Morales–torrens v. Noreste
| Decision Date | 15 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 09–1413 (GAG). |
| Citation | 767 F.Supp.2d 287 |
| Parties | Gilberto MORALES–TORRENS, Plaintiff,v.CONSORCIO DEL NORESTE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Wilma E. Reveron–Collazo, Estudio Legal Wilma E. Reveron Collazo, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Manuel Porro–Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Office, Christian E. Pagan–Cordoliani, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Wandymar Burgos–Vargas, P.R. Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Plaintiff, Gilberto Morales–Torrens (“Plaintiff”), commenced this action against the Consorcio del Noreste (“Consorcio”) and its Executive Director Carlos Rodriguez–Rivera (“Rodriguez–Rivera”) (collectively, “Defendants”) in their official and personal capacities. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also brings state claims alleging violations of Puerto Rico Law 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 194(a); Puerto Rico Law 45 of April 18, 1935, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 11, § 7; and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141–5142.
Presently before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 71). Plaintiff opposed this motion (Docket No. 77). By leave of the court, Defendants filed a reply brief (Docket No. 92) which Plaintiff opposed by sur-reply (Docket No. 95). After reviewing these submissions and the pertinent law, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion at Docket No. 71.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “An issue is genuine if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party’ at trial, and material if it ‘possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.’ ” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). The nonmoving party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2003)).
The Consorcio del Noreste is a government entity with the capacity to sue and be sued. ( See Docket No. 28–2 ¶ 4.) The Consorcio receives federal funds under the Work Investment Act (“WIA”) to train, provide services and mentoring programs to increase Puerto Rico's workforce. ( See Docket No. 71 –1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Morales–Torrens began working for the Consorcio on August 13, 2001 as a regular employee in the position of Assistant Counselor at the main offices of the Consorcio. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 2.) During his employment and prior to January 2005, Plaintiff held various trust positions as Director and Interim Director, as well as career positions as Sub Director. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 3.) In 2003, by recommendation of New Progressive Party (“NPP”) member and then Mayor of Río Grande, Hon. Emilio Rosa Pacheco, Plaintiff was appointed Director of the Local Office of Río Grande. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 4.) The position of Director of the Local Office of Río Grande was a trust position appointment. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 5.) As such, Plaintiff was aware that the Executive Director of the Consorcio could remove him at any point in time for any reason. Id. The Executive Director that appointed Plaintiff as Director was Carlos Juan Mendez, an NPP activist. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff held the position of Director until 2004. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 8.)
In the year 2000, Plaintiff worked in the NPP primaries as an election poll watcher for the mayoral candidacy of Mr. Emilio Rosa Pacheco. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also worked as an election poll watcher for the NPP in the 2000 general elections. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 23.) In 2004, Plaintiff worked in the advance motorcade, “avanzadas,” for Carlos Juan Mendez, a NPP candidate for District 36 Representative. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 24.) Part of his duties as a member of the avanzadas was to distribute political propaganda for the NPP. Id. During the avanzadas, Plaintiff spent time with Rodriguez–Rivera and other Consorcio co-workers. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff worked as a poll watcher for gubernatorial candidate Luis Fortufiño in the 2008 NPP primaries. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 26.) Plaintiff voted in these primaries. Id.
Co-defendant Rodriguez–Rivera became the Executive Director of the Consorcio in January 2005. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 9.) Between February and March of that year, Rodriguez–Rivera interviewed and appointed Plaintiff to the trust position of Director of Participant Services. Id. On October 24, 2007, Plaintiff was notified by the Director of Human Resources, Mrs. Ivette Fuentes, that he had been transferred from his trust position to a career position. ( See Docket No. 71–1 ¶ 19; see also Docket No. 71–2 at 27, l. 21–25). Plaintiff subsequently filed complaints against Defendants in Puerto Rico Court of First Instance and in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on October 31, 2008 and May 7, 2009, respectively. (See Docket Nos. 88–14, 1.)
On May 18, 2009, Rodriguez–Rivera notified Plaintiff by letter of disciplinary proceedings against him and the intention of termination. ( See Docket Nos. 71–20; 28–2 ¶ 26(f)). On June 3, 2009, Plaintiff received a second letter notifying him of his dismissal. ( See Docket No. 77–13.) Plaintiff was notified through a third letter, dated June 11th, 2009 that he had been reinstated in his position while an informal hearing took place. ( See Docket No. 77–14.) Following an administrative hearing, Plaintiff was notified of his ultimate dismissal from the Consorcio. ( See Docket No. 71–21.)
III. Legal AnalysisA. Section 1983 Claim
Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Section 1983 creates a remedy for those who are deprived of the rights, privileges, or immunities granted to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Rodriguez–Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 99 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must prove that someone has deprived them of a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and the perpetrator acted under color of state law. Cruz–Erazo v. Rivera–Montañez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir.2000).
The First Amendment protects non policymaking public employees from adverse employment actions based on their political opinion. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75–76, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990); Padilla–Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2000). A prima facie case of political discrimination requires evidence that (1) the plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff's opposing political affiliation; (3) a challenged employment action occurred; and (4) political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged employment action. See Martinez–Velez v. Rey–Hernandez, 506 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir.2007); Peguero–Moronta v. Santiago, 464 F.3d 29, 48 (1st Cir.2006). Plaintiff “must point ‘to evidence on the record which, if credited, would permit a rational fact finder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus.’ ” Gonzalez–De–Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir.1996)). Additionally, the plaintiff “must make a fact-specific showing that a causal connection exists between the adverse treatment and the plaintiff's political affiliation.” Aviles–Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 5 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Correa–Martinez v. Arrillaga–Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 58 (1st Cir.1990)).
If the plaintiff proves his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory ground for...
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