Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital

• Decision Date: 20 December 1940
• Citation: 199 So. 344,145 Fla. 360
• Parties: NICHOLSON v. GOOD SAMARITAN. HOSPITAL.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

199 So. 344

145 Fla. 360

NICHOLSON v. GOOD SAMARITAN. HOSPITAL.

Florida Supreme Court

December 20, 1940

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; C. E. Chillingworth Judge.

Action by Dan Nicholson against the Good Samaritan Hospital to recover for burns allegedly caused by negligence of nurse employed by the defendant. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Reversed.

COUNSEL

Albert S. Dubbin, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.

McKay Dixon & DeJarnette, of Miami, for defendant in error.

OPINION

BROWN Justice.

The plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, brought this action against the Good Samaritan Hospital, a Florida Corporation, for the recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained by his being severely burned by reason of the negligence of the nurse employed by the defendant in the care of the plaintiff. There were two counts in the declaration, the first of which, inter alia, alleged that:

'* * * the defendant was in the business of conducting an infirmary and hospital for the treatment of patients requiring operations * * * and for a reasonable compensation said defendant undertook and promised to properly nurse and care for the plaintiff preparatory to and during a surgical operation which he then required and thereafter, until he had sufficiently recovered to leave the institution, and that while the plaintiff was so in said infirmary for such treatment and after he had been operated on for gall bladder trouble, the plaintiff suffered third degree burns on both legs by reason of the negligence of one of the nurses employed by the defendant in the care of the plaintiff and while said nurse was engaged in and about the duties of her employment; * * *'

The second count alleges the same facts, but in addition alleges:

'* * * that the plaintiff suffered third degree burns on both legs by reason of the said defendant's negligently entrusting the care of the plaintiff, while he was under an anaesthetic, to an incompetent nurse, and while said nurse was engaged in and about the duties of her employment; that the said burns were deeply inflicted on the inside of each of the plaintiff's legs, between the knee and the ankle; that by reason of the negligence of said defendant, through its servant and employee, the said nurse, the plaintiff suffered the said serious injuries. * * *.'

There is no direct allegation that the defendant corporation did not exercise ordinary care in employing the nurse. The nearest approach to this is the allegation that defendant negligently entrusted the care of plaintiff to an incompetent nurse.