Morgan v. People
| Decision Date | 09 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 79SC367,79SC367 |
| Citation | 624 P.2d 1331 |
| Parties | Roy Alan MORGAN, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Steven H. Denman, Cynthia C. Cederberg, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for petitioner.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Susan P. Mele-Sernovitz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for Respondent.
Defendant Roy Alan Morgan was convicted by a jury of a violation of section 18-8-203, C.R.S.1973, introducing contraband in the first-degree. The defendant appealed contending that the trial court erred in denying his challenge of a prospective juror for cause. The court of appeals in an unpublished opinion affirmed the conviction. We granted certiorari, and now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
The specific charges against the defendant involved alleged possession of marijuana in the state penitentiary. During voir dire, the defense attorney indicated that his client might not testify. When the juror in question was asked if the defendant's failure to testify would affect his ability to be fair and impartial, he replied that he wanted to hear "both sides of the story." Following explanations of the general principles of law regarding the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent, the prospective juror indicated that he "could go along with that." However, he commented that he would "find it hard not hearing both sides of it," and that he couldn't "picture one side of a trial."
The need for a careful evaluation of the competence of potential jurors to assess the defendant's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence admitted at trial, and the serious practical problems involved with these assessments, are sound reasons for placing great discretion in the trial court in the jury selection procedures. See People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538, 549 P.2d 1320 (1976); Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922, 78 S.Ct. 1363, 2 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1958). The placing of this discretion in the trial judge does not, however, permit appellate courts to abdicate their responsibility to ensure that the requirements of fairness are fulfilled. Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337, 565 P.2d 1340 (1977). A prospective juror should be excused if "it appears doubtful" that he will be governed by the instructions of the court as to the law of the case. Jones v. People, 23 Colo. 276, 47 P. 275 (1896). See also Colo.Crim.P. 24(b)(1)(X) and section 16-10-103(1)(j),...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Harlan, No. 95SA298.
...it should resolve the doubt by sustaining the challenge." Russo, 713 P.2d at 362 (emphasis added); see also Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo.1981) ("A prospective juror should be excused if `it appears doubtful' that he will be governed by the instructions of the court as to the ......
-
People v. Hinojas-Mendoza, Court of Appeals No. 03CA0645 (CO 7/28/2005)
...to the defendant's receiving a fair trial, and the first prospective juror appeared to misunderstand that burden. See Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1981). As to the second prospective juror, his previous weapons charge and interest in motorcycles were race-neutral reasons for exerc......
-
People v. Marquez
...the merits of the case and an unwillingness to accept and apply those principles that form the bedrock of a fair trial"); Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331 (Colo.1981) (juror doubted his ability and willingness to apply the law following explanations of the general principles of law regarding......
-
People v. Tippett, 86SA3
...juror or alternate juror. Jury selection procedures are left within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331 (Colo.1981). The trial court erred in its method of selecting the alternate juror. However, the principle that error must be prejudicial to b......