Nero v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.
Decision Date | 26 June 2019 |
Docket Number | Opinion No. 5660,Appellate Case No. 2015-001277 |
Citation | 831 S.E.2d 143,427 S.C. 392 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Otis NERO, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Employer, and State Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents. |
Stephen J. Wukela, of Wukela Law Firm, of Florence, for Appellant.
John Gabriel Coggiola, of Willson, Jones, Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia, for Respondent.
Otis Nero lost consciousness and fell to the ground in the presence of his two immediate supervisors while working on a South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) road crew. Nero argues the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in reversing the Single Commissioner's findings that (1) SCDOT received adequate notice of his workplace accident and (2) Nero demonstrated reasonable excuse for—and SCDOT was not prejudiced by—Nero's late formal notice. Upon our prior review of Nero's arguments, we considered the question of timely notice as a jurisdictional issue and applied a de novo standard of review in reversing the Appellate Panel decision. Nero v. S.C. Dep't of Transp. , 420 S.C. 523, 804 S.E.2d 269 (Ct. App. 2017). Our supreme court granted SCDOT's petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed, reiterating that "timely notice under section 42-15-20 is not a jurisdictional determination, and must be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard." Nero v. S.C. Dep't of Transp. , 422 S.C. 424, 812 S.E.2d 735 (2018). We now reverse the Appellate Panel because the substantial evidence in the record does not support its findings that Nero failed to provide SCDOT with adequate notice of his workplace injury or that SCDOT was prejudiced by Nero's late formal notice.
On June 20, 2012, Nero was working on a SCDOT road crew supervised by lead man Benjamin Durant and supervisor Danny Bostick. Nero's work, along with that of four or five other members of the crew, involved pulling a thirty-foot-long two-by-four "squeegee board" to level freshly poured concrete. At some point during the day, Bostick pulled Nero off the squeegee board temporarily because Nero appeared overheated. After a break, Nero returned to pulling the squeegee board.
At approximately 3:00 p.m., after finishing the day's work and cleaning up, the crew, including Nero, Durant, and Bostick, were talking and joking near the supervisor's truck when Nero lost consciousness and fell to the ground. Nero regained consciousness, stood up, told his supervisors he was fine, and drove home. Once home, Nero passed out again in his driveway. His wife immediately took him to the hospital where he was admitted, diagnosed with cervical stenosis, and treated by a neurosurgeon.
While at the emergency room, Nero filled out a "History and Physical Report" stating in part, "I passed out talking to my boss." Nero was initially seen by his primary care physician, Dr. Robert Richey. After a series of tests, Dr. Richey determined Nero had cervical stenosis and referred Nero to a neurosurgeon, Dr. William Naso, who performed a fusion surgery.
On July 9, 2012, prior to his surgery, Nero provided the employer's human resources department with his "SCDOT Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health Condition (Family Medical Leave Act)" paperwork. Nero did not specifically mention a neck "popping" incident with the squeegee board in this submission, but did report that he required neck surgery. Under the section designated "approximate date condition commenced," Nero wrote, "several years—neck and syncope."
On January 6, 2014, Nero filed a request for a hearing, alleging he suffered injuries to his neck and shoulders while pulling the squeegee board on June 20, 2012. The single commissioner found Nero's claim compensable as an injury by accident that aggravated a preexisting cervical disc condition in Nero's neck. The single commissioner further determined Nero had a "reasonable excuse" for not formally reporting his work injury because (1) his lead man and supervisor were present and knew of pertinent facts surrounding the accident sufficient to indicate the possibility of a compensable injury, (2) the lead man and supervisor followed up with Nero, and (3) SCDOT was aware Nero did not return to work after the June 20, 2012 incident. Further, SCDOT was notified Nero was hospitalized and ultimately had neck surgery. Finally, the single commissioner found SCDOT was not prejudiced by the late formal reporting of the injury.
SCDOT appealed to the Appellate Panel. The Appellate Panel reversed the single commissioner, finding that although Nero's two immediate supervisors witnessed him collapse, Nero never reported that an incident with the squeegee board involved a "snap" in his shoulders and neck. The Appellate Panel further found Nero's excuse for not formally reporting was not reasonable and SCDOT was prejudiced because Nero's late reporting deprived it of the opportunity to investigate the incident and whether Nero's work aggravated any preexisting cervical stenosis.
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the standard for our review of Appellate Panel decisions.
Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc. , 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Under the APA, this court may reverse or modify the decision of the Appellate Panel when the substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because "the decision is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." Transp. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund , 389 S.C. 422, 427, 699 S.E.2d 687, 689–90 (2010) ; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(d)–(e) (Supp. 2016). "The Appellate Panel is the ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation cases, and if its findings are supported by substantial evidence, it is not within our province to reverse those findings." Mungo v. Rental Unif. Serv. of Florence, Inc. , 383 S.C. 270, 279, 678 S.E.2d 825, 829–30 (Ct. App. 2009). "Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action." Taylor v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 368 S.C. 33, 36, 627 S.E.2d 751, 752 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson , 364 S.C. 514, 519, 613 S.E.2d 544, 547 (2005) ).
Nero argues the Appellate Panel erred when it found SCDOT did not receive adequate notice under section 42-15-20(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015). We agree.
Section 42-15-20 sets forth the requirement that an employee provide timely notice of an accident to an employer, stating, in pertinent part:
" Section 42-15-20 requires that every injured employee or his representative give the employer notice of a job-related accident within ninety days after its occurrence." Bass v. Isochem , 365 S.C. 454, 472, 617 S.E.2d 369, 379 (Ct. App. 2005) ; see also McCraw v. Mary Black Hosp. , 350 S.C. 229, 237, 565 S.E.2d 286, 290 (2002) (). "Generally, the injury is not compensable unless notice is given within ninety days." Bass , 365 S.C. at 473, 617 S.E.2d at 379. "The burden is upon the claimant to show compliance with the notice provisions of section 42-15-20." Id. ; Lizee v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health , 367 S.C. 122, 127, 623 S.E.2d 860, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ().
" Section 42-15-20 provides no specific method of giving notice, the object being that the employer be actually put on notice of the injury so he can investigate it immediately after its occurrence and can furnish medical care for the employee in order to minimize the disability and his own liability." Hanks v. Blair Mills, Inc. , 286 S.C. 378, 381, 335 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1985). Satisfaction of the notice provision should be liberally construed in favor of claimants.
Mintz v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co. , 218 S.C. 409, 414, 63 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1951) ; Etheredge v. Monsanto Co. , 349 S.C. 451, 458, 562 S.E.2d 679, 683 (Ct. App. 2002). In Etheredge , this court concluded "notice is adequate, when there is some knowledge of accompanying facts connecting the injury or illness with the employment, and signifying to a reasonably conscientious supervisor that the case might involve a potential compensation claim." 349 S.C. at 459, 562 S.E.2d at 683 ; contra Sanders v. Richardson , 251 S.C. 325, 328, 162 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1968) (...
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