Nassau Chapter Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Local 830, AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO v. County of Nassau

• Decision Date: 12 May 1992
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,P
• Citation: 154 Misc.2d 545,585 N.Y.S.2d 966
• Parties: NASSAU CHAPTER CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 830, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000,laintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU and Nassau Community College, Defendants. /IAS, Nassau County, Part 25
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 966

585 N.Y.S.2d 966

154 Misc.2d 545

NASSAU CHAPTER CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 830, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU and Nassau Community College, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Trial/IAS Nassau County, Part 25.

May 12, 1992.

Gaba & Stober, P.C., Garden City, for plaintiff.

Robert W. Schmidt, Nassau County Atty., by Cheryl Petri, Mineola, for defendants.

MARVIN E. SEGAL, Justice.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The plaintiff, the Nassau Chapter Civil Service Employees Association, Local 830, AFSCME Local 1000, AFL-CIO (hereinafter CSEA), is the exclusive bargaining agent for various Nassau County employees, including a unit of security officers employed at Nassau Community College. On or about October 5, 1987, ten members of the CSEA, employed by the defendants as security officers at Nassau Community College, executed CSEA Employee Complaint Forms, all of which allege a violation of the employee's right to receive payment of a meal allowance for days on which the employee worked more than three hours overtime in addition to his regular shift.

Thereafter, on or about November 17, 1987, pursuant to the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect for the period January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1987 (hereinafter CBA), the CSEA filed a class action grievance alleging that the defendants violated the CBA by failing to pay meal money in accordance with the Agreement. Said grievance sought payment of meal money retroactive to 1980. A third step hearing on this grievance was held at the Nassau County Office of Employee Relations on or about March 1, 1988.

                The grievance was denied, on or about March 23, 1988, on the ground that the grievance was "grossly untimely".   The CSEA proceeded to an advisory appeal of the third step determination to the Nassau County Grievance Board (hereinafter Grievance Board).   On or about May 10, 1989, a fourth step hearing was held before the Grievance Board.   The written decision of the Grievance Board, dated September 1, 1989, recommends that the grievance should be granted, and that the grievants should receive meal money for dates on which they worked a regular shift plus three hours overtime, in cases where it can be documented that a one hour break, or [154 Misc.2d 547] less, in service occurred.   The decision recommends that relief be granted only as to claims which arose within sixty days prior to November 17, 1987, the date the grievance was filed.   On or about September 13, 1989, the County Executive, by his deputy, Santa Rozzi, concurred with and adopted the findings of the Grievance Board
                

On or about August 31, 1990, the plaintiff commenced the above captioned action seeking the following relief: judgment (a) declaring that the defendants breached the CBA by not paying meal money for violations occurring more than sixty days prior to the filing of the grievance; and (b) directing the defendants to pay meal money owed to the employees of Nassau Community College since January 1, 1980, with interest thereon. The defendants answered the Complaint on or about September 19, 1990. The plaintiff now moves the Court for summary judgment striking the defendants' Answer, and granting the plaintiff judgment for the relief demanded in its Complaint. The defendants cross move for judgment dismissing the Complaint. The plaintiff contends that the defenses set forth in the defendants' Answer are devoid of merit. The defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that: (1) the action is time barred; (2) the determination under review was rational and proper as a matter of law; (3) the defendants did not violate the CBA; (4) the Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; and (5) the Complaint is barred by the doctrine of laches.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The defendants herein contend that the exclusive remedy available to plaintiff to contest the determination of the Grievance Board was an Article 78 proceeding which, pursuant to CPLR 217, must be commenced within four months after the recommendation of the Grievance Board became final and binding. The defendants assert that the determination at issue herein became final and binding on September 13, 1989, upon the concurrence and adoption of the recommendation by the County Executive. As the instant action was not commenced until August 31, 1990, more than four months after the findings of the Grievance Board became final, the defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint as time barred. The defendants further contend that as the proceeding before the Court is in the nature of a review of the determination of an administrative agency, the scope of the Court's review is limited to a determination as to whether there was a rational basis for the Grievance Board's decision, or whether said decision was arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiff contends that the instant action is properly set forth as a declaratory judgment action pursuant to CPLR 3001, seeking judgment declaring that the defendants have violated plaintiff's contractual rights. The plaintiff contends that as the declaratory judgment action seeks to adjudicate contractual rights, it is governed by the six year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213(2).

