Miller v. Ririe Joint School Dist. No. 252

• Decision Date: 16 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 252,No. 24159,252,24159
• Citation: 132 Idaho 385,973 P.2d 156
• Parties: , 133 Ed. Law Rep. 251 Nikkie MILLER, Idaho Falls, October 1998 Term Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIRIE JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 252; L. Dean Birch, Superintendent, Ririe Joint School District, in his official capacity; Ririe Joint School District Board Of Trustees; Board Members Jim Lovell,Lynette Miller, Clyde Cook, Blairmoncur And George Newby, In Their official Capacities; Scott W. Marotz, law offices of McGrath, Marotz & Smith, an unincorporated association; Gary L. Cooper, and The Law Offices of Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge,Chartered, an unincorporated association,Defendant-Respondents. Idaho Falls, October 1998 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 156

973 P.2d 156

132 Idaho 385, 133 Ed. Law Rep. 251

Nikkie MILLER, Idaho Falls, October 1998 Term Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIRIE JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 252; L. Dean Birch, Superintendent, Ririe Joint School District No. 252, in his official capacity; Ririe Joint School District No. 252 Board Of Trustees; Board Members Jim Lovell,Lynette Miller, Clyde Cook, Blairmoncur And George Newby, In Their official Capacities; Scott W. Marotz, law offices of McGrath, Marotz & Smith, an unincorporated association; Gary L. Cooper, and The Law Offices of Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge,Chartered, an unincorporated association,Defendant-Respondents.

No. 24159.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Idaho Falls, October 1998 Term.

Feb. 16, 1999.

John E. Rumel, Boise, for appellant.

Marotz Law Office, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Scott W. Marotz argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice

Nikkie Miller (Miller) is appealing the denial of attorney fees by the district court after she obtained an injunction preventing attorneys from representing the administration of the Ririe School District No. 252 (School District) in discharge proceedings against her before the Board of Directors of the School District (Board). Miller claimed attorney fees under The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as the prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In a prior action ¹ (Miller I ) Miller sought to enjoin members of the Board from hearing discharge proceedings brought against her on the basis that they were biased. In the present action she sought to enjoin the School District's customary attorneys from participating in the discharge proceedings on the basis that they had represented the Board members in Miller I. The district court granted the injunction but denied Miller attorney fees.

At the time Miller filed her complaint in Miller I, she was an employee of the School District. She had been employed by the School District since 1974--the first sixteen years as a teacher and the last six as an elementary school principal. The law firms of McGrath, Marotz & Smith and Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Chartered (School District Attorneys) advised Superintendent L. Dean Birch (Superintendent) concerning an employment action contemplated against Miller. At a Board meeting held on October 14, 1996, the Board accepted a recommendation from the Superintendent to place Miller on probation. On November 27, 1996, the Board placed Miller on administrative leave with pay and initiated discharge proceedings against her based upon the Superintendent's recommendation. At both the October 14, 1996, and November 27, 1996, Board meetings, one of the School District Attorneys, Scott Marotz (Marotz), the Superintendent, and the individual Board members met in executive session regarding the adverse employment action contemplated against Miller. Marotz advised the Superintendent, the Board and the individual Board members concerning the discharge proceedings contemplated and eventually initiated against Miller. After the Board placed Miller on administrative leave and initiated discharge proceedings against her, Marotz continued to advise both the Superintendent and the Board concerning the adverse employment action taken against Miller. Miller sought an injunction against the Board and the individual Board members from hearing the discharge proceedings, alleging that the Board and its individual members were actually or probably biased, lacked impartiality and prejudged the issues in violation of her federal and state due process rights. (Miller I ). The district court temporarily enjoined the Board and its individual members from participating in the discharge proceedings. Marotz appeared as the attorney for the Board and its members during the proceedings on Miller's application for a temporary Miller inquired whether the School District Attorneys intended to represent the School District, and specifically the Superintendent, in the discharge proceedings before the Board. The School District Attorneys replied that they did intend to provide such representation. Miller initiated the present action by filing a complaint requesting injunctive relief, alleging that such representation would violate her due process rights because the School District Attorneys had represented the Board in the bias action. The district court granted Miller's motion and entered its order granting permanent injunctive relief and judgment, enjoining the School District from utilizing the School District Attorneys in the discharge hearing.

restraining order. The district court ultimately disqualified two Board members but allowed the remaining three to sit as decision makers at Miller's discharge hearing.

Miller filed an application seeking an award of attorney fees in the amount of $5,083.50 and costs in the amount of $159.50 as the prevailing party on her due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court awarded Miller costs but denied her an award of attorney fees, concluding that her "reference to Section 1983 was strictly gratuitous." Miller appealed the district court's order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, awards of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Shields v. Martin, 109 Idaho 132, 141, 706 P.2d 21, 30 (1985). "Any elements of legal analysis which figure in the district court's decision are, however, subject to de novo review." Corder v. Brown, 25 F.3d 833, 836 (9th Cir.1994).

III.

MILLER IS ENTITLED TO SEEK ATTORNEY FEES FOR A DUE PROCESS CLAIM MADE PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

There is no dispute that Miller had renewable contract status and liberty and property interests in her employment under federal and Idaho law. See Bowler v. Board of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 392, Shoshone County, Mullan, 101 Idaho 537, 541, 617 P.2d 841, 845 (1980); Ferguson v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 98 Idaho 359, 364, 564 P.2d 971, 976 (1977). Due process claims are appropriately made under § 1983. Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 355, 715 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1986); Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587, 592, 887 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Ct.App.1994). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

A party who prevails on a civil rights claim under § 1983 is entitled to seek recovery of attorney fees under § 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); see, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 468, 860 P.2d 653, 671 (1993). Section 1988(b) provides in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."

Miller's complaint alleged a claim to protect her due process rights under § 1983 through injunctive relief. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 569-70, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973); International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F.Supp. 806, 810 (E.D.Pa.1973) ("[I]njunctive relief is available under Section 1983."). Miller obtained an injunction against the School District from utilizing the School District Attorneys in the discharge proceedings because of their involvement in the bias action. Despite prevailing

on the issue she presented, the district court denied Miller attorney fees under § 1988, stating that it did not analyze the case under § 1983 but considered it a case for injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the question of whether there was a conflict of interest warranting disqualification of counsel.

A. Standing

At the threshold the School District claims that Miller suffered no injury and therefore has no standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The School District argues that the fact Miller obtained a permanent injunction is not dispositive on the issue of whether she was the prevailing party under §§ 1983 and 1988, maintaining that the mere appearance of impropriety of the School District Attorneys appearing before the Board does not meet the requirement of injury in fact in order to have standing under § 1983.

Given that Miller's § 1983 claim for injunctive relief arose out of a procedural due process issue concerning her discharge hearing, the correct legal framework in which to analyze her "injury" is found in Johnson v. Bonner County School District No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 887 P.2d 35 (1994) and Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). Relying in part on Gibson, the Court in Johnson stated that a trial court may enjoin a biased decision maker from conducting a due process hearing.

In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973), optometrists who worked for professional corporations sought to prevent an allegedly biased state licensing board from revoking their licenses. The board, composed by law exclusively of private optometrists, had previously brought a lawsuit against those whose licenses they proposed to revoke on virtually identical charges to those that were the basis for the proposed revocation. In addition, there was a serious question of the board's personal financial stake in the matter in controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge district court's authority to issue an injunction against the state administrative proceeding where the optometrists whose licenses were at...