Mitchell v. N.C. Div. of Emp't Sec., 5:14–CV–584–D.

• Decision Date: 03 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5:14–CV–584–D.,5:14–CV–584–D.
• Citation: 76 F.Supp.3d 620
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Paul A. MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and Wayne Community College, Defendants.

76 F.Supp.3d 620

Paul A. MITCHELL, Plaintiff

v.NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and Wayne Community College, Defendants.

No. 5:14–CV–584–D.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

Signed Nov. 3, 2014.

Paul A. Mitchell, Goldsboro, NC, pro se.

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, Chief Judge.

On October 7, 2014, Paul A. Mitchell (“Mitchell” or “plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis [D.E. 1] and a verified complaint against defendants North Carolina Division of Employment Security and Wayne Community College (“WCC”) [D.E. 1–1]. Mitchell seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. See Compl. [D.E. 1–1] 1, 20–21. As explained below, the court permits Mitchell to proceed in forma pauperis but dismisses the complaint and denies his request for injunctive relief.

I.

Mitchell is a former instructor at WCC. Compl. 1. Mitchell has a different civil action pending in this court against the North Carolina Community College System, WCC, and various WCC officials alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and numerous state law claims arising from his employment and termination at WCC. See Amended Complaint, Mitchell v. Bd. of Trs. of Wayne Cmty. Coll., 5:14–CV–231–D (E.D.N.C. June 5, 2014) [D.E. 6]. In addition, on September 9, 2014, this court denied Mitchell's attempt to remove a criminal action pending against him in Wayne County Superior Court. See Order, In re N.C. v. Mitchell, No. 5:14–CR–156–D, 76 F.Supp.3d 618, 2014 WL 7399121 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2014) [D.E. 3]. The criminal action also relates to his former employment at WCC. See id.

In Mitchell's latest complaint, he has sued the North Carolina Division of Employment Security and WCC. See Compl. Mitchell alleges that WCC retaliated against him in violation of Title VII during his unemployment case at the North Carolina Division of Employment Security. See Compl. 11–14 (counts I and II). According to Mitchell, WCC retaliated against him by making “false statements” about him to the North Carolina Division of Employment Security in order to disqualify Mitchell from receiving unemployment benefits and to injure his reputation. See id. 11. Mitchell also alleges that the North Carolina Division of Employment Security retaliated against him in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) when it denied his request to receive unemployment benefits. See Compl. 15–19 (counts HI and IV). Mitchell seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, to include: (1) an order directing the North Carolina Division of Employment Security to “release [his] withheld employment benefits of $7,350,” including interest; (2) an order directing WCC “to reinstate Mitchell to his original position as Science Instructor with back pay”; and (3) an order directing WCC not to retaliate against Mitchell or engage in racial discrimination against Mitchell. See id. 20–21 (prayer for relief).

First, the court addresses Mitchell's latest Title VII claims against WCC. Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See, e.g., Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir.2012) ; Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir.2009) ; Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509–13 (4th Cir.2005) ; Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491–92 (4th Cir.2005) ; Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132–33 (4th Cir.2002) ; Sloop v. Mem'l Mission Hosp. Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 148–50 (4th Cir.1999) ; Dennis v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156–57 (4th Cir.1995). If a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. See, e.g., Jones, 551 F.3d at 300.

Mitchell never filed a charge of discrimination with or obtained a resolution from the EEOC concerning his latest retaliation claims against WCC.¹ Thus, Mitchell has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the EEOC under Title VII. Accordingly, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over his Title VII retaliation claims against WCC and dismisses those claims. See id.

Alternatively, even if Mitchell need not file an EEOC charge concerning WCC's alleged retaliation, Mitchell fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against WCC. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotation omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir.2010), aff'd, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012) ; Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008). In evaluating a complaint, the court “accepts all well-pled facts as true” but need not accept a complaint's “bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” nor a complaint's conclusions of law. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com. Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir.2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Although a court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D.N.C.2011) ; see Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 304 n. 5. “The ‘special judicial solicitude’ with which a district court should view ... pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate. Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed.” Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.1990). Every party—pro se or otherwise—must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam).

Mitchell's complaint contains no direct evidence of retaliation. Instead, he relies on the McDonnell Douglas framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–06, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ; see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ; Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) ; Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir.2013) ; Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir.2007) ; Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 190 (4th Cir.2001) ; Holley v. N.C. Dep't of Admin., 846 F.Supp.2d 416, 441 (E.D.N.C.2012). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer took action against him that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse; and (3) the employer took the materially adverse employment action because of the protected activity. Balas, 711 F.3d at 410 ; Holland, 487 F.3d at 218 ; Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir.2003) ; see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2524–33, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) ; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–70, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). An adverse employment action includes “[a] discriminatory act that adversely affect[s] the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment.” Holland, 487 F.3d at 219 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original); see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 68–70, 126 S.Ct. 2405 ; Balas, 711 F.3d at 410.

Mitchell's Title VII retaliation claims against WCC fail because he has not plausibly alleged that WCC's participation in his unemployment case at the North Carolina Division of Employment Security constitutes a materially adverse action. As a matter of law, WCC's participation in Mitchell's unemployment case is not a materially adverse action. See, e.g., Griffin v. S. Piedmont Cmty. College, No. 3:10CV412, 2011 WL 3841562, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2011) (unpublished); Yanke v. Mueller Die Cut Solutions, Inc., No. 3:03 CV 527, 2007 WL 437694, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2007) (unpublished). Moreover, statements that WCC employees or agents made in the unemployment case are privileged and do not constitute a materially adverse action. Cf., e.g., N.C. Gen.Stat. § 96–4(x)(5) ; Howard v. Food Lion, Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 585, 598–99 (M.D.N.C.2002). Thus, even if the court has jurisdiction over Mitchell's Title VII retaliation claims against WCC, Mitchell has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Next, the court addresses Mitchell's Title VI claims against the North Carolina Division of Employment Security. To the extent that Mitchell asks this court to review the merits of the decision denying his request for unemployment benefits compensation and to award him unemployment benefits, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such a request. See, e.g., D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–88, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) ; Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) ; Rodriguez v. Doe, 549 Fed.Appx. 141, 144 (4th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (unpublished); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 463–64 (4th Cir.2006). Instead, Mitchell must appeal the decision denying his request for unemployment benefits to the North Carolina Superior Court. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 96–15(h), (i).

Alternatively, even if the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Mitchell's Title VI claims against the North Carolina Division of Employment Security, Mitchell has failed to state a claim upon which relief...