Mugge v. Warnell Lumber & Veneer Co.

• Decision Date: 23 November 1909
• Citation: 58 Fla. 318,50 So. 645
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: MUGGE v. WARNELL LUMBER & VENEER CO.

50 So. 645

58 Fla. 318

MUGGE v. WARNELL LUMBER & VENEER CO.

Florida Supreme Court

November 23, 1909

In Banc. Action by the Warnell Lumber & Veneer Company against Robert Mugge. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a writ of error. Motion denied.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The rules used in construing statutes are in general applicable in construing Constitutions.

In construing and applying provisions of a Constitution, the leading purpose should be to ascertain and effectuate the intent and object designed to be accomplished.

In determining the meaning of words in a Constitution, they should be taken, not separately, but in conjunction with other words, and considered in the light of the purpose of the lawmakers, as shown by the provisions as an entirety.

When words may import different meanings, they should have the meaning and effect designed to be given them, as appears by a fair consideration of the whole context, in view of the object intended to be accomplished.

When consideration is given to all the provisions on the subject it is apparent that the intent, purpose, and policy of the Constitution is to confer upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases that the circuit courts exercise original jurisdiction of and determine, and to vest in the circuit courts appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases that the county courts exercise original jurisdiction of and determine.

The words 'originating' and 'arising,' as used in the sections of the Constitution relating to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the circuit courts refer to all cases which the circuit and county courts respectively, exercise original jurisdiction of and determine.

Where a county court is established by the Legislature in a county it has original jurisdiction over all such causes as are assigned to its jurisdiction by the Constitution, whether such causes have already been instituted in the circuit court or not; and where cases over which such county court has exclusive original jurisdiction have already, before the establishment of such county court, been instituted in the circuit court, such circuit court, immediately upon the establishment of the county court, ceases to have original jurisdiction over all such causes, and they are transferred for trial and determination from the circuit court to such county court ex proprio vigore the legislative act establishing such county court, and over all such civil causes so transferred to and determined by such county court the circuit court, under the Constitution, has exclusive final appellate jurisdiction. If the judge of the circuit court is disqualified to hear and determine appellate proceedings in any such cause, because of orders made therein by him while the cause was pending in the circuit court, the law provides for a hearing therein before some other qualified circuit judge. The Supreme Court in such civil cases has no appellate jurisdiction, whether the cause was in fact originally instituted in the circuit court or not.

The circuit court, not the Supreme Court, has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of a county court, in causes commenced in the circuit court, but transferred by operation of law, upon the creation of the county court, to the latter court.

COUNSEL Glen & Himes, for plaintiff in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD C.J.

The Warnell Lumber & Veneer Company brought an action against Robert Mugge in the circuit court for Hillsborough county. While the action was pending in the circuit court, a county court for Hillsborough county was established by an act of the Legislature, and the cause, not then being within the jurisdiction of the circuit court, was transferred to such county court, where a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff below.

Counsel for the defendant below have presented here a motion for a writ of error to the said judgment of the county court. A writ of error is, under the statutes of this state, a writ of right, and issues on demand; but, as the case raises a question of appellate jurisdiction, the motion is presented, so the jurisdictional feature may be determined before the writ of error is issued. See Webster v. Powell, 36 Fla. 703, 18 So. 441.

The provisions of the Constitution to be considered are: 'The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity originating in the circuit courts.' Section 5, art. 5. 'The circuit courts * * * shall have final appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising in the county court.' Section 11, art. 5. The county courts have no equity jurisdiction in any county. Nor do the county courts have criminal jurisdiction in counties where criminal courts of record are established therein. Section 29, art. 5, Const.; Jackson v. State, 33 Fla. 620, 15 So. 250. There is a criminal court of record in Hillsborough county. The rules used in construing statutes are in general applicable in construing Constitutions. 8 Cyc. 729.

In construing and applying provisions of a Constitution, the leading purpose should be to ascertain and effectuate the intent and the object designed to be accomplished. In determining the meaning of words, they should be taken, not separately, but in conjunction with other words, and considered in the light of the purpose of the lawmakers, as shown by the provisions as an entirety. Where words may import different meanings, they should have the meaning and effect designed to be given them, as appears by a fair consideration of the whole context, in view of the object intended to be accomplished. There is no question of general and special or particular intent here. See 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 347 et seq.; Board of Public Instruction v. County Commissioners (decided at this term) 50 So. 574; Conklin v. Goldsmith, 5 Fla. 280; Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. D'Alemberte, 39 Fla. 25, 21 So. 570.

When consideration is given to all the provisions on the subject it is apparent that the intent, purpose, and policy of the Constitution are to confer upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases of which the circuit courts take original jurisdiction, and to vest in the circuit courts appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases of which the county courts take original jurisdiction. With this in view the language, 'all cases at law or in equity originating in the circuit courts,' and 'all civil cases arising in the county courts,' as used in the sections of the Constitution above quoted, clearly mean all case...