Metz Co. v. Boston & M.R.R.

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: RUGG
• Citation: 227 Mass. 307,116 N.E. 475
• Decision Date: 29 May 1917
• Parties: METZ CO. v. BOSTON & M. R. R.

227 Mass. 307
116 N.E. 475

METZ CO.
v.
BOSTON & M. R. R.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 29, 1917.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Charles U. Bell, Judge.

Action by the Metz Company against the Boston & Maine Railroad. On defendant's exceptions to judgment for plaintiff. Exceptions sustained, with disrections.

John [227 Mass. 307]L. Harvey and Wm. J. Bannan, both of Waltham, for plaintiff.

Trull & Wier and John M. O'Donoghue, all of Lowell, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

This is an action to recover the value of certain castings shipped in interstate commerce from Black Rock in the state of New York to Waltham in this commonwealth, and lost in transportation. It was admitted that a bill of lading ‘was issued according to law and that a copy of said bill of lading had been duly filed with the tariff schedules of the issuing carrier with the Interstate Commerce Commission and these tariff schedules[227 Mass. 308]had been duly published and kept open for inspection in accordance with the acts of Congress and amendments thereto relating to interstate commerce.’ One clause of this bill of lading was in these words:

‘Claims for loss, damage, or delay must be made in writing to the carrier at the point of delivery or at the point of origin within four months after delivery of the property, or, in case of failure to make delivery, then within four months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed. Unless claims are so made the carrier shall not be liable.’

It is beyond question that a provision of this sort is valid and binding on the parties under the Interstate Commerce Act. This needs no discussion in view of Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McLaughlin, 242 U. S. 142,37 Sup. Ct. 140,61 L. Ed. 207;

[116 N.E. 476]

Northern Pacific Ry. v. Wall, 241 U. S. 87, 36 Sup. Ct. 493, 60 L. Ed. 905, and Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 36 Sup. Ct. 555, 60 L. Ed. 1022; L. R. A. 1917A, 265.

The jury made an express finding, however, that the condition of the bill of lading requiring written notice of loss within four months had been waived by the defendant. This finding was warranted by the evidence. Therefore, the single question presented is whether such a condition in a bill of lading can be waived under the federal laws relating to interstate commerce. This is a question touching which the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are binding. The interstate Commerce Act supersedes all state laws as to the subject over which Congress thus has put forth its superior power. Corbett v. Boston & Maine R. R., 219 Mass. 351-356, 107 N. E. 60. This question presented in the case at bar seems to us to be set at rest by Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, at page 197, 36 Sup. Ct. 541, at page 544 (60 L. Ed. 948), where it was said:

‘The parties could not waive the terms of the contract under which the shipment was made pursuant to the federal act; nor could the carrier by its conduct give the shipper the right to ignore these terms which were applicable to that conduct and hold the carrier to a different responsibility from that fixed by the agreement made under the published tariffs and regulations. A different view would antagonize the plain policy of the act and open the door to the very abuses at which the act was aimed. Chi. & Alt. R. R. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 153, 166 [32 Sup. Ct. 648 (56 L. Ed. 1033, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 501)].’

Those words are exactly applicable to the facts here presented. They were used in the course of a decision respecting a clause in a bill of lading in effect the same as that here involved.[227 Mass. 309]While the facts of that case were slightly dissimilar to those of the case at bar, they are not different in substance, and they call for the operation of the same principles of law. It cannot be presumed that the words just quoted were used inadvisedly or without a full appreciation of the natural force to be attributed to the comprehensive reference to waiver in that connection. This decision appears to mean that, when the form of the bill of lading with its numerous contractual provisions has been filed according to law with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the interstate rate for transportation has been fixed with reference to the terms and obligations of that...