Mendly v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 25 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. B073226,B073226
• Citation: 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 822,23 Cal.App.4th 1193
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Elizabeth MENDLY, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 822

28 Cal.Rptr.2d 822

23 Cal.App.4th 1193

Elizabeth MENDLY, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B073226.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

March 25, 1994.

Review Denied July 28, 1994.

Rehearing Denied April 25, 1994.

ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Inc., Robert D. Newman, Richard A. Rothschild, Inner City Law Center, Nancy Mintie, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, John H. Brinsley, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Tha Win, and Gary L. Blasi, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n by Peter O. Israel and Muegenburg, Norman & Dowler, Ventura, as amicus curiae, on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

DeWitt W. Clinton, County Counsel, Roberta M. Fesler, Asst. County Counsel, Patrick A. Wu, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Ada Treiger, Sr. Deputy County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.

LILLIE, Presiding Justice.

In this class action involving Los Angeles County general relief benefits, plaintiffs appeal from a December 14, 1992 order denying plaintiffs' motion to enforce judgment and for permanent injunction. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce a July 1991 stipulated judgment on two grounds: (1) subsequent legislation (A.B. 2883 (Stats.1992, ch. 721)) purporting to invalidate the stipulated judgment constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the contract clauses of the federal and state constitutions; and (2) as applied to the stipulated judgment, the subsequent legislation violates the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. As the factual background of this appeal involves a series of legislative amendments involving general assistance aid, we first set out the pertinent legislative framework.

LEGISLATIVE AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Legislative Framework

"County general assistance 'is a program of last resort for indigent and disabled persons unable to qualify for other kinds of public benefits.' " (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 451, 456, 277 Cal.Rptr. 815.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 (hereinafter section 17000) imposes a mandatory duty upon the counties to support " 'all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident.' " (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 676, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.) "Section 17001 imposes a further mandatory duty on the board of supervisors of each county to adopt ' "standards of aid and care" ' for the indigent and dependent poor." (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 456, 277 Cal.Rptr. 815.)

"The counties have broad discretion to set eligibility standards for, and conditions upon, their general assistance aid. (Clay v. Tryk (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 119, 124 ....) However, ' " '[i]n administering general assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state. [Citation.] When a statute confers upon a state agency the authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out its provisions, the agency's regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. [Citation.]' " ' [Citation.]" (Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 535, 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182.)

Prior to 1991 legislation, case law had held that a board of supervisors' establishment of general assistance grant levels must be based on a factual study of actual subsistence costs in the county. (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 457, 277 Cal.Rptr. 815.) Minimum subsistence, at the least, must include allocations for housing, food, utilities, clothing, transportation and medical care (ibid.), and "a county must demonstrate reasonable support in the administrative record for the factual determinations used to set grant levels and ... the board of supervisors has a duty to consider the actual studies." (Id. at p. 459, 277 Cal.Rptr. 815.) "The study ... is often called a Boehm study after the case which first held that the level of general assistance payments must be set with reference to a factual study of what amount is needed for minimum subsistence. (Boehm v. County of Merced (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 447, 452 ....) In a subsequent decision after remand the appellate court held that a general assistance grant must include moneys for basic necessities which it defined as food, clothing, housing (including utilities), transportation and medical care. (Boehm v. Superior Court, supra, [ (1986) ], 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 502 (Boehm II).)" (Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 541-542, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182.)

"In 1991 the Legislature enacted section 17000.5 which took effect June 30 and provides in pertinent part: '(a) The board of supervisors in any county may adopt a general assistance standard of aid that is 62 percent of a guideline that is equal to the 1991 federal official poverty line and may annually adjust that guideline in an amount equal to any adjustment provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) ] for establishing a maximum aid level in the county. [p] (b) The adoption of a standard of aid pursuant to this section shall constitute a sufficient standard of aid. [p] (d) For purposes of this section, "federal official poverty line" means the same as it is defined in subsection (2) of Section 9902 of Title 42 of the United States Code.' " (Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182.)

"The official poverty guideline for 1991 was set at varying dollar amounts based upon the size of the family unit. Thus for a family of one the figure was set at $6,620, for a family of two $8,880, for a family of three $11,140 and so forth." (11 Cal.App.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182.)

As stated by the court in Oberlander, the County of Contra Costa "maintains that the provision of section 17000.5 setting 62 percent of the federal poverty level as 'a sufficient standard of aid' was the legislative equivalent of a repeal of Boehm. It argues that after the enactment of section 17000.5, any county which meets the 62 percent requirement has by definition provided minimum subsistence needs, ergo the study requirement need not be met. We find that reading of the section to be compelling." (11 Cal.App.4th at p. 542, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182.)

In August 1992, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 2883, urgency legislation, effective on September 15, 1992, and which amended Section 17000.5 in certain respects which are not pertinent to this appeal. Section 2 of Assembly Bill No. 2883 provides in pertinent part: "(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there is a fiscal emergency in the State of California, which; was not anticipated and that affects the ability of counties to provide welfare services in the state. Counties that have entered into agreements, including court-ordered stipulated judgments, which require the payment of general assistance grants above the amounts provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, will suffer serious consequences if forced to maintain those levels. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the provisions of existing agreements, including court-ordered stipulated judgments, that require counties to provide general assistance grants above the current levels provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code." Subdivision (b) of section 2 declared the provisions of any such agreement or court-ordered stipulated judgment "null and void."

In light of the above legislative history, we set out the procedural background of this action, which had its genesis under the law as set out in Boehm, and which culminated in a stipulated judgment filed at about the time of the effective date of section 17000.5 on June 30, 1991.

B. Procedural Background

In December 1990, three individual plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, filed a verified complaint against the defendants (hereinafter referred to collectively as County) for injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief, and in the alternative, for peremptory writ of mandate, challenging the adequacy of the County's general relief grant of $312 per month, which they had been receiving since July 1, 1989. The complaint alleged that there was no evidence presented to the County in 1989 or 1990 to support the maintenance of the current $312 per month grant level, which had not changed since 1988; that representatives of plaintiffs' class had presented evidence that the grant for a single person should be increased to at least $420 per month; that County arbitrarily and capriciously declined to adjust the monthly grant allowances in 1989 and 1990 and failed to conduct any study or survey and failed to make any accurate, objective or factual determinations as to the actual costs of minimum subsistence in the county.

The complaint further alleged that County's failure to increase the monthly grant constituted a violation of mandatory duties under Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 and County's failure to provide an adequate monthly allowance for shelter has rendered and continues to render many general relief recipients homeless. A separate cause of action was asserted for recovery of retroactive benefits since July 1, 1989, "because [plaintiffs] have been receiving inadequate GR [general relief] benefits, which were and are substantially less than they were and are legally entitled to receive."

In an answer filed in April 1991, County denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted numerous affirmative...