N.Y. State United Teachers v. State

• Citation: 31 N.Y.S.3d 618,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 03572,140 A.D.3d 90
• Decision Date: 05 May 2016
• Docket Number: 521358
• Parties: New York STATE UNITED TEACHERS, by its President, Karen E. MAGEE, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

140 A.D.3d 90

31 N.Y.S.3d 618

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 03572

New York STATE UNITED TEACHERS, by its President, Karen E. MAGEE, et al., Appellants,

v.STATE of New York et al., Respondents.

521358

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

May 5, 2016.

Richard E. Casagrande, New York State United Teachers, Latham, for appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb of counsel), for respondents.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., GARRY, LYNCH, DEVINE and CLARK, JJ.

DEVINE

, J.

Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered October 3, 2014 in Albany County, which, among other things, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and (2) from an order of said court, entered March 24, 2015 in Albany County, which, among other things, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.

In 2011, the Legislature enacted “a comprehensive property tax cap [to] help end the devastating impact of property taxes on homeowners throughout New York” (Senate Introducer's Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 2011, ch. 97, at 16). Education Law § 2023–a

was enacted as part of that legislation and provides that, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the amount of taxes that may be levied by or on behalf of any school district, other than a city school district of a city with [125,000] inhabitants or more, shall not exceed” a tax levy limit as defined in that section (Education Law § 2023–a[1] ). The statute provides an exception where a school district proposes a budget requiring a property tax levy exceeding the limit, and that budget is subsequently approved by a supermajority of at least 60% of voters casting ballots (see Education Law §§ 2022, 2023–a[6] ).

Plaintiffs commenced this action in 2013, seeking a declaration that the tax cap imposed by Education Law § 2023–a

was unconstitutional. In lieu of serving an answer, defendants moved to dismiss the first amended complaint. The Legislature created a real property tax freeze credit while that motion was pending (see L. 2014, ch. 59, part FF), the purpose of which was to provide a two-year income tax credit to eligible homeowners who had paid real property taxes to school and municipal jurisdictions that abided by the property tax cap and took further steps to improve efficiency (see Education Law § 2023–b

; Tax Law § 606[bbb] ). Plaintiffs thereafter sought leave to serve a second amended complaint that, among other things, challenged the constitutionality of the tax freeze as well as the tax cap.

In an order entered in October 2014, Supreme Court dismissed the first amended complaint and granted plaintiffs leave to serve the second amended complaint. Following service of the second amended complaint, defendants moved to dismiss it for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court thereafter issued an order in March 2015 that, among other things, granted that motion. In so doing, Supreme Court rejected defendants' contention that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action, but determined that their claims uniformly failed to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs now appeal from the October 2014 and March 2015 orders.¹

Defendants argue as an alternative ground for affirmance that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. With regard to the challenges to Education Law § 2023–a

, the second amended complaint alleges that the individual plaintiffs are all taxpayers and that they voted for school district budgets in 2012 requiring property tax levies that exceeded the tax levy limit, budgets that were supported by a simple majority of voters but failed to achieve the supermajority required by Education Law § 2023–a(6). Plaintiffs accordingly claim that Education Law § 2023–a has impaired their constitutional rights, including the “right to participate in the governance of their own schools,” and has degraded their ability to provide school funding as they see fit (Paynter v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d 434, 442, 765 N.Y.S.2d 819, 797 N.E.2d 1225 [2003] ). Applying the common-law standard for standing articulated in Boryszewski v. Brydges , 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579 (1975), we agree with Supreme Court that these allegations “gain [the individual plaintiffs] standing to challenge the constitutionality of” Education Law § 2023–a (Board of Educ., Shoreham–Wading Riv. Cent. School Dist. v. State of New York, 111 A.D.2d 505, 507, 488 N.Y.S.2d 887 [1985], lvs. dismissed 66 N.Y.2d 603, 498 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 489 N.E.2d 256 [1985], 66 N.Y.2d 854, 498 N.Y.S.2d 366, 489 N.E.2d 253 [1985] ; see Matter of

Schulz v. State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 336, 344–345, 599 N.Y.S.2d 469, 615 N.E.2d 953 [1993] ; compare

New York State Assn. of Small City School Dists., Inc. v. State of New York, 42 A.D.3d 648, 651, 840 N.Y.S.2d 179 [2007] [noting that “the parents and students of individual school districts can challenge the constitutionality of their school's funding”] ). The individual plaintiffs further allege that the tax freeze legislation authorized “a wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or ... illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of state funds” due to its allocation of those funds for a tax credit, and such allegation affords them standing to challenge it (State Finance Law § 123–b[1]

; see

Schulz v. Silver, 134 A.D.3d 1369, 1371–1372, 22 N.Y.S.3d 623 [2015], appeal dismissed 27 N.Y.3d 959, 29 N.Y.S.3d 921, 49 N.E.3d 1216 [2016]

). Inasmuch as the individual plaintiffs have standing, we need not go further and decide whether plaintiff New York State United Teachers has organizational standing (see

Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 813, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654, 798 N.E.2d 1047 [2003], cert. denied 540 U.S. 1017, 124 S.Ct. 570, 157 L.Ed.2d 430 [2003] ).

Turning to the arguments advanced by plaintiffs, in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994]

; see

J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 N.Y.3d 324, 334, 970 N.Y.S.2d 733, 992 N.E.2d 1076 [2013] ). Legislative acts nevertheless “enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality[, and] ... parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute's invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt” (LaValle v. Hayden, 98 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 746 N.Y.S.2d 125, 773 N.E.2d 490 [2002] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see

Schulz v. State of N.Y. Exec., 134 A.D.3d 52, 55, 19 N.Y.S.3d 92 [2015], appeal dismissed 26 N.Y.3d 1139, 27 N.Y.S.3d 502, 47 N.E.3d 782 [2016] ).

Plaintiffs allege that Education Law § 2023–a

and the tax freeze legislation run afoul of N.Y. Constitution, article XI, § 1 (hereinafter the Education Article), which directs the Legislature to “provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” The Education Article does not require that equal educational offerings be provided to every student, but does mandate defendant State of New York “to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 316, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 655 N.E.2d 661 [1995] ; see

Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today [R.E.F.I.T.] v. Cuomo, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 283, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551, 655 N.E.2d 647 [1995] ; Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 47–48, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 [1982], appeals dismissed 459 U.S. 1138, 1139, 103 S.Ct. 775, 74 L.Ed.2d 986 [1983] ). As a result, even “gross educational inequities” will not give rise to a claim under the Education Article, and a plaintiff must allege “the deprivation of a sound basic education, and causes attributable to the State” in order to state a claim (New York Civ. Liberties Union v. State of New York, 4 N.Y.3d 175, 178–179, 791 N.Y.S.2d 507, 824 N.E.2d 947 [2005] ).

Plaintiffs acknowledge in their second amended complaint that they are not “seek[ing] to establish any specific ... failure to provide a sound basic education” as a result of the challenged legislative acts. They nevertheless suggest that their claim is viable because the Education Article acknowledges that “a system of local school districts exists and will continue to do so because the residents of such districts have the right to participate in the governance of their own schools” (New York Civ. Liberties Union v. State of New York, 4 N.Y.3d at 181, 791 N.Y.S.2d 507, 824 N.E.2d 947

[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord.

Paynter v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d at 442, 765 N.Y.S.2d 819, 797 N.E.2d 1225 ). It is true that “ the Education Article enshrined in the Constitution a state-local partnership in which ‘people with a community of interest and a tradition of acting together to govern themselves' make the ‘basic decisions on funding and operating their own schools' ” (Paynter v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d at 442, 765 N.Y.S.2d 819, 797 N.E.2d 1225

, quoting Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 46, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 ). That being said, the provision is intended to ensure that education is “a responsibility of the State” (New York Civ. Liberties Union v. State of New York, 4 N.Y.3d at 182, 791 N.Y.S.2d 507, 824 N.E.2d 947 ), and fundamentally protects against failures by the State to provide “adequate instruction and facilities” commensurate with that responsibility (Paynter v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d at 442, 765 N.Y.S.2d 819, 797 N.E.2d 1225 ; see

Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d at 922, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106, 801 N.E.2d 326 ). Plaintiffs therefore...