Morris v. State

Decision Date17 January 2007
Docket NumberNo. 08-06-00267-CV.,08-06-00267-CV.
Citation214 S.W.3d 159
PartiesReginald Eugene MORRIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Stanley G. Schneider, W. Troy McKinney, Schneider & McKinney, P.C., Houston, for appellant.

Michael A. McDougal, Dist. Atty., Gail Kikawa McConnell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Conroe, for state.

Before McKEITHEN, C.J., GAULTNEY, and HORTON, JJ.

OPINION

HOLLIS HORTON, Justice.

On July 17, 1999, the JULIE V and a Wellcraft Nova Spyder collided on Lake Conroe. As a result, three passengers aboard the JULIE V were killed. Contending that Reginald Eugene Morris operated the Wellcraft at the time of the collision, the State charged Morris with three separate counts of intoxication manslaughter. TEX. PEN.CODE ANN. § 49.08 (Vernon 2003).1 (1) In July 2000, a jury found Morris guilty on each count. Morris v. State, No. 09-00-477 CR, 2002 WL 31835085, at *1 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, Dec.18, 2002, pet.ref'd). Morris appealed, and we reversed and remanded his case for a new trial because of errors in admitting and excluding evidence. Id. at *17.

Before his retrial, Morris asserted he was not competent to stand trial. However, at his competency trial in February 2004, a jury rejected his incompetency claim.

Subsequently, in August 2004, the State again tried Morris on three counts of intoxication manslaughter and once again the jury found Morris guilty on each charge. The jury assessed punishment on each count at eighteen years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and a $10,000 fine.

Morris now appeals the jury's finding in his competency hearing. He contends that the jury's finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Morris also appeals from the jury's finding of guilt in his August 2004 trial, and asserts the evidence supporting his conviction is legally insufficient and that the trial court made various errors in allowing and excluding evidence. Finally, Morris appeals from the trial court's judgment and asserts the trial court erred in cumulating his sentences.

Morris raises eleven points of error in his brief. Having reviewed the record, we find no reversible error with respect to the competency trial or the guilt phase of his intoxication manslaughter trial. With respect to his sentence, we agree the trial court erred in the manner it partially cumulated his sentences. As a result, we affirm Morris's convictions, and because we agree that the trial court improperly cumulated his sentences, we modify the judgment to provide that Morris's sentence on Count III run concurrently with his sentence on count II. As reformed, we affirm.

Challenge to Jury's Competency Finding

In his first point of error, Morris asserts that the jury's finding him competent to stand trial is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Morris argues that he was incompetent to stand trial because a traumatic brain injury caused him to have no memory of the event. At the competency trial, Morris contended that he had no memory from a period of approximately thirty minutes before the accident until four days later.

Standard of Review

Under Texas law, a defendant is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving he was incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).2 (2) A person is incompetent if he does not have:

(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or

(2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.

Id. at 46B.003(a).3 (3) When a defendant challenges a jury finding on which he bears the burden, "the correct standard of review is whether after considering all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust." Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim.App.1990). Because both elements of the test for incompetency address the defendant's competence at a future date, rather than the time of the offense, a claim that the defendant suffers from a memory problem of a past event would not generally trigger a competency hearing. Further, we note that the State is not required to prove a culpable mental state for a conviction for intoxication manslaughter under Section 49.08 of the Penal Code. Thus, whether a memory lapse could result in a defendant's incompetence to stand trial for intoxication manslaughter is debatable. Here, however, since the trial court allowed Morris a competency hearing, and because the State does not contend that a competency hearing was not required, we proceed under the assumption that Morris's memory deficiency triggered a right to a competency proceeding.

The Competency Trial

Morris called five witnesses and the State called one witness at the competency trial. Morris first called Dr. Steven Rosenblatt, a board certified psychiatrist, as an adverse witness. Dr. Rosenblatt agreed that as a result of the collision, Morris suffered a traumatic brain injury. Dr. Rosenblatt indicated that Morris told him he made a conscious decision not to drive the boat and went to sleep in the aft area of the boat. Dr. Rosenblatt agreed that if Morris could not remember the events shortly before the incident that he would be unable to testify regarding those events. Nevertheless, Dr. Rosenblatt stated that Morris could testify to the things about which he had knowledge, and that even if Morris had amnesia for the events immediately prior to the incident, he was not incompetent under the applicable statutory test. Dr. Rosenblatt testified that Morris was aware of the nature of the charges against him and the potential consequences of a trial, and that, even if he could not remember the incident itself, he could assist his attorneys by providing relevant information about the day of the accident. Dr. Rosenblatt testified that in his opinion, Morris was competent to stand trial.

