Nat'l Overall Dry Cleaning Co. v. Yavner

• Decision Date: 09 June 1947
• Citation: 73 N.E.2d 744,321 Mass. 434
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: NATIONAL OVERALL DRY CLEANING CO. v. YAVNER.

321 Mass. 434

73 N.E.2d 744

NATIONAL OVERALL DRY CLEANING CO.

v.YAVNER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 9, 1947.

Bill in equity by the National Overall Dry Cleaning Co. against Meyer Yavner to enjoin the defendant from violating an agreement existing between the plaintiff and a union, of which defendant was a member. From a decree overruling his demurrer and from a final decree granting an injunction and damages, defendant appeals.

Final decree reversed and suit remanded, and appeal from interlocutory decree dismissed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Cabot, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, DOLAN, RONAN, and SPALDING, JJ.

F. A. Thayer, of Boston, for plaintiff.

M. A. Cherwin, of Boston, for defendant.

RONAN, Justice.

The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the business of cleaning overalls and other garments which it collected from and delivered to its various customers, brought this bill in equity against the defendant, a former employee who worked as a driver and collector and who was a member of a trade union with which the plaintiff had an agreement relative to the wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, to enjoin the defendant from violating an article of that agreement which in substance provided that an employee ceasing to be employed by the plaintiff for any reason would not for the period of 12 months thereafter ‘solicit business from any customer served by him or by any other employee of said company.’ The defendant appealed from a decree overruling his demurrer and from a final decree granting an injunction and damages.

After the demurrer was overruled, the bill was amended in a material aspect. Indeed, the amendment went to the essence of the plaintiff's case and supplied the only ground upon which it was granted relief. The defendant, instead of challenging the sufficiency of the bill as amended, sought and secured permission to amend his answer, and the hearing was had upon these amended pleadings. The ruling on the demurrer to the original bill, even if not well founded as the defendant contends, ceased to be of any materiality and became moot. The appeal from the interlocutory decree overruling that demurrer presents no question of law and is dismissed. Hushion v. McBride, 296 Mass. 4, 4 N.E.2d 443;Revere v. Blaustein, 315 Mass. 93, 51 N.E.2d 772.

It appears from an examination of the evidence and from the findings of the judge-no one of which can be said to be plainly wrong in so far as they go-that the defendant entered the employment of the plaintiff in 1940 and continued in such employment to September 3, 1946, when he was discharged; that during all the period of his employment the defendant was a member of a trade union that had several successive written agreements with the plaintiff governing working conditions of its members in the employ of the plaintiff, which also included the provision, already mentioned, precluding its members, after the termination of their employment for any reason, from soliciting the plaintiff's customers; that the last written agreement was dated July 20, 1945, and by its terms expired July 20, 1946, but by agreement of the parties was extended pending negotiations for a new agreement and until a new agreement was executed; that this agreement of July 20, 1945, was in full force and effect at the time of the defendant's discharge; that after his discharge the defendant solicited customers of the plaintiff who had been served by the defendant while he was in the employ of the plaintiff and that damage had thereby resulted to the plaintiff.

The defendant contends that the agreement of July 20, 1945, was not binding upon him for various reasons. This agreement stated that it ‘must be signed by the individual members of the association.’ This we take to mean the other employers conducting a business similar to that of the plaintiff. The agreement of July 20, 1945, with the plaintiff was not signed by such employers, but it cannot for that reason be deemed invalid because that agreement has been fully performed up to September 3, 1946, by the plaintiff, the union, and the defendant, who was familiar with all its terms and must be held to have waived the requirement of the signatures of the other laundry owners to this agreement. Vitti v. Garabedian, 264 Mass. 1, 161 N.E. 607;Zarthar v. Saliba, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367;Cueroni v. Coburnville Garage, Inc., 315 Mass. 135, 52 N.E.2d 16. In the next place, the inference is plain that these other laundry owners had entered into similar agreements with the union, as all of them including the plaintiff and the union agreed that their written agreements, which apparently ran for a term similar to that of the plaintiff's agreement, should be considered in full force and effect pending negotiations for new agreements, and the defendant was one of the representatives of the union who participated in this arrangement with these laundry owners. The making of such a temporary arrangement was not unauthorized by the union, as the defendant contends, for the evidence was direct and positive that the union representatives had authority to make this arrangement. DuBois v. Powdrell, 271 Mass. 394, 171 N.E. 474; Jackson v. Colonial Provision Co. Inc., 314 Mass. 177, 49 N.E.2d 726;Ventromile v. Malden Electric Co., 317 Mass. 132, 57 N.E.2d 209.

The agreement of July 20, 1945, expressly provided that it should be binding on all members of the union who were employed by the plaintiff. This agreement was made by the union in behalf of its members who were in the employ of the plaintiff, and was binding on the defendant at the time of his discharge. Whiting Milk Co. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379;Members of Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union v. Hall Baking Co., 320 Mass. 286, 69 N.E.2d 111.

The agreement provided that all previous agreements between the union and the plaintiff had become null and void, and that no member of the union employed by the plaintiff should sign or make any individual agreement with the plaintiff. The evidence which the defendant offered to show that prior to entering the employment of the plaintiff he had an oral agreement with the plaintiff by which he should retain as his own personal property the patronage of the customers he then had was properly excluded as it tended to contradict the provisions of the union agreement, especially the provision preventing the defendant from soliciting customers whom he served when an employee of the plaintiff. Western Newspaper Union v. Dittemore, 264 Mass. 74, 161 N.E. 908;S. F. Bowser & Co. Inc. v. Independent Dye House, Inc., 276 Mass. 289, 177 N.E. 268;Tupper v. Hancock, 319 Mass. 105, 64 N.E.2d 441.

There is nothing in the union agreement requiring the submission of the present controversy to arbitration. Neither is the statute of frauds applicable, for the defendant was not hired for any period exceeding a year and the agreement with the union did not require the plaintiff to hire any of the union members for any definite term. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 335, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762;Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Webb, 5 Cir., 64 F.2d 902;Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042, 33 A.L.R. 322;Dooley v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 130 N.J.Eq. 75, 21 A.2d 334;Amelotte v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 173 Misc. 477, 17 N.Y.S.2d 929;Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692.

The plaintiff and the employee could under the union agreement terminate the employment by a week's notice, except that the plaintiff could summarily discharge an employee for ‘drunkenness, theft or embezzlement’ and an employee discharged ‘for dishonesty or theft’ had a right to a hearing. The plaintiff after giving such notice could request the employee not to perform any further services, and in that event the latter would be entitled to a week's wages one week after the discharge. The defendant testified that he was discharged for overcharging customers, but that this was done with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and for its pecuniary gain. When the plaintiff's president and treasurer began to testify concerning the reasons and the circumstances attending the discharge of the defendant, the judge observed that under the union...