Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center v. Polston
| Decision Date | 13 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,MID-MISSOURI,WD |
| Citation | 995 S.W.2d 527 |
| Parties | MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, Appellant, v. Tammy POLSTON and Division of Employment Security, Respondents. 56587. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Beth S. Riggert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for appellant.
Ronald J. Miller, Jefferson City, for respondent Division of Employment Security.
Before EDWIN H. SMITH, P.J., and HANNA and SPINDEN, JJ.
Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center (MMHC) appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) awarding unemployment compensation benefits to Tammy Polston, the respondent, under § 288.040, RSMo Supp.1997.
In its sole point on appeal, MMHC claims that the Commission erred in deciding that the respondent was not disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits under § 288.050.1, RSMo Supp.1997, because she voluntarily left her full-time employment with MMHC without good cause and had not yet earned wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount.
We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
On January 14, 1997, the respondent began full-time employment as a clerk typist II with MMHC. On August 7, 1997, while still working full time at MMHC, she started working part time at Casey's General Store, a convenience store. She continued to work both jobs until January 20, 1998, when she voluntarily resigned from her job at MMHC.
Sometime after resigning from her job at MMHC, the respondent began full-time work at Casey's. On February 3, 1998, Casey's terminated her employment due to an absence from work the previous day. Thereafter, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits, pursuant to § 288.040, RSMo Supp.1997, effective February 1, 1998. MMHC protested the payment of such benefits to the respondent.
On March 3, 1998, a deputy of the Division of Employment Security (the Division) determined that the respondent was disqualified, pursuant to § 288.050.1, RSMo Supp.1997, from receiving benefits because she "left work with [MMHC] voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work or employer." The respondent appealed the deputy's determination to the Division's appeals tribunal. At a hearing before the appeals tribunal on April 7, 1998, the respondent testified that she resigned from her job at MMHC because she lost her driver's license for a year making it difficult for her to get to work at MMHC in Columbia, Missouri, from her home in Fulton, Missouri, and, further, that she was going to begin working full time at Casey's. She testified that she began working full time at Casey's "directly" after she quit her job at MMHC. On April 17, 1998, the appeals tribunal reversed the Division deputy's determination, deciding that the respondent was not disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits by reason of her leaving work with MMHC voluntarily while "still working full-time for another employer."
MMHC appealed the appeals tribunal's decision to the Commission. On October 23, 1998, the Commission affirmed the decision of the appeals tribunal, adopting its decision and issuing a separate opinion. The Commission cited Brown v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 577 S.W.2d 90 (Mo.App.1978) in support of its decision.
This appeal follows.
Our review of the Commission's decision is governed by § 288.210, RSMo Supp.1995, which provides, in pertinent part:
The findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court shall be confined to questions of law. The court, on appeal, may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the decision of the commission on the following grounds and no other:
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the decision was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award; or
(4) That there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
In our review under this section, we are not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or its application of the law to the facts. Bunch v. Division of Employment Sec., 965 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Mo.App.1998) ().
In Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 571 (Mo.App.1995), this court outlined the process for review of an award made by the Commission in worker's compensation decisions. In Travelers Equities Sales, Inc. v. Division of Employment Sec., 927 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Mo.App.1996) we held that the Davis standard was applicable to employment security decisions as well. Review is a two-step process. First, an appellate court must determine whether the whole record, viewed in the light most favorable to the decision, contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. Davis, 903 S.W.2d at 571. If it does, the court, in the second step, makes a determination as to whether the decision is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. In this second step, the reviewing court considers all of the evidence in the record, including that not favorable to the decision. Id.
I.
In its sole point on appeal, MMHC claims that the Commission erred in deciding that the respondent's termination of her full-time employment with MMHC did not disqualify her from receiving immediate unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to § 288.050.1, RSMo Supp.1997. 1 Specifically, MMHC contends that the appellant was not eligible for such benefits because she voluntarily left her employment with MMHC without good cause attributable to her employment or employer and had not yet earned wages equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount.
In its decision on the respondent's claim for benefits, the Commission affirmed in a separate opinion the decision of the appeals tribunal awarding the respondent benefits. As such, the Commission adopted the finding of the tribunal that the respondent voluntarily left her employment with MMHC, which finding is supported by the record. Given this finding, in deciding whether the respondent was entitled to benefits, the Commission was, as was the tribunal, required to determine whether she did so with or without good cause in that, if a claimant voluntarily leaves employment, § 288.050, RSMo Supp.1997, makes good cause a condition precedent to receiving immediate benefits. Fair-Kincaid v. Division of Employment Sec., 964 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Mo.App.1998).
"The question of whether a claimant had good cause to leave his employment is a legal issue and thus we do not defer to the Commission's determination on the matter." Bunch, 965 S.W.2d at 877 (citing Sokol v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 946 S.W.2d 20, 26 (Mo.App.1997)).
"Good cause" has been interpreted as meaning "cause that would motivate the average able-bodied and qualified worker in a similar situation to terminate his or her employment." The conditions that motivate the employee to voluntarily leave "must be real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical, and good faith is an essential element." Two elements have thus been identified as necessary in establishing good cause--reasonableness and good faith....
Whether the employee's action was reasonable depends upon whether the employee can prove that his concerns are real or that any reasonable worker would have these concerns. Good faith requires that the employee make a showing that an attempt was made to resolve the dispute before he took the drastic step of quitting the job.
Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
The phrase "good cause" has no precise meaning and depends on the facts of each case. Department of Natural Resources and Recreation v. Lossos, 960 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Mo.App.1998). Good cause has been interpreted as not including reasons, which perhaps may be legitimate and necessary from a personal standpoint, but are not causally connected to the employee's work or employer. Smith v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Mo.App.1993).
Although the Division deputy, in initially reviewing and denying the respondent's claim, expressly found that she left her employment with MMHC without good cause, neither the Commission nor the appeals tribunal expressly referenced good cause. However, in approving the respondent for benefits, both the Commission and the tribunal relied on the holding in Brown v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 577 S.W.2d 90 (Mo.App.1978), which dealt with the issue of whether a claimant quitting part-time employment without good cause, while keeping his or her concurrent full-time employment, was disqualified from benefits. Implicit in their reliance on Brown for approving benefits for the respondent is the fact that they found that she voluntarily left her job with MMHC without good cause attributable to her work or employer. This is so in that, if the Commission had found that she left her job with MMHC voluntarily, but with good cause, it would have been unnecessary to rely on Brown in reaching its decision that she was not disqualified from benefits. Moreover, for the reasons stated, infra, the record supports such a finding.
At the hearing before the tribunal, the appellant testified that she resigned from her job at MMHC because she had lost her driver's license for a year, making it difficult for her to get to work at MMHC in Columbia from her home in Fulton, and that she had another job. And, while the reasons given for her resigning from her job at MMHC may have been justifiable personal reasons, they were not attributable to her work or MMHC, and, as such, under § 288.050.1, RSMo Supp.1997, she is deemed to have left her...
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