Montie v. Bastrop Cnty.
| Decision Date | 19 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-16-00123-CV,03-16-00123-CV |
| Parties | Rebekha Montie, Appellant v. Bastrop County, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
NO. 28,961, HONORABLE REVA TOWSLEE-CORBETT, JUDGE PRESIDING
After Rebekha Montie was terminated from her job as a manager for an animal shelter in Bastrop County, she filed a suit against Bastrop County alleging that she was fired in violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act (the "Act"). See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 554.001-.010. In particular, she alleged that she was fired after she reported that her supervisor, Diane Mollaghan, who was the director for the shelter and Bastrop County Animal Services, was guilty of cruelty to animals. Specifically, Montie urged that Mollaghan failed to timely euthanize shelter animals that were injured or ill and failed to maintain the animals at the shelter by not providing them with adequate water and food or properly cleaning their cages, and she contended that Mollaghan's actions led to overcrowding and suffering by numerous animals, which Montie asserted violated provisions of the Penal Code as well as the Bastrop County Rabies and Animal Control Order ("Order"). See Tex. Penal Code § 42.092 (); Order § 8.1 (). In response, Bastrop County filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the case because Montie did not comply with the requirements for a claim under the Act. Subsequently, the district court convened a hearing on the plea. Once the district court considered the parties' various arguments, it issued an order denying Bastrop County's plea. Bastrop County appealed that ruling. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 51.014(a)(8) (), 101.001(3) (defining "[g]overnmental unit" as including counties). In its appeal, Bastrop County argued that "the district court does not have jurisdiction over Montie's claims because she did not make a report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority," as required by the Act, when she allegedly informed two members of the Bastrop County Commissioners' Court ("Commissioners' Court") about the misconduct. Bastrop Cty. v. Montie, No. 03-14-00424-CV, 2015 WL 1611944, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). After considering the arguments offered by the parties, this Court determined "that Montie could not reasonably have believed that the two commissioners were an appropriate law-enforcement authority." Id. Accordingly, we concluded "that Montie was not entitled to protection under the Act" and reversed "the order of the district court denying Bastrop County's plea to the jurisdiction." Id. However, we also remanded "the case to the district court to allow Montie an opportunity to replead" "because the pleadings [did] not establish that Montie's claims suffer from an incurable jurisdictional defect." Id.
On remand, Montie amended her petition and asserted, among other things, that she made a complaint to an appropriate law-enforcement authority when she reported the allegedmisconduct by Mollaghan to Mollaghan herself. In response, Bastrop County filed a second plea to the jurisdiction asserting that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Montie's claims because Montie's claims did not satisfy the requirements of the Act. Further, as support for its arguments, Bastrop County attached an affidavit from the Chief Deputy of the Bastrop County Sheriff's Office, Charlie Littleton, to its plea. Subsequent to Bastrop County filing its plea, Montie filed a motion to strike Littleton's affidavit. After considering the arguments by the parties, the district court denied Montie's motion to strike and granted Bastrop County's plea to the jurisdiction. In three issues on appeal, Montie challenges the district court's rulings on her motion to strike and on Bastrop County's plea to the jurisdiction. We will reverse the district court's order granting Bastrop County's plea to the jurisdiction and remand the case for further proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law" that appellate courts "review de novo." City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013). Accordingly, appellate courts perform a de novo review of a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007); see Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) (). When performing this review, courts look to the plaintiff's petition to determine "whether the facts pled affirmatively demonstrate that jurisdiction exists." State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007). "If the pleadings are insufficient to establish jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable defect, the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to replead." Id. at 643. However, if "the pleadings affirmatively negate the existenceof jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend." Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). When, as here, "an action is grounded in statute, subject matter jurisdiction must be shown under the applicable statute." Arnold v. Price, 365 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). Moreover, if a plea "challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, [appellate courts] consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised." Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. Where a challenged jurisdictional fact overlaps with the merits and where "the evidence creates a fact question . . . [,] the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder." Id. at 227-28.
In addition, the jurisdictional questions at issue in this appeal involve statutory construction, which appellate courts also perform de novo. See Texas Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008). When performing this analysis, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. 2011); State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). In ascertaining that intent, we rely on the plain meaning of the words in the statute "unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results." DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 635; see Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009); Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 284. If "a statute's words are unambiguous and yield but one interpretation," we "give such statutes their plain meaning without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids." Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., 422 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2013). Moreover, we look to the entire act and not just to "isolatedportions," 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex. 2008), and we read the statute as a whole, In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tex. 2014). Furthermore, we presume that "the Legislature selected language in a statute with care and that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind," DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 635, and we endeavor not to interpret a statute "in a manner that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous," Columbia Med. Ctr. of Los Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008).
DISCUSSION
Motion to Strike
In her second issue on appeal, Montie challenges the district court's ruling regarding her motion to strike the affidavit from Littleton that Bastrop County attached to its plea to the jurisdiction. In his affidavit, Littleton explained that he is the Chief Deputy of the Bastrop County Sheriff's Office and assists the Sheriff in administering "the activities of the deputies in the various departments," including the Estray Division. See Black's Law Dictionary 631 (9th Ed. 2010) (defining "[e]stray" as "[a] valuable tame animal found wandering and ownerless; an animal that has escaped from its owner and wanders about"). In addition, he related that animal-cruelty cases are investigated by deputies for the Estray Division "who would then submit a completed investigation to the" district attorney. Further, he explained that although the animal shelter was under the supervision of the Sheriff's Office at the time that Montie was hired, supervision was later transferred to the Commissioners Court. When discussing Mollaghan, Littleton explained that she "was a Department Head in charge of the administrative and operational duties of the Shelter" and directed "the day to day operation of the animal shelter" but did not "conduct criminal investigationsof animal cruelty" and had no "authority to regulate or enforce animal cruelty criminal laws." Finally, he related that "Mollaghan was not a State of Texas certified peace office or prosecutor and therefore, could not investigate or prosecute criminal violations of law against anyone, including any violations of law against herself."
When challenging the district court's ruling, Montie asserts that the affidavit was not submitted until two years after the discovery period expired and 47 days before the scheduled trial date. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.3 (). Further, Montie contends that Bastrop County failed to disclose Littleton as either an expert or as a person with knowledge of relevant facts in its response to requests for disclosures...
To continue reading
Request your trial