Generally, an Article 78 proceeding is not the proper procedural vehicle to resolve contractual rights. Schaffer v. Evans, 86 A.D.2d 708, 446 N.Y.S.2d 541, affirmed, 57 N.Y.2d 992, 457 N.Y.S.2d 237, 443 N.E.2d 485; Automated Ticket Sys. v. Quinn, 70 A.D.2d 726, 416 N.Y.S.2d 864, modified on other grounds, 49 N.Y.2d 792, 426 N.Y.S.2d 731, 403 N.E.2d 454; Matter of Phalen v. Theatrical Protective Union No. 1, 27 A.D.2d 909, 278 N.Y.S.2d 667; reversed 22 N.Y.2d 34, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881, 238 N.E.2d 295; Matter of City Construction Dev., Inc. v. Commissioner of the New York State Office of General Services, 176 A.D.2d 1145, 575 N.Y.S.2d 595; Matter of Mohican Cable T.V. Corp. v. Cronin, 34 A.D.2d 692, 309 N.Y.S.2d 480; Matter of Corbeau Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 32 A.D.2d 958, 302 N.Y.S.2d 940. Further, the law in this State is clear that absent a contractual provision whereby a union voluntarily and unequivocally surrenders its right to resort to the Courts to enforce the CBA (see, Nassau Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. v. County of Nassau, 84 A.D.2d 784, 443 N.Y.S.2d 884; Aloi v. Board of Educ. of the West Babylon Union Free School District, 81 A.D.2d 874, 439 N.Y.S.2d 169; Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. [Tillinghast-Stiles Co.], 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104), a union may properly bring a declaratory judgment action to construe the rights of its members under the CBA, see, Hertz v. Rozzi, 148 A.D.2d 535, 538 N.Y.S.2d 867; Matter of County of Broome v. Rauen, 130 A.D.2d 811, 515 N.Y.S.2d 137; Nassau Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. v. County of Nassau, supra; Aloi v. Board of Education of the West Babylon Union Free School District, supra; Cromer v. County of Nassau, 77 A.D.2d 610, 430 N.Y.S.2d 633; O'Brien v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, 71 A.D.2d 605, 418 N.Y.S.2d 124.

The statute of limitations applicable to a declaratory judgment action depends on the nature of the underlying claim, see, Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 401 N.E.2d 190. A declaratory judgment action which seeks judgment construing the plaintiff's rights under a CBA is an action on the contract governed by the six year limitation period set forth in CPLR 213(2), see, Hertz v. Rozzi, supra; Aloi v. Board of Education of the West Babylon Union Free School District, supra; Cromer v. County of Nassau, supra. Plaintiff's action herein, properly commenced as a declaratory judgment action, is not time barred. Further, the issue before the Court is not limited to a review of the recommendation of the Grievance Board. Rather, plaintiff is entitled to a de novo determination of its cause of action by the Court.

Neither party herein contests the finding by the Grievance Board that the defendants violated the CBA by failing to pay meal money to employees who worked three hours overtime with a one hour, or less, break in service. The plaintiff, however, disagrees with the recommendation by the Grievance Board that the defendants are obligated only to afford relief for violations of the Agreement which occurred within sixty days prior to November 17, 1987, the date on which the plaintiff filed a class action grievance. The plaintiff contends (1) that the CBA contains no limitation of the period within which the CSEA may file a class action grievance; (2) that plaintiff could not maintain the instant action until it exhausted its administrative remedies; (3) that a cause of action does not accrue until such time as a plaintiff may properly commence an action; (4) that the cause of action herein therefor accrued on September 13, 1989, upon the exhaustion of plaintiff's administrative remedies; and (5) that pursuant to CPLR 213(2), a cause of action upon a contractual obligation must be commenced within six years after the accrual of the action. Based upon the above reasoning, the plaintiff concludes that the Complaint herein was timely served, and that it is entitled to relief retroactive to 1980.

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect citizens from stale and vexatious claims, and to end the possibility of litigation after the lapse of a reasonable period of time. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224; Vastola v. Maer, 48 A.D.2d 561, 370 N.Y.S.2d 955, affirmed 39 N.Y.2d 1019, 387 N.Y.S.2d 246, 355 N.E.2d 300. The statutes of limitations are more than provisions or rules of practice and procedure; they embody an important policy of giving reposes to human affairs. Cerio v. Charles Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 87 A.D.2d 972, 450 N.Y.S.2d 90.

Unless modified by the terms of the Agreement, the...