Mitchell v. Lonergan

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: RUGG
• Citation: 189 N.E. 39,285 Mass. 266
• Decision Date: 15 February 1934
• Parties: MITCHELL v. LONERGAN et al.

285 Mass. 266
189 N.E. 39

MITCHELL
v.
LONERGAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 15, 1934.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Brown, Judge.

Action of tort by Margaret Mitchell, p. p. a., against William J. Lonergan and another, heard without a jury. Finding for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000, and defendants bring exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

[285 Mass. 267]J. G. Kelly and C. B. Sperber, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

R. H. Lee, of Boston, for defendants.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This plaintiff received personal injuries while riding as the guest of one Connolly, the operator of an automobile hired by him from the defendants in the course of their business of letting automobiles. There was evidence tending to show that Connolly hired the automobile from the defendants under a contract in writing and himself drove it away from the defendants' place of business; that a short time after driving it upon the highways, having occasion to stop, he applied the brakes in the usual way and the automobile halted suddenly and threw him forward; that he then drove to the home of the plaintiff and she accepted his invitation to ride, and that during the ride he put on the brakes again and they ‘grabbed on so quick’ that the plaintiff was thrown ‘forward out of the seat through the windshield’ and injured. Experts testified to the effect that the accident was caused by defective brakes in the automobile, or other possible causes which could have been discovered by careful examination in the garage of the defendants prior to the letting to Connolly, [285 Mass. 268]and which could not have occurred during the time the automobile was used on the way from the place of business of the defendants to the place of the accident.

At the close of the evidence the defendants requested a ruling that as matter of law the plaintiff was ‘not entitled to recover on the pleadings and all the evidence.’ This request was denied and a finding was made for the plaintiff. The exceptions of the defendants to that denial, bring the case here.

[189 N.E. 40]

The question is whether the lessor of an automobile for specified rental is liable to a guest of the lessee for injuries caused by a defective braking mechanism which could have been discovered upon reasonable examination before the letting. That precise question as applied to motor vehicles has never arisen for decison in this Commonwealth.

The conceded fact that the defendants let the automobile to Connolly for hire warranted an inference that according to common experience he might use it for the purpose of carrying other persons as passengers, either on the footing of guests, employees, joint adventurers, or otherwise. It was not necessary that this purpose be stated at the time of the hiring. It would be one of the implications of the transaction in the absence of anything to the contrary. Automobiles are not inherently dangerous as are explosive and inflammable substances, McGowan v. Longwood, 242 Mass. 337, 341, 136 N. E. 72, 23 A. L. R. 617, yet in operation upon highways they are perilous to the safety of mankind and they are destructive to human life. If not in repair, they may be fraught with great hazard to their occupants as well as to others. In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 594-597, 147 N. E. 681. It was said in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 356, 47 S. Ct. 632, 633, 71 L. Ed. 109: ‘Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property.’ The transaction between the defendants and Connolly must be treated as to its legal obligations and implications upon the basis of these matters of common knowledge.

The main question in the case at bar is settled in principle adversely to the contentions of the defendants by [285 Mass. 269]Horne v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 326. That was an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries suffered by the...