Moran v. School Committee of Littleton

• Decision Date: 05 February 1945
• Citation: 317 Mass. 591,59 N.E.2d 279
• Parties: JOHN GEDDES MORAN v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF LITTLETON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

317 Mass. 591

59 N.E.2d 279

JOHN GEDDES MORAN v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF LITTLETON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

February 5, 1945

December 5, 6 1944.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., QUA, DOLAN RONAN, & WILKINS, JJ.

School and School Committee. Evidence, Affidavit, Presumptions and burdon of proof. Error, Whether error harmful. Quasi-judicial Tribunal.

It is a general rule, based on necessity and designed to enable an administrative board to exercise its power where it might otherwise be barred from so doing on account of the bias interest or prejudice of one or more of its members, that a member who is biased or prejudiced against one on trial before the board is not required to withdraw from the hearing if no other board can hear and determine the matter being heard, especially if his withdrawal would deprive the board of the number of members required to take a valid affirmative vote. Per RONAN,

J.

The mere fact that, at a hearing by a school committee of charges preferred by it under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, as appearing in St. 1934, c. 123, against a teacher serving at its discretion, two of its three members testified under oath as witnesses and were examined by the committee's counsel and cross-examined by counsel for the teacher, did not disqualify the two from resuming their function as members of the committee and participating in its decision.

A decision, made by an administrative board after a hearing required in a quasi-judicial proceeding, is a nullity if it is based on evidence known only to the members of the board and not presented at the hearing. Per

RONAN, J. At a hearing by a school committee of charges preferred by it under G. L.

(Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, as appearing in St. 1934, c. 123, against a teacher serving at discretion, no prejudicial error was shown in the admission of affidavits as evidence where it appeared that the charges were substantiated by evidence apart from the affidavits.

A school teacher dismissed by the school committee following proceedings under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, as appearing in St. 1934, c.

123, is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to secure his reinstatement in his position unless he proves that the school committee committed an error in such proceedings and that the error was prejudicial to him.

PETITION, filed in the Superior Court on October 5, 1943, for a writ of mandamus.

The case was heard by Forte, J. H. D. White, for the petitioner.

J. N. Kelly, for the respondents.

RONAN, J. The petitioner, a teacher serving at the discretion of the school committee, having been removed by the committee from his position as principal of the high school of Littleton after a public hearing upon charges preferred by the committee appealed from an order of the Superior Court dismissing a petition for mandamus which he brought to secure his reinstatement.

During the hearing before the committee, two of the three members who then constituted the committee testified under oath as witnesses, and were examined by counsel for the committee and cross-examined by counsel for the petitioner. Each of them after testifying resumed his duties as a member of the committee. Nothing in the record indicates that the petitioner objected to this procedure, but he now contends that by becoming witnesses they were thereby disqualified to act further as members and that the decision in which they participated was void.

The power of school committees to elect and contract with teachers and their duty to maintain the schools at a high standard have been frequently stated in the decisions of this court and we need not repeat what was there stated. See, for instance, Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325; Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82; Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679; Hayes v. Brockton. 313 Mass. 641 . The responsibility for the removal of a teacher who is incompetent or whose retention would be detrimental to the best interests of the public school system rests exclusively with the committee, although the exercise of the power to remove a teacher has for many years been regulated by statute, more especially with reference to teachers who like the petitioner are employed to serve at the discretion of the committee. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, as appearing in St. 1934, c. 123. Knowles v. Boston, 12 Gray, 339. Toothaker v. School Committee of

Rockland, 256 Mass. 584 . Rinaldo v. School Committee of Revere, 294 Mass. 167. Graves v. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80 . Frye v. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537 . Perkins v. School Committee of Quincy, 315 Mass. 47 . These statutory provisions do not limit the power conferred upon the committee but restrict the manner of its exercise. No provision has been made by the Legislature to substitute anyone for a member of the committee who might be biased, prejudiced or personally interested in the ousting of a teacher, or who by physical or other reasons is unable to be present and participate in the hearings. Perkins v. School Committee of Quincy, 315 Mass. 47 . Compare Real Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 311 Mass. 430 . Furthermore, no removal can be effected except by a two thirds vote of the entire committee. It is unlikely that members of a school committee, especially in a small town, will not learn of the public's criticism of or dissatisfaction with the work or conduct of a teacher, particularly one who occupies the highest position on the teaching staff. It can hardly be contended that possession of such information by a member of the committee would disqualify him from hearing the charges and voting to retain or discharge the teacher. If members are to be disqualified upon such grounds, then it would frequently happen that the committee charged with the duty of removing a teacher could not act, and that a teacher, no matter how incompetent or unsuited on account of improper conduct of one kind or another, would remain immune to removal. It would be a reproach to the law if no remedy existed for the elimination of such a situation. The general rule is that a member of an administrative board who is biased or prejudiced against one on trial before the board is not required to withdraw from the hearing if no other board can hear and determine the matter, especially if his withdrawal would deprive the board of the number of members required to take a valid affirmative vote. This rule is based on necessity and is designed to enable the board to exercise its power where it might otherwise be barred from doing so on account of the bias, interest or prejudice of its members. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90 . Hill v. Wells, 6 Pick. 104. Commonwealth v. McLane, 4 Gray, 427. Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors, 48 Ariz. 104. Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. 22 Cal. (2d) 344. Gordy v. Dennis, 176 Md. 106. Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids, 192 Mich. 276. State v. Burney, 269 Mo. 602. State v. District Court, 87 Mont. 108. Crane v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 90 N. J. L. 109. People v. Waldo, 212 N.Y. 156. Bradycamp v. Metzger, 310 Penn. St. 320. State v. Humphreys, 163 Tenn. 20. Rutter v. Burke, 89 Vt. 14. State v. Houser, 122 Wis. 534. Compare Coyne v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 312 Mass. 224 .

The two members of the committee were not disqualified by acquiring the information that they disclosed as witnesses. Neither were they barred from further considering the case on account of the fact that they had testified. The petitioner was entitled to know all the evidence upon which the committee based its decision. If they considered their information material, they could not properly remain silent. The plain dictates of justice required them to disclose the facts that they knew, if they intended to consider them with the other testimony. If they did not divulge these facts and did consider them in reaching their conclusion to dismiss the petitioner, then the latter was deprived of the right given to him by the statute which prohibited his removal unless the charges were substantiated by evidence produced at the hearing. Even in the absence of such a statutory provision, a decision made in a quasi-judicial proceeding by an administrative board based on evidence known only to the members of the board is a nullity. American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 298 Mass. 161 . Boott Mills v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 311 Mass. 223 . Burns v. Thomas Cook & Sons, Inc. ante, 398. See Berlandi v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 424 , 447-448. To hold that the committee might proceed upon information that some of its members had acquired before the hearing and had withheld from the petitioner "would nullify the right to a hearing, -- for manifestly there is no hearing when the party does not know what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an opportunity to test, explain, or refute." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 227 U.S. 88, 93. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 17-20.

Doubtless, counsel is under an obvious and serious handicap in cross-examining a member of the committee before whom his client is on trial upon charges preferred by the committee, who it must be assumed had sufficient knowledge and confidence in the truth of the charges to warrant it in bringing ouster proceedings; but it must be kept in mind that the proceedings are brought in the public interest, and if the procedure provided is though to impose too great a hardship upon a teacher the remedy lies with the Legislature.

The petitioner objected to the introduction of six affidavits at the hearing before the committee. It may well be that the affidavits...