), the person is entitled to a hearing conducted by the State Office of Administrative Hearings. Proceedings for disciplinary action are governed by the administrative procedure law, Chapter 2001, Government Code....
TEX. HUM. RES.CODE ANN. §§ 42.072(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.2002) (emphasis added). Section 2001.171 of the Administrative Procedure Act reads as follows: "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within a state agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171.
In the present case, Mega Child Care exhausted all available administrative remedies and was entitled to judicial review. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171; Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 15-17. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted the TDPRS's plea to the jurisdiction.
We sustain issue one. In light of our disposition under issue one, it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of Mega Child Care's other issues, and we decline to do so.
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court.
In the district court, appellant, Mega Child Care, Inc. (Mega), sought judicial review of a decision issued by an administrative law judge from the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH). SOAR upheld the decision of appellee, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (TDPRS), to revoke Mega's license to operate a child-care facility. TDPRS filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that Mega did not have any statutory rights to judicial review. The district court granted TDPRS's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Mega's suit. I would affirm.
In its first issue, Mega contends that section 40.0041 of the Human Resources Code and section 725.4001(a) of the Administrative Code each create a right to judicial review of SOAH's decision to uphold TDPRS's revocation of Mega's child-care license. The majority concludes that Mega has a statutory right to judicial review of SOAH's decision under section 2001.171 of the Government Code.
At the outset, it must be noted that it is well-settled Texas law that there is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order adversely affects a vested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional right. Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex.2000).
Mega argues that section 40.0041 of the Human Resources Code creates a right to judicial review of its license revocation. Section 40.0041 provides that TDPRS "shall develop and implement a uniform process for receiving and resolving complaints against" it. TEX. Hum. RES.CODE ANN. § 40.0041(a)(1) (Vernon 2001). The process includes "statewide procedures through which the public, consumers, and service recipients are informed ... of the right to make a complaint against [DPRS] ... and ... of [DPRS's] procedures for resolving a complaint, including the right to appeal a decision made at the local level ...." Id. Contrary to Mega's contention that the right to appeal is available to all, including child-care facilities, section 40.0041 applies only to complaints against TDPRS by members of the public, not to licensing decisions made by TDPRS pursuant to chapter 42 of the Code. The statute specifically refers to "the public, consumers, and service recipients." Id.
As a child-care facility, Mega is subject to Chapter 42 of the Human Resources Code, which governs the regulation of certain facilities, homes, and agencies that provide child-care services. Section 42.072 provides, in part:
(a) The department may suspend, deny, revoke, or refuse to renew the license, listing, registration, or certification of approval of a facility or family home that does not comply with the requirements of this chapter, the standards and rules of the department, or the specific terms of the license, listing, registration, or certification. The department may revoke the probation of a person whose license, listing, or registration is suspended if the person violates a term of the conditions of probation.
(b) If the department proposes to take...
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Texas Prot. & Reg. Serv. V. Mega Child Care
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