New York Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 10 December 1934
• Docket Number: 31409
• Citation: 171 Miss. 396,157 So. 902
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. QUINN

157 So. 902

171 Miss. 396

NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. QUINN

No. 31409

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 10, 1934

Division A

1 INSURANCE.

Compliance with life policy requiring due proof of disability before default in premium, or within six months after default if disability precedes default, held condition precedent to waiver of premiums and recovery of disability benefits.

2 INSURANCE.

In action for diability benefits under life policy physician's letter stating that insured had been sick for some time and that investigation would be appreciated held insufficient to impose any duty on insurer to waive premiums as provided in policy or to constitute proof of disability.

3. EVIDENCE. Insurance.

Evidence that insured's mother, having addressed letters to insurer, gave letters and money to postman, requesting him to stamp and mail letters, held insufficient to raise presumption of receipt thereof by addressee, and was insufficient for jury on question of due proof of disability.

HON. T. E. PEGRAM, Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Chickasaw county HON. T. E. PEGRAM, Judge.

Action by John T. Quinn against the New York Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Reversed, and judgment for appellant.

Loving & Loving, of Columbus, for appellant.

Contracts of insurance whose terms are plain and unambiguous should be construed as written.

Continental Casualty Co. v. Hall, 118 Miss. 871, 80 So. 335; American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Nedilinger, 113 Miss. 74, 73 So. 875.

It is the duty of the appellee to show that he has complied with the terms and conditions of the policy.

The life insurance business has become one of the most extensive businesses in the country, and such business depends almost entirely upon contracts. The power to make such contracts as the parties desire to make, when not prohibited by law or public policy, is a fundamental principle of the life insurance business, and is essential to its successful conduct.

Berry v. Lamar Life Insurance Co., 165 Miss. 405, 142 So. 887; Mutual life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hebron, 166 Miss. 145, 146 So. 445.

We submit under these decisions that the court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that if they believe from a preponderance of the evidence that before default in premiums under the policy notice was given to the company of the disability and request for blanks to submit the proof thereof on, that instead of such he should have instructed the jury that due proof of total and permanent disability must be received by the company before default before the jury should find for the plaintiff.

In giving instruction No. 2, this is erroneous in that it places liability on the company on request for blanks to submit proof to the company, and liability should have been based on due proof received by the company before default.

There is no evidence whatever that the appellant received any notice of the total or permanent disability, much less, due proof, but on the other hand, the evidence shows that this due proof was not received by the appellant.

T. G. Abernethy, of Okolona, and C. A. Bratton, of Pontotoc, for appellee.

The appellee is not estopped by his signed statements to the Metropolitan Insurance Company to the effect that his disability began on October 15, 1931, when as a matter of fact it began June 15, 1931.

10 R. C. L., p. 840, par. 145; Brown, etc., v. Haigh, 37 So. 478, 113 La. 563; Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 165 Miss. 405, 145 So. 887; 14 R. C. L., p. 137, par. 507.

The policy is silent as to the kind of proof or as to how the proof should be furnished, except that it says, "furnish due proof." In furnishing proof of this character there is no particular form of proof which might be demanded.

3 Words & Phrases, 1st Series, p. 2256.

The insured furnished the appellant with what he regarded as due proof. And since it was within the province of the jury to decide as to whether or not the insurer received this proof, and the jury having so found, if the letters including insured's proof was insufficient, it was the duty of the company to point out wherein the same was insufficient.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 813, 85 So. 93; 7 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2 Ed.), p. 5880; Brown v. Fraternal Acc. Assn., 18, Utah, 265, 55 P. 637.

In the United States it is apparently well settled that delivery of a letter to a carrier or postman constitutes a mailing of the letter.

21 R. C. L., p. 762, par. 33; p. 742, par. 15; p. 5099, par. 33, note 14; 25 A. L. R. 12, note; Foster v. Metts & Co., 55 Miss. 67.

The obligation of the appellant to waive premium and pay disability benefits arose upon the happening of the disability and not upon the receipt and approval of proof of disability before default in payment of premium.

Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977.

It is true that where the terms of a policy are of doubtful meaning, that construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted.

Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 174, 68 L.Ed. 235, 31 A. L. R. 102, 44 S.Ct. 90; Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 322, 48 L.Ed. 512, 72 L.Ed. 895.

The contract of insurance prepared by an insurance company will be construed liberally as against the insured and strictly against the company.

Boyd v. Miss. Home Ins. Co., 75 Miss. 47, 21 So. 708; Ga. Home Ins. Co. v. Allen, 119 Ala. 436, 24 So. 399; Travellers Ins. Co. v. Plaster, 210 Ala. 607, 98. So. 909; Ellis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 Ala. 166, 106 So. 689; Martin v. Sun Ins. Office of London, 83 Fla. 325, 91 So. 363; Corp. of Roman Catholic Church v. Royal Ins. Co., 158 La. 601, 104 So. 383; Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Moore, 151 Miss. 189, 117 So. 524; Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Boldin, 100 Miss. 660, 56 So. 609; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Lokey, 52 So. 45, 166 Ala. 174; Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Draper, 65 So. 923, 187 Ala. 103; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 85 So. 298, 204 Ala. 313; Illinois Automobile Ins. Exch. v. Southern Motor Sales Co., 92 So. 429, 207 Ala. 265, 24 A. L. R. 734; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Gramling, 78 So. 337, 75 Fla. 409; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. New, 51 So. 61, 125 La. 41, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 136 Am. St. Rep. 326; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills, 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73; Shivers v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 55 So. 965, 99 Miss. 744; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 110 So. 432, 144 Miss. 541; Gilliland v. Order of Ry. Conductors of Am., 112 So. 225, 216 Ala. 13; Queen Ins. Co. v. Patterson Drug Co., 74 So. 807, 73 Fla. 665, L. R. A. 1917D 1091; National Surety Co. v. Williams, 77 So. 212, 74 Fla. 446; Elliott v. Belt Automobile Assn., 100 So. 797, 87 Fla. 545; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Cartmel, 100 So. 802, 87 Fla. 495, 35 A. L. R. 1013; Williams v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 3 Orleans App. 34; Max J. Winkler Brokerage Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 4 Orleans App. 341; Brown v. Union Indemnity Co., 2 La. App. 505, 105 So. 918, 159 La. 641; 32 C. J., p. 1152, par. 265.

OPINION

Cook, J.

Appellee instituted this suit against the appellant on a policy of life insurance to recover total and permanent disability benefits, under the following provisions of the policy:

"Upon receipt at the Company's Home Office, before default in payment of premium under said policy, of due proof that the insured is totally disabled as above defined, and will be continuously so totally disabled for life, or if the proof submitted is not conclusive as to the permanency of such disability, but establishes that the insured is, and for a period of not less than three consecutive months immediately preceding receipt of proof has been totally disabled as above defined, the following benefits will be granted:

"Waiver of Premium.--. . .

"Income Payments.--. . .

"This agreement shall automatically terminate if any premium on said policy shall not be duly paid or if said policy shall be surrendered; except that in event of default in payment of premium under said policy after the insured has become totally disabled as above defined, said policy will be restored and the benefits shall be the same as if said default had not occurred, provided due proof that the insured is and has been continuously from date of default so totally disabled and that such disability will continue for life or has continued for a period of not less than three consecutive months, is received by the company not later than six months after said default."

The premium on this policy was payable quarterly on the 15th day of the months of April, July, October, and January, and the policy contained the usual provision for thirty days' grace in which to make payment of the premium. The proof shows that the last quarterly payment of the premium was made on April 15, 1931, and that the...