Mo. Mun. League v. State, SC 94493

• Decision Date: 04 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC 94493,SC 94493
• Citation: 465 S.W.3d 904
• Parties: Missouri Municipal League, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

465 S.W.3d 904

Missouri Municipal League, Appellant

v.State of Missouri, Respondent.

No. SC 94493

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc .

Opinion issued August 4, 2015

The Missouri Municipal League was represented by Jane E. Dueker of Stinson Leonard Street LLP in St. Louis, (314) 259–4559, and Allan Garner of Allan Garner Law LLC in Independence, (816) 478–3848. The state was represented by Senior Counsel Ronald R. Holliger and Brandon D. Laird of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751–3321.

St. Louis County residents who filed a brief as a friend of the Court were represented by Marie Defer, a St. Louis University School of Law student who is certified under Supreme Court Rule 13 to appear in court and provide legal assistance in certain circumstances and under the supervision of a licensed attorney, and John J. Ammann, Brendan Roediger, Stephen Hanlon and Chad Flanders of the St. Louis University Legal Clinic in St. Louis, (314) 977–2778; Sophie Zavaglia of SWMK Law LLC in St. Louis, (314) 480–5180; and John D. McAnnar, Michael–John Voss and Thomas Harvey of ArchCity Defenders Inc. in St. Louis, (855) 724–2489.

Opinion

Paul C. Wilson, Judge

The Missouri Municipal League (“MML”) filed this lawsuit challenging the validity of section 302.341.2, RSMo Supp.2013, as enacted in House Bill 103 (2013) (“HB103”). The circuit court denied MML's claims, and MML appeals. But, after this case was briefed, argued, and submitted, the General Assembly passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill 5 (2015) (“SB5”). In addition to enacting various new sections, SB5 repeals the language in section 302.341.2 that formed the basis for MML's claims. Accordingly, MML's claims are moot, and this appeal is dismissed.

Background

In 1999, the General Assembly passed what is commonly referred to as the “Macks Creek Law.” See § 302.341.2, RSMo 2000. It prohibited any municipality with a municipal court division from receiving more than 45 percent of its total annual revenue from fines for traffic violations. Collections in excess of this revenue cap were to be remitted to the director of the department of revenue for distribution to local schools. Id. In 2009, this revenue cap was reduced from 45 percent to 35 percent. See § 302.341.2, RSMo Supp.2009.

In 2013, HB103 reduced the revenue cap from 35 percent to 30 percent and required all local governments (including counties) with municipal court divisions to provide an accounting to the state auditor showing the percentage of general operating revenue generated from fines for traffic violations. § 302.341.2, RSMo Supp.2013. HB103 also enacted language in section 302.341.2 providing that any local government failing to comply with the revenue cap's reporting and remittal requirements would “suffer an immediate loss of jurisdiction of the municipal court of said [local government] on all traffic-related charges until all requirements of [section 302.341.2] are satisfied.” Id.

Soon after HB103 went into effect, MML filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the version of section 302.341.2 enacted in HB103 is invalid and enjoining future enforcement of its provisions. MML does not challenge the application of the revenue cap to any particular facts, local government, or municipal court divisions. Instead, MML claims that HB103 violated the bill-passage requirements in article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution. MML also claims that the version of section 302.341.2 enacted in HB103 violates various substantive provisions of the constitution. The circuit court granted the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the state on each of these claims. MML appeals, and this Court has jurisdiction. See Mo. Const. art. V, § 3.

Analysis

This Court is obligated, either upon motion of a party or acting sua sponte, to examine an appeal for mootness because “[m]ootness implicates the justiciability of a controversy and is a threshold issue to appellate review.” LeBeau v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 459 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Mo. banc 2015).

A cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy. When an event occurs which renders a decision unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed. And where an enactment supersedes the statute on which the litigants rely to define their rights, the appeal no longer represents an actual controversy, and the case will be dismissed as moot.

Humane Society of United States v. State, 405 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Mo. banc 2000) ).

As explained in State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470 (Mo. banc 2001), an event rendering a decision unnecessary may occur at any point, including on appeal.

Even a case vital at inception of the appeal may be mooted by an intervenient event which so alters the position of the parties that any judgment rendered [merely becomes] a hypothetical opinion. In deciding whether a case is moot, an appellate court is allowed to consider matters outside the record.

Id. at 473 (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, no matter what declaration the Court might make about the validity of HB103 or the version of section 302.341.2 enacted therein, that declaration would have no practical effect going forward. As of August 28, 2015, the rights and obligations of MML's members will not be governed by HB103 and its version of 302.341.2. Instead, those rights and obligations will be governed by the provisions of SB5; provisions that are not—and cannot be—addressed in this case. Accordingly, because all of MML's procedural and substantive claims are moot, this appeal must be dismissed. See Reardon, 41 S.W.3d at 473 (“When an event occurs that makes a court's decision unnecessary or makes granting effectual relief by the court impossible, the case is moot and generally should be dismissed.”).

First, MML's procedural claims are moot because they are based on allegations that the enactment of HB103 violated the constitutional bill-passage requirements in article III, sections 21 and 23. In LeBeau and Humane Society, however, this Court held that such procedural challenges are moot when the General Assembly later repeals and reenacts the statutory provisions at issue. Because the passage of SB5 in 2015 cures whatever procedural defects there may have been in the enactment of HB103, MML's procedural challenges must be dismissed as moot.

Second, MML's substantive constitutional challenges are moot because the principles applied in LeBeau and Humane Society are not limited to procedural challenges. MML claims that the version of section 302.341.2 enacted in HB103 violates: (1) separation of powers; (2) this Court's power to make rules governing procedure in the lower courts; (3) local governments' general constitutional right of access to the courts; and (4) certain local governments' specific constitutional right to establish municipal courts to hear and determine ordinance violations. In addition, MML argues—but did not plead—that the language of section 302.341.2 is unduly “vague” and “unworkable” because it does not define the key terms necessary to understand and implement the revenue cap. Finally, MML argues that section 302.341.2 does not establish clear procedures for determining whether a particular local government is in compliance with the revenue cap or allow a local government to seek judicial review of such a decision.

But each of MML's substantive claims focuses on language in section 302.241.2 that is now gone. SB5 repealed—and did not reenact—that language. Moreover, SB5 enacts new provisions aimed at supplying the definitions and procedures that MML...