Morrow v. Helms
Decision Date | 16 March 2001 |
Citation | 873 So.2d 1132 |
Parties | Pamela MORROW and Ruth H. Morrow v. Annie Jean HELMS et al. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
C. Clay Torbert III and Richard H. Allen of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for appellants.
L. Merrill Shirley, Elba, for appellees.
Annie Jean Helms and several other persons (the "contestants") contested the validity of a will offered for probate as the will of Bernice Grimes; they filed their contest in the Coffee Probate Court. Pamela Morrow and Ruth H. Morrow (the "proponents") maintained that the will was valid. The case was transferred from the Coffee Probate Court to the Coffee Circuit Court. The will contest proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict for the contestants. The proponents moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") at the close of the contestants' evidence and at the close of all the evidence, and the proponents renewed their motion after the jury had returned its verdict. The trial court denied both motions and entered a judgment for the contestants. The proponents appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the case to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975. The motion formerly known as a motion for a directed verdict is now known as a motion for a judgment as a matter of law (JML). See Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P. Our supreme court has stated the standard of review applicable to a ruling on a JML motion:
Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 So.2d 1237, 1240 (Ala.1999).
The proponents argue that the trial court erred by submitting the following issues to the jury: (1) whether the will was invalid because of an improper execution; (2) whether the will was invalid on the basis of incapacity; and (3) whether the will was invalid on the basis of an exercise of undue influence by the proponents over the decedent.
The proponents argue that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider whether the will was properly executed. They argue that the will was self-proved, pursuant to § 43-8-132, Ala.Code 1975, which states:
It is undisputed that the will and the acknowledgment complied with all the requirements of § 43-8-132, except that the documents contain no notary seal. The proponents argue that the absence of the notary seal does not destroy the self-proved status of the will. The contestants argue that the absence of the notary seal precludes the will from being self-proved. This court has held that the absence of a notary seal on an affidavit presented as evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment did not affect the admissibility of the affidavit. McCloud v. State, 715 So.2d 230 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998). The court stated its reasoning as follows:
715 So.2d at 232. See also Harrison v. Simons, 55 Ala. 510 (1876) ( ).
The holding of McCloud is directly applicable to this case. Section 43-8-132(b) provides that the will becomes self-proved by execution of an acknowledgment of the testator and affidavits of the witnesses, which are certified by a notary. Both McCloud and this case involve notarization of affidavits, and, based on the holding of McCloud, we conclude that the notary seal is not required to validate the acknowledgment and affidavits in the decedent's will. Furthermore, the notary in this case, who is also the attorney who drafted the will, signed the document and testified that he witnessed the signing of the will by the decedent and the witnesses. In this case, the contestants presented no other evidence indicating that the will was improperly executed or that the affidavits were forged or fraudulent. Therefore, the trial court erred by not admitting the will as self-proved and erred by submitting to the jury the issue whether the will was properly executed.
Bolan v. Bolan, 611 So.2d 1051, 1057 (Ala. 1993).
The decedent and her husband, who had predeceased her, accumulated a sizable estate during their marriage. They operated a successful business for many years. They had no children. In 1994, the decedent executed a will that would have divided her estate among her sister and her niece—the proponents—and several of her husband's relatives, who are the contestants. The 1994 will favored the proponents. Her husband died of cancer in 1996. In December 1996, the decedent was diagnosed with the same form of cancer that her husband had had. In January 1997, the decedent executed a will that practically disinherited all of the contestants and left almost all her estate to the proponents. The decedent died in 1998. The contestants are challenging the probate of the 1997 will. The evidence most favorable to the contestants indicates that the decedent had been extremely upset about her cancer diagnosis. Her physician prescribed a pain reliever. The proponents presented no evidence indicating that the pain medication had made the decedent mentally incompetent at the time she executed the will. The attorney who drafted the will testified that the decedent was competent at the time she executed her will. The evidence in the record suggests that the decedent may have executed the 1997 will rashly and quickly; however, the fact that a person takes rash actions while in a state of mental upset is not at all proof of a lack of capacity. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by submitting to the jury the issue of the decedent's capacity.
Last, the proponents argue that the trial court erred by submitting to the jury the issue whether they had exercised undue influence over the decedent.
Burns v. Marshall, 767 So.2d 347, 352 (Ala.2000).
We conclude that the trial court also erred by submitting to the jury the issue of undue influence. The proponents are the sister and niece of the decedent, and they cared for the decedent during her terminal illness. However, the record contains no evidence indicating that the proponents...
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...a judgment entered by the Coffee Circuit Court on a jury verdict in favor of the contestants in a will contest. Morrow v. Helms, 873 So.2d 1132 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). On June 13, 2003, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed this court's judgment in part, reversed this court's judgment in part, and......