Mitchell v. Lonergan

• Decision Date: 15 February 1934
• Citation: 189 N.E. 39,285 Mass. 266
• Parties: MITCHELL v. LONERGAN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

285 Mass. 266

189 N.E. 39

MITCHELL

v.LONERGAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 15, 1934.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Brown, Judge.

Action of tort by Margaret Mitchell, p. p. a., against William J. Lonergan and another, heard without a jury. Finding for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000, and defendants bring exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

J. G. Kelly and C. B. Sperber, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

R. H. Lee, of Boston, for defendants.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This plaintiff received personal injuries while riding as the guest of one Connolly, the operator of an automobile hired by him from the defendants in the course of their business of letting automobiles. There was evidence tending to show that Connolly hired the automobile from the defendants under a contract in writing and himself drove it away from the defendants' place of business; that a short time after driving it upon the highways, having occasion to stop, he applied the brakes in the usual way and the automobile halted suddenly and threw him forward; that he then drove to the home of the plaintiff and she accepted his invitation to ride, and that during the ride he put on the brakes again and they ‘grabbed on so quick’ that the plaintiff was thrown ‘forward out of the seat through the windshield’ and injured. Experts testified to the effect that the accident was caused by defective brakes in the automobile, or other possible causes which could have been discovered by careful examination in the garage of the defendants prior to the letting to Connolly, and which could not have occurred during the time the automobile was used on the way from the place of business of the defendants to the place of the accident.

At the close of the evidence the defendants requested a ruling that as matter of law the plaintiff was ‘not entitled to recover on the pleadings and all the evidence.’ This request was denied and a finding was made for the plaintiff. The exceptions of the defendants to that denial, bring the case here.

The question is whether the lessor of an automobile for specified rental is liable to a guest of the lessee for injuries caused by a defective braking mechanism which could have been discovered upon reasonable examination before the letting. That precise question as applied to motor vehicles has never arisen for decison in this Commonwealth.

The conceded fact that the defendants let the automobile to Connolly for hire warranted an inference that according to common experience he might use it for the purpose of carrying other persons as passengers, either on the footing of guests, employees, joint adventurers, or otherwise. It was not necessary that this purpose be stated at the time of the hiring. It would be one of the implications of the transaction in the absence of anything to the contrary. Automobiles are not inherently dangerous as are explosive and inflammable substances, McGowan v. Longwood, 242 Mass. 337, 341, 136 N. E. 72, 23 A. L. R. 617, yet in operation upon highways they are perilous to the safety of mankind and they are destructive to human life. If not in repair, they may be fraught with great hazard to their occupants as well as to others. In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 594-597, 147 N. E. 681. It was said in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 356, 47 S. Ct. 632, 633, 71 L. Ed. 109: ‘Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property.’ The transaction between the defendants and Connolly must be treated as to its legal obligations and implications upon the basis of these matters of common knowledge.

The main question in the case at bar is settled in principle adversely to the contentions of the defendants by Horne v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 326. That was an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries suffered by the wife of one who hired from the defendant stable-keepers a horse and carriage for the purpose of taking himself and his family to a funeral; there was evidence that the driver of the horse was careful and that the horse was unsafe and ran away and injured the wife of the hirer of the horse and carriage. It was held (page 331 of 115 Mass.) that it ‘was the duty of the defendants to furnish a suitable horse for the purpose for which it was hired, and a part of their contract that they would do so. If they have negligently furnished one which was unsuitable, and injury has been occasioned thereby, it is not a defence that they did not know that the horse was unsuitable.’ That action appears to have been brought in the name of both husband and wife, but nothing turns upon their common law relations because, before that cause of action arose, St. 1871, c. 312 (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 209, § 6) had become effective enabling a married woman to sue in an action of tort as if she were sole. See Thibeault v. Poole (Mass.) 186 N. E. 632. To the same effect is Lynch v. Richardson, 163 Mass. 160, 39 N. E. 801,47 Am. St. Rep. 444. That was an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by the wife of the one who hired a horse and carriage from the defendant, the keeper of a livery stable, and caused by the viciousness of the horse. It was held that it was the duty of the defendant to furnish a horse free from dangerously vicious habits and that, if he knew of the existence of the habits, or if ‘by the exercise of reasonable care to ascertain whether the horse was suitable for the use of hirers, he ought to have known that it was dangerous, he is liable for such injuries as resulted from wrongful conduct.’ There is nothing inconsistent with this in the point decided in Copeland v. Draper, 157 Mass. 558, 32 N. E. 944,19 L. R. A. 283, 34 Am. St. Rep. 314. To the same effect is Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. 586, 80 Am. Dec. 699. Compare Hyman v. Nye & Sons, 6 Q. B. D. 685, which seems to go rather far in holding a defendant to responsibility.

The obligations established and the liabilities enforced by Horne v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 326, and Lynch v. Richardson, 163 Mass. 160, 39 N. E. 801,47 Am. St. Rep. 444, do not arise directly out of contract, becausethe plaintiff in neither of those cases was a party to the contract of hire. They arise out of the duty imposed by law that one shall not negligently put forth in public places a...