Morris also called Jack Zimmerman, a board certified criminal attorney. Although not familiar with the facts of this case, Zimmerman testified that a person without the present ability to consult with his attorney concerning the facts of the offense with which he is charged is not competent to stand trial, unless no question exists about what happened. However, Zimmerman admitted that he would not file a motion claiming his client to be incompetent just because the client claimed he was asleep when the crime was committed. Zimmerman also agreed that a defendant would not be considered incompetent if intoxication caused the impairment.

Dr. Daneen Milam, a neuropsychologist, also testified for Morris. Dr. Milam addressed numerous issues and testified that Morris could not: (1) give a reasonable account of what happened at the time of the offense; (2) identify or locate witnesses; (3) help plan his legal strategy; (4) follow testimony for the purpose of determining if there were errors; (5) testify to relevant evidence or be cross-examined; (6) challenge prosecution witnesses; or (7) disclose pertinent facts surrounding the alleged offense. Dr. Milam testified that in her opinion, Morris was not competent to stand trial. However, Dr. Milam acknowledged that Morris's intellectual abilities were normal and that during her interview, Morris knew who she was and why she was there. Dr. Milam also stated that Morris had the present ability to talk to his lawyer, understand the charges against him, and provide his attorney with information for other portions of the day that he recalled that might be helpful to his defense.

Another witness called by Morris, Sergeant Kenneth Henderson, testified that the only potential eyewitnesses to the collision itself were the people on the boats involved in the collision. Gary Carlin, the Wellcraft's other occupant and one of the potential witnesses, died in May 2000. Sergeant Henderson testified that none of the occupants of the JULIE V could identify the Wellcraft's driver at the time of the collision but also stated that the identity of its driver could be determined through factors other than eyewitness testimony.

Finally, Debbie Cummings, Morris's lifetime partner, testified that Morris was unconscious for three to four days after the accident. During her testimony, Cummings related several incidents occurring long after the collision that showed Morris continued to suffer from an ongoing short-term memory impairment.

During its case, the State called Dr. Walter Quijano, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Quijano testified that in his opinion amnesia itself is not a basis to find a person incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Quijano recognized that there might be circumstances when amnesia, together with an absence of evidence to allow a reconstruction of events, might render a person incompetent. Dr. Quijano suggested that if a person had amnesia, it would be important to determine if the circumstances could be shown by other witness-testimony or physical evidence. Finally, Dr. Quijano suggested that Morris's amnesia was alcohol-induced.

The jury rejected Morris's incompetency claim.

Application of Texas Law to Facts

Morris relies principally on Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.Crim. App.1977) to support his claim that amnesia renders a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Morris contends that his inability to recall events from a period of thirty minutes prior to the accident until about four days later interfered with his ability to consult with his attorney, and that because of this amnesia, he did not have a factual understanding of the proceeding against him.

In Jackson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument that the defendant's loss of memory rendered him incompetent to stand trial for a charge of voluntary manslaughter. 548 S.W.2d at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Morris v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • November 18, 2009
    ...respect appellant's amnesia claim, but I dissent to the Court's judgment with respect to the stacking issue. 1. Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159, 164-68 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 2007). 2. Appellant's issues are (1) The court of appeals erred in reforming the trial court's stacking order rather t......
  • State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • December 29, 2011
    ...or his hospital records. Also significant, Texas requires expert proof to be by clear and convincing evidence, Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tex.App.2007), and Mata has since been limited and held not to preclude blood test result evidence when expert retrograde extrapolation testim......
  • Wooten v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 22, 2008
    ...the hospital's blood-serum analysis and converting the results into whole-blood analysis terminology); Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159, 175-77 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. granted) (assessing the reliability of blood-test results from Kodak Etchakem 750 in hospital's blood-serum test); Gar......
  • Lasiter v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 2009
    ...of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust." Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim.App.1990); Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. granted). We are mindful that in reviewing a fact finder's resolution of an issue, "[t]he jury is the judge of the cre......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
27 books & journal articles
  • Argumentative questions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Is It Admissible? Part I. Testimonial Evidence
    • May 1, 2022
    ...during cross-examination, opposing counsel may probe bias, partnership or financial interests of the witness. 11 Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159 (Tex.App., 2007). In general, the trial court retains the discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination to avoid harassment and endangerment ......
  • Pretrial Motions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1 - 2021 Contents
    • August 16, 2021
    ...of proof at a competency hearing is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent by a pre ponderance of the evidence. Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. filed ). To prove incompetence, a defendant must prove he does not have a sufficient present ability to consult ......
  • Pretrial Motions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1 - 2015 Contents
    • August 17, 2015
    ...of proof at a competency hearing is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent by a pre ponderance of the evidence. Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. filed ). To prove incompetence, a defendant must prove he does not have a sufficient present ability to consult ......
  • Argumentative Questions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2015 Part I - Testimonial Evidence
    • July 31, 2015
    ...during cross-examination, opposing counsel may probe bias, partnership or financial interests of the witness. 8 Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159 (Tex.App., 2007). In general, the trial court retains the discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination to avoid harassment and endangerment o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT