Mounier v. State
| Decision Date | 14 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 33521,33522,s. 33521 |
| Citation | 178 So.2d 714 |
| Parties | Bruce Adrian MOUNIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Vernon Russell THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert E. Brandt, Miami, for appellants.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
These two appeals were consolidated and will be disposed of in one opinion inasmuch as the points involved in both appeals are identical.
The defendants in the court below, Thompson and Mounier, were arrested by officers of the Department of Conservation for spearfishing in a prohibited area in Monroe County contrary to the provisions of Section 370.172(2), Florida Statutes 1963, F.S.A. They were tried before the court without a jury, adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $500 each or serve six months in the county jail.
During the course of the trial, a motion was made to quash the information on the ground that the statute, the violation of which was charged therein, was unconstitutional These cases must be reversed because the proof of the State clearly established the fact that the offense upon which these defendants were convicted was not committed in Monroe County. Having reached such conclusion, we are not required nor should we pass upon the validity of the subject statute. It is a fundamental principle that courts will not do so where the case before them may be disposed of upon any other ground. This result does not, however, divest us of jurisdiction under the Constitution. In the Lissenden case, 3 we held that where a trial court directly passes upon the validity of a state statute, this Court has jurisdiction of and should determine the appeal even though in its consideration of the case it is decided that the action of the trial court in passing upon the jurisdictional issue of statutory validity was unnecessary to the disposition of the cause.
and invalid in that 'it offends the equal protection of the laws clause of the State and Federa Constitutions; that the Act was a local act passed under the guise of a general law; that the classification upon which the Statute was based is unreasonable, arbitrary and possessed of no unique character; that the Statute was arbitrary and discriminatory and that it discriminated against a class of persons; that the Statute countervenes [sic] and is repugnant to the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions, guaranteeing to citizens the right to due process of law. It is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary, harsh and discriminatory, and it countervenes [sic] the spirit and the intent of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Florida. It violates the Declaration of Rights and it violates Section 24 of the Declaration of Rights.' 1 The motion to quash was overruled, thereby passing directly upon the validity of this statute. 2 Such ruling in an appeal from the final judgment of conviction entered after trial upon the merits brings this case within our appellate jurisdiction on direct appeal
We now direct our attention to the basic issue in these cases. Was the offense for which these defendants were convicted in Monroe County, Florida committed within said county?
The statute under which the indictment was made provides in its pertinent provisions:
'(2) It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to take any fish by means of any spear, gig or other similar device in an area in Monroe county known as the Upper Keys, or to engage in any spearfishing in said area, said area shall include all salt waters under the jurisdiction of the state board of conservation beginning at the county line between Dade and Monroe counties and running south, including all of the keys down to and including Long Key.' 370.172(2), F.S.1963, F.S.A. (Emphasis supplied.)
At a preliminary hearing and during the trial it was conceded by the State that the violation occurred at Davis Reef which is 3 4/5 nautical miles off Plantation Key in a southeasterly direction.
Before proceeding to a further discussion of the question, we deem it pertinent to point out that the statute above quoted makes spearfishing unlawful in an area 'in Monroe county known as the Upper Keys.' The language following the semicolon to the effect that said area shall include The boundaries of Florida, as fixed by the Constitution at the time this offense was committed, appear in the footnote. 5 In this area the boundary is three geographical miles from the Florida coast line, 'meaning the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters; * * *' The boundaries of Monroe County are defined as 'so much of the State of Florida as is situated south of the county of Collier and west and south of the county of dade.' 6 Section 6.11, F.S.A. defines the coast line as follows:
all waters under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Conservation, etc. must be construed as relating only to that area lying within Monroe County. Whether the State Board of Conservation or the State of Florida through any other agency has jurisdiction over the waters or over the conduct of these defendants where the offense was committed or beyond that into the open ocean is a question not presented here and one on which we do not pass. 4 We are proscribed in our disposition of these cases by the limited issue involved
Organic law requires that in all criminal prosecutions the accused have the right to a public trial in the county where the crime was committed. 7
No citation of authority is required or necessary to support the proposition that the failure of the State to prove that the crime was committed in the county where the trial took place is fatal.
The record of the hearing reveals that both the county solicitor and the trial judge were laboring under the mistaken view that the constitutional boundaries of the State of Florida extended to the edge of the Gulf Stream. This was the boundary of the State under Article I of the Constitution prior to the adoption of Amended Article I at the general election in 1962. In 1962, however, the boundaries of Florida were changed by the people to include only a distance seaward of three geographic miles in this particular area. It appearing without any question that the offense was committed beyond this line, it follows that the conviction was a nullity and that these defendants should have been discharged.
Reversed and remanded with directions to discharge these defendants and restore to them the personal property which was confiscated by the State.
It is so ordered.
I vigorously dissent for the reasons given in my dissenting opinion in Lissenden v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 So.2d 632. I still think it is dead wrong to entertain a case here because the trial court has passed on the constitutionality of an act and then evade that issue by resorting to the rule that constitutionality will not be decided if the case can be determined without it.
I do not believe this case should be decided on the basis of whether the spearfishing acts alleged to constitute criminal offenses occurred within the legal boundaries of the State of Florida as such boundaries are prescribed by the State Constitution and laws of the State. Moreover, under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.) as construed in the Tidelands cases in United States v. Floirda, 363 U.S. 121, 80 S.Ct. 1026, 4 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1960), and United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 80 S.Ct. 961, 4 L.Ed.2d 1025, the actual legal boundaries of the State are yet to be officially determined. This Court should take judicial notice that the task of surveying and mapping the boundaries of the State pursuant to said Act as construed in the above decisions has not been completed Whether the spearfishing here involved took place within the legal boundaries of the State is therefore an open question. The Court should not put its imprimatur upon a determination of the location of a portion of the State boundary made in the local court prior to an official determination thereof by the State in agreement with the Federal Government.
nor have the State and the United States reached agreement as to the exact lines of the legal boundaries of the State as recognized by the Submerged Lands Act.
A cursory reading of the Submerged Lands Act, particularly its definitions of the terms 'boundaries' and 'coast line.' will reflect the complexity of the problem of determining the exact boundary line of the State along the eastern side of the Florida Keys. The Florida Keys, an archipelago of numerous islands and outcroppings of shals and mangrove flats, present many problems in determining the actual line of boundary of the State of Florida in this area.
But aside from the question concerning where the State's boundary line may exist within the contemplation of the Submerged Lands Act, its location is immaterial insofar as the disposition of the...
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