Murray v. Regier

• Decision Date: 05 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC01-100, No. SC01-174.
• Citation: 872 So.2d 217
• Parties: Charles MURRAY, Petitioner, v. Jerry REGIER, etc., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

872 So.2d 217

Charles MURRAY, Petitioner, v. Jerry REGIER, etc., et al., Respondents.

Nos. SC01-100, SC01-174.

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 5, 2002.

Rehearing Denied April 23, 2004.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and John E. Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin and Margaret Brenan, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.

HARDING, Senior Justice.

We have for review Murray v. Kearney, 770 So.2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), on the basis of express and direct conflict with this Court's opinion in Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center v. T.O., 684 So.2d 814 (Fla.1996). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Murray also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court. We granted review of both matters and consolidated them for purposes of oral argument.

This case has a long and rather convoluted procedural history. Charles Murray is currently being detained in a state treatment center pending his commitment trial under the Jimmy Ryce Act (the Act).¹ Murray was convicted in Dade County of attempted capital sexual battery on a minor child through a plea agreement in which he agreed to a term of incarceration followed by probation with the condition that he complete a sex offender treatment program. After Murray served the incarcerative portion of his sentence, but prior to his release for probation, the State filed a petition to have Murray civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under the Act. Murray then filed a motion for specific performance of his criminal plea agreement, arguing that he should be released to serve the agreed-upon probation. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Murray's motion.

Murray then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fourth District Court of Appeal,² seeking his release from the treatment center based upon an alleged violation of his constitutional right to due process. The Fourth District Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the circuit court that ordered Murray's pretrial detention under the Act and transferred the habeas petition to the Third District Court of Appeal.³ The Third District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the habeas petition because Murray was not confined in the court's territorial jurisdiction and transferred the petition back to the Fourth District Court. The Fourth District Court then dismissed the petition, without prejudice to Murray to seek a written order on his motion for specific performance of the plea agreement and to seek review of that order in the Third District Court of Appeal. On Murray's motion for rehearing, clarification, or certification, the Fourth District Court withdrew its order of dismissal and ordered the State to respond to Murray's petition. The Fourth District Court then issued an opinion concluding that it did not have jurisdiction and once again dismissed Murray's petition. The district court noted that habeas relief is unavailable where an appeal is available and concluded that Murray should have appealed the order of civil commitment, appealed the denial of his motion to enforce the plea, or moved to withdraw his plea. Upon Murray's motion for rehearing, the Fourth District Court withdrew this opinion and issued a substitute opinion on November 1, 2000, which is the subject of the instant proceedings. See Murray v. Kearney, 770 So.2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

In the opinion under review, the Fourth District Court again stated that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Murray's petition and dismissed it. See id. at 274. The district court stated that its habeas jurisdiction was limited to determining whether the challenged order was entered without jurisdiction or was illegal. The district court cited this Court's opinion in Alachua Regional, which addressed the scope of review when the court entertaining a habeas petition does not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court that issued the order under challenge. See Murray, 770 So.2d at 274. Under this inquiry, the Fourth District Court determined that Murray was not entitled to relief because the trial court that issued the commitment order had jurisdiction over the cause and the order was legal. See id. at 274-75. The district court noted that Murray's civil commitment was not a continuation of his incarceration from the plea because the criminal case involved a totally separate proceeding. The court further noted that Murray had not raised an argument that his confinement violates the requirements of the Act. See id. In a footnote, the district court characterized Murray's claim as "alleging an equitable estoppel against the state pursuing civil commitment" because he had substantially changed his position by agreeing to the plea and sentence seven years before and that he had not received the bargained-for benefit of release from confinement. See id. at 275 n. 4.

After the district court dismissed Murray's habeas petition, he filed a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court based on express and direct conflict and also filed a habeas petition with this Court, arguing that his civil commitment order is illegal because it violates his due process right to specific performance of his plea agreement. We granted review in both cases and consolidated them for all appellate purposes. We resolve this matter on the basis that the Fourth District Court's decision is in conflict with this Court's opinion in Alachua Regional. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Fourth District Court did not correctly apply Alachua Regional to the facts of the instant case.

In Alachua Regional, this Court explained the scope of review when a court entertaining a habeas corpus petition does not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court that issued the order or other process under challenge. See 684 So.2d at 816. Under such circumstances, the scope of the reviewing court's jurisdiction is limited to whether the court that entered the order was without jurisdiction to do so or whether the order is void or illegal. Id. "The reviewing court may not discharge the detainee if the detention order is merely defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance." Id.

In the instant case, the Fourth District Court dismissed Murray's habeas petition, concluding that it "[did] not have jurisdiction." Murray, 770 So.2d at 274. The district court concluded that under Alachua Regional Murray's commitment order was not illegal because the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter and the order did not violate the procedural requirements of the Act. See id. at 274-75.

Murray contends that no court has ever considered the merits of his constitutional claim, that is, that the civil commitment violates his constitutional right to due process because the plea agreement in his criminal case specified that he would receive sex offender treatment while on probation supervision in the community. The procedural history of this case, recounted above, indeed reflects that Murray has been frustrated in his efforts to have the merits of his habeas claim considered by some court. While the scope of habeas inquiry by a court that does not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court which issued the order under challenge "is limited to whether the court that entered the order was without jurisdiction to do so or whether the order is void or illegal," Alachua Regional, 684 So.2d at 816, this limited inquiry does not foreclose constitutional challenges to pretrial detention or leave a petitioner like Murray without an avenue to bring such a challenge. Under the Fourth District Court's interpretation of Alachua Regional, a claim of illegality only encompasses the statutory or procedural requirements of the Act, and not constitutional claims like Murray's. As this Court explained in Haag v. State, 591 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1992), while the right to habeas relief "is subject to certain reasonable limitations consistent with [its] full and fair exercise," it "should be available to all through simple and direct means, without needless complication or impediment, and should be fairly administered in favor of justice and not bound by technicality." Further, "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); see also In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla.1977) (recognizing that civil commitment to a mental institution involves a deprivation of liberty and thus due process guarantees must be provided).

In light of these principles, we conclude that the Fourth District Court has interpreted the term "illegal" too narrowly. Under Alachua Regional, the reviewing court may discharge the detainee if the detention order is "void or illegal," but not if the order "is merely defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance." 684 So.2d at 816. A challenge to the form or substance of an order implies that something is lacking in the order or that it contains an imperfection or shortcoming. Alachua Regional followed a long line of cases that recognized similar limitations on a circuit court's habeas review. See, e.g., State ex rel. Scaldeferri v. Sandstrom, 285 So.2d 409 (Fla.1973) (holding that circuit court may entertain habeas corpus proceeding and discharge petitioner held under an illegal or void order issued by a court over which there is no appellate jurisdiction, but may not review "the legal sufficiency of the order"); Janes v. Heidtman, 272 So.2d 207, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (permitting reviewing court without appellate jurisdiction to discharge a person based on illegality of order, but not upon a determination of irregularity, insufficiency in form or substance or...