O'Neal v. State

• Decision Date: 11 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. ED 88760.,ED 88760.
• Parties: Walter Lee O'NEAL, Jr., Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

236 S.W.3d 91

Walter Lee O'NEAL, Jr., Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 88760.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

September 11, 2007.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied October 18, 2007.

Lisa M. Stroup, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Roger W. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Judge.

Movant Walter Lee O'Neal, Jr., appeals the motion court's denial without an evidentiary hearing of his post-conviction relief motion, which sought to vacate his Alford¹ pleas of guilty to two counts of second-degree felony murder. Because the facts recited at the plea hearing constitute a factual basis for Movant's pleas of guilty, we deny his first point. Because his claim otherwise relies on allegations outside the plea record, we reject his second point and affirm the motion court's judgment.

Movant robbed a motel in Farmington, Missouri. After being spotted by police, Movant fled in a van, and police officers followed in their cars, in high-speed pursuit. One pursuing officer's car collided with a bystander's car, killing its two occupants. The State charged Movant with two counts of second-degree felony murder, one count of first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree tampering, and one count of felony resisting arrest. The State and Movant reached a plea agreement and Movant entered his Alford pleas of guilty to two counts of second-degree felony murder, Section 565.021 RSMo.2000,² on December 29, 2005.³

In his post-conviction challenges, Movant asserts that the presented facts do not constitute second-degree felony murder for two distinct reasons. First, he argues that the victims' deaths were not the "natural and proximate result" of the robbery. Second, he asserts that the deaths did not result from his immediate flight from police because his flight was over before the victims' car was hit by the officer's car.

Therefore, we set forth the following details, which the State related at the plea hearing as a factual basis for Movant's pleas. The State asserted that, had the case proceeded to trial, the State would have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that on May 12, 2004, the Farmington police department issued a dispatch regarding a robbery, which had just occurred at the Farmington Super 8 Motel. The dispatch included the robber's description. A number of Farmington police officers responded to the dispatch, either by arriving on the scene or by patrolling the environs, in search of the suspect. Officer Barton saw a van whose driver matched the broadcast description of the suspect. As Officer Barton attempted to get the van's license-plate number, the van's driver spotted the police car and took off. As later learned, that driver was Movant. Officer Barton followed with his car in pursuit and radioed to other officers that he was pursuing the suspected robber. A number of other officers from the Farmington Police Department joined the chase in their cars. Movant traveled at a very high rate of speed through the streets of Farmington. In particular, the State asserted that "while officers were in pursuit" of Movant, Officers Lacey and Ratliff, each in his own separate police car, were pursuing Movant's van coming up Maple Valley Drive. The State continued, declaring:

A number of vehicles had pulled off to the side of the road to yield to the oncoming police vehicles, including a vehicle that was driven by the victim, Monica Heit. That vehicle was also occupied by Janis Moutray.

They had pulled off to the side of the road, and although Officer Lacey was able to pass with his lights and sirens activated, Corporal Byron Ratliff was behind, and apparently the vehicle drive[n] by Ms. Heit did not see that there was another police vehicle coming.

The police vehicle driven by Corporal Ratliff had his lights and sirens activated. And unfortunately Ms. Heit pulled out into the road in an attempt to actually cross over the road as if to go into the Pang Apartment complex.

Corporal Ratliff collided with the vehicle that was occupied by Ms. Heit and Ms. Moutray.

The State asserted that Ms. Heit and Ms. Moutray died because of their injuries sustained in the accident. The State declared that Movant, after traveling at a high rate of speed through several streets, lost control of his van and crashed into the side of a building. The police took Movant into custody and searched his person and the van. The Movant was wearing clothing consistent with the broadcast description of the robbery suspect. And the police found various items consistent with those items reported stolen from the motel. The police checked the van's license number and discovered that it had been stolen from St. Louis. The police took Movant to the police department and advised him of his Miranda⁴ rights. He then confessed to robbing the motel.

After hearing the State's recitation, Movant conceded that the State had correctly summarized the evidence he would have to confront if he went to trial. Movant also acknowledged that he understood what was meant by an Alford plea. He confirmed that he and his attorney had reviewed and discussed the evidence "quite a few times" over an eighteen-month period. Movant further acknowledged that his decision to enter Alford pleas of guilty resulted from their review of the evidence and these discussions. Movant further stated that he understood his right to a jury trial and his other attendant rights described by the trial court, all of which he understood were waived by pleading guilty. The plea court found that Movant's pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently, with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences of the Alford pleas. Further, the plea court found that a factual basis existed to support the Alford pleas of guilty. Finally, the court accepted Movant's Alford pleas and sentenced Movant to two concurrent terms of thirty years' imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections.

Movant filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief. Appointed counsel then filed an amended motion. Movant alleged his guilty pleas were entered unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently because he was denied effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. He claimed that the recited facts, which he conceded existed at his guilty-plea hearing, did not constitute second-degree felony murder and his plea counsel did not so advise him. Specifically, Movant alleged that the recited facts did not constitute second-degree felony murder because: (1) the bystanders' deaths were not the "natural and proximate result" of the robbery charged as the underlying felony; and (2) the bystanders' deaths did not result from his immediate flight from police because his flight was over before the officer's car hit the victims' car. Movant asked that his pleas of guilty be vacated. The motion court's judgment denied Movant's request for an evidentiary hearing and his motion for post-conviction relief. Movant now appeals, advancing the same two claims argued to the motion court. However, we deny his first claim because the facts recited at the plea hearing demonstrate that the victims' deaths were the natural and proximate result of the robbery. And we reject his second claim because, having found the motion court's findings sufficient for our review, his claim relies on allegations outside the plea record. Therefore, we affirm the motion court's judgment denying relief.

Discussion

In his first point, Movant alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying an evidentiary hearing and post-conviction relief because a factual basis did not exist for his pleas because the charged deaths were not the "natural and proximate result" of the robbery charged as the underlying felony. Movant argues that the victim driver's action of pulling her car into the pursuing officer's lane of traffic constituted an independent, intervening cause sufficient to relieve him of the responsibility for the victims' deaths. The motion court denied Movant's claim, reasoning that Movant, in fleeing an armed robbery at a high rate of speed, could reasonably have anticipated that the police would give chase at a high rate of speed and that innocent bystanders may be injured or killed by a collision with his vehicle or with a police car chasing him. The motion court concluded that the victim's actions were part of the chain of events set in motion by Movant and not a "new and independent force," whether or not the victim was at fault for her actions while driving in the wake of Movant's chase.

This Court's review of a motion court's denial of a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Dorsey v. State, 115 S.W.3d 842, 845 (Mo. banc 2003); Flores v. State, 186 S.W.3d 398, 399 (Mo. App. E.D.2006). A motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a full review of the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. banc 1997); Flores, 186 S.W.3d 398. In reviewing a motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 24.035, an Alford plea is not treated differently from a guilty plea. Nguyen v. State, 184 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Mo.App. W.D.2006).

A plea court may not enter judgment on a guilty plea unless it determines there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 24.02(e). A factual basis for a guilty plea is necessary to ensure that the guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, thereby satisfying due-process requirements. State v. Henry, 88 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). The required factual basis can be established by the defendant's testimony, or his acknowledgment of facts recited by the prosecutor. Ennis...