Melendez v. Autogermana, Inc., Civil No. 07-2094 (GAG).

• Decision Date: 17 March 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07-2094 (GAG).
• Citation: 606 F.Supp.2d 189
• Parties: Robert MELÉNDEZ, Plaintiff v. AUTOGERMANA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

606 F.Supp.2d 189

Robert MELÉNDEZ, Plaintiff v. AUTOGERMANA, INC., Defendant.

Civil No. 07-2094 (GAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 17, 2009.

Order Denying Reconsideration April 23, 3009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Peter John Porrata, Peter John Porrata Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Frank Zorrilla-Maldonado, Jesus R. Rabell-Mendez, Rabell Mendez CSP, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Robert Meléndez brings the present action against Autogermana, Inc. under the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the Act" or "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. This court's supplemental jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1367) is also invoked to assert claims under Puerto Rico law, namely Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 1323-1333. Under Puerto Rico law, plaintiff may recover double the amount of damages against the responsible employer. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 1341. The plaintiff requests declaratory judgment and monetary damages.

This matter is before the court on motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum filed by defendant on October 30, 2008 (Docket Nos. 20 & 21.) A statement of uncontested facts was also submitted. (Docket No. 20-2.) Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of its motion in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2008. (Docket No. 31.) Plaintiff supported its opposition with a statement of contested and uncontested facts. (Docket No. 32.) Plaintiff also submitted a statement under the penalty of perjury. (Docket No. 32-11.) Defendant replied to plaintiff's response on January 28, 2009. (Docket No. 38.) Defendant further replied to plaintiff's response to the statement of contested facts on January 28, 2009. (Docket No. 39.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and that a trier of fact could reasonably find in its favor. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000). The party opposing summary judgment must produce "specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form," to counter the evidence presented by the movant. López-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994)). A party cannot discharge said burden by relying upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupportable speculation." Id.; see also Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996)) ("`[N]either conclusory allegations [nor] improbable inferences' are sufficient to defeat summary judgment.").

The court must view the facts in a light most hospitable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Arroyo-Audifred v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 527 F.3d 215, 217 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006)); Patterson v. Patterson, 306 F.3d 1156, 1157 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990)). A fact is considered material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case under applicable law. Nereida-González v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993). The court must determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed. Adria Int'l Group, Inc. v. Ferré Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir.2001).

LOCAL RULE 56

In the District Court of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 56(b), previously Local Rule 311(12), requires a motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of material facts that supports the moving party's claim that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. These facts are then deemed admitted until the nonmoving party provides a similarly separate, short and concise statement of material facts establishing that there is a genuine issue in dispute. Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 56(e) (2004); see Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir.2001); Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001); Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir.2000); Domínguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R. 1997).

Additionally, the facts must be supported by specific reference to the record, thereby pointing the court to any genuine issues of material fact and eliminating the problem of the court having "to ferret through the Record." Domínguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. at 727; see also Carmona Ríos v. Aramark Corp., 139 F.Supp.2d 210, 214-15 (D.P.R.2001); Velázquez Casillas v. Forest Lab., Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 161, 163 (D.P.R.2000). Failure to comply with this rule may result, where appropriate, in judgment in favor of the opposing party. Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d at 33. Parties have for the most part complied with our local anti-ferret rule.

ADEA

The policy behind the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., is: "to promote employment of older persons based on their abilities rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). To achieve these goals, the Act makes it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000). Therefore, "liability depends on whether ... [age] actually motivated the employer's decision." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993)). Most significantly, plaintiff's age must play an actual role in the employer's decision making process and have a determinative influence in the outcome. Id.

It is well established that an ADEA plaintiff at all times bears the burden of proof in age discrimination cases. Shorette v. Rite Aid of Me., Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.1998); see also Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 332 (1st Cir.1997); Sánchez v. P.R. Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 723 (1st Cir. 1994). However, rarely will a plaintiff be able to proffer direct evidence of a discriminatory animus, because seldom will there "be `eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental process[]". Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. at 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). In such cases where a plaintiff lacks direct evidence that an employer's actions were motivated by an age animus the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), dictates the progression of proof. Suárez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49 53 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991)); Piñeiro-Ruiz v. P.R. Ports Auth., 557 F.Supp.2d 248, 253 (D.P.R.2008).

"Direct evidence of [age] discrimination is ... evidence [that standing alone] ... shows a discriminatory animus." Mandavilli v. Maldonado, 38 F.Supp.2d 180, 192-93 (D.P.R.1999) (quoting Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir.1990)). Direct evidence "consists of statements by a decisionmaker that directly reflect the alleged animus and [stand] squarely on the contested employment decision." Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir.2000); see also Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st Cir.1996) (stating that the remarks or comments must be linked to the adverse employment decision). On the other hand, "[s]tray remarks in the workplace, statements by non-decisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself do not constitute proof of direct evidence." Adams v. Corporate Realty Servs., Inc., 190 F.Supp.2d 272, 276 (D.P.R.2002) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)). For example, direct evidence would be an admission by the decision making employer that it explicitly considered age in reaching an employment decision. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir.1996).

III. FACTS

Autogermana, Inc., hired Meléndez on February 27, 1996, at the time its business first opened. (Docket No. 1, at 2-3, ¶¶ 7 & 9; Docket No. 22, at 2.) He became a salesperson in the sales department. For various years, defendant's parent company ("BMW") frequently recognized plaintiff for his superior sales. (Docket No. 1, at 3, ¶ 8.) Between 2001 and 2005, he received the Top Seller or Profile in Achievement Award from both BMW of North America and Autogermana, Inc. (Docket No. 32, at 2-5, ¶¶ 2-6.) According to plaintiff, prior to his termination defendant began a ...