Nash-Perry v. City of Bakersfield
| Decision Date | 12 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-cv-1512 JLT BAK (SAB) |
| Parties | TAMETRIA NASH-PERRY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, OFFICER ALEJANDRO PATINO, and nominal defendant JASON OKAMOTO, Defendants. JASON OKAMOTO, individually and as successor-in-interest to CHRISTOPHER OKAMOTO, and Z.S., by and through her guardian ad litem, Brittney Saucedo, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BAKERSFIELD and OFFICER ALEJANDRO PATINO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL (DOCS. 102, 103, AND 104)
Tametria Nash-Perry, Jason Okamoto, and minor Z.S. seek to hold Bakersfield Police Officer Alejandro Patino and the City of Bakersfield liable for the fatal shooting of Christopher Okamoto under federal and state law. (See generally Doc. 38.) Defendants contend all actions taken were lawful and reasonable. On July 1, 2022, both parties filed motions in limine, which are now before the Court. (Docs 102, 103, and 104.)
“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S 38, 40 n. 2 (1984). The Ninth Circuit explained motions in limine “allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes ahead of trial, without first having to present potentially prejudicial evidence in front of a jury.” Brodit v Cabra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Courts disfavor motions in limine seeking to exclude broad categories of evidence. See Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). The Court “is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Wilkins v. Kmart Corp., 487 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1218 (D Kan. 2007). The Sixth Circuit explained, “[A] better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise [in trial]” as opposed to ruling on a motion in limine. Sperberg, 519 F.2d at 712. Nevertheless, motions in limine are “an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Services, 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997).
“[A] motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence,” C & E Services, Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (D. D.C. 2008), because that is the province of the jury. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The Court will bar use of the evidence in question only if the moving party establishes that the evidence clearly is not admissible for any valid purpose. Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.
Moreover, the rulings on the motions in limine made below do not preclude either party from raising the admissibility of the evidence discussed herein, if the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates a change of circumstances that would make the evidence admissible. In this event, the proponent of the evidence SHALL raise the issue outside the presence of the jury. Finally, the rulings made here are binding on all parties and not merely to the moving party.
II. Motion to Bifurcate the Trial (Doc. 103)
Defendants seek bifurcation of the trial into two stages: (1) liability and compensatory damages, and (2) punitive damages. (Doc. 103.) Plaintiffs have not opposed the motion.
Pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” See also Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir. 1977). The decision to bifurcate is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1985). “A decision ordering bifurcation is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Stevenson v. Holland, 504 F.Supp.3d 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (citation omitted).
Courts consider several factors to determine whether bifurcation is appropriate under Rule 42, including “potential prejudice to the parties, potential confusion to the jury, and the relative convenience and economy which would result” from bifurcation. Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2016) (); Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (); see also Rios v. Tilton, 2016 WL 29567 at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016). Notably, “[c]ourts routinely bifurcate liability and punitive damages claims in actions with claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Motley v. City of Fresno, 2020 WL 3642502 at *2, n.1 (E.D. Cal. July 5, 2020).
The Court finds Plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by bifurcation, because in the first stage, the jury will determine whether they are entitled to punitive damages. In the second stage, which would follow immediately, the jury would determine the amount punitive damages. Bifurcation would avoid potential confusion of issues for jurors, as the scope of evidence in the first phase would be limited to liability, whether the conduct gives rise to punitive damages and compensatory damages. Bifurcation would expedite and economize trial by precluding the presentation of the financial status of the defendants unless and until it is necessary. See Figueroa v. Gates, 207 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1101-02 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (). Accordingly, Defendants' motion to bifurcate the trial into two stages is GRANTED in PART. Evidence and arguments relating to the amount of punitive damages will be excluded from the first stage of trial, though whether the plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages will be determined in the first phase.
III. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 1 (Doc. 104)
Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence of after-acquired information concerning Christopher Okamoto. (Doc. 104.) Specifically, Plaintiffs request exclusion of:
any and all evidence concerning information about decedent Christopher Okamoto which was not known to Defendant Officer Alejandro Patino at the time of the subject shooting incident, including evidence regarding the presence of drugs in Decedent's system at the time of the shooting, and evidence regarding a text message exchange between Decedent and his grandmother on the evening of the shooting.
(Id. at 2.) According to Plaintiffs, the evidence should be excluded under Rules 401, 402, 403, and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and because “the probative value... is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, undue delay, and wasting time.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs note that “[t]he main issues in this case concern the reasonableness of Officer[] Patino's use of deadly force against Christopher Okamoto.” (Doc. 104 at 4.) The conduct of Officer Patino is evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene regardless of the actual motivation of the particular officers. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996). Instead, liability may not attach unless his actions were objectively unreasonable, regardless of the officer's motivation. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011) ().
When evaluating reasonableness, the fact finder “must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 756 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Thus, in general, the fact finder “cannot consider evidence of which the officer[] [was] unaware.” See Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 872-74, 873 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2011). On the other hand, what is known to the officer at the time bears on the facts and circumstances of the event. Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, any evidence known to Officer Patino is admissible, but information not known to him may not be admitted.
Plaintiffs report that “[t]he toxicology report prepared by the Coroner's Office in connection with the autopsy of Decedent indicates that he may have had multiple drugs and alcohol in his system at the time of the shooting.” (Doc. 104 at 5.) Specifically, Defendants note the toxicology report indicated that “Plaintiff was intoxicated/under the influence of both alcohol and Xanax at the time of the incident.” (Doc. 107 at 5.)
Plaintiffs contend the toxicology evidence should be excluded as irrelevant because “the officers did not know that Mr Okamoto had drugs in his system at the time of the shooting, and have never testified that they formed any opinions about whether Mr. Okamoto was under the influence of any illegal drugs during the incident.” (Doc. 104 at 5.) Plaintiffs assert, “The effects that alcohol and/or drugs might have on a person's behavior is also a subject of expert testimony, and a proper foundation must be laid before evidence on that subject can be admitted.” (Id. at 6...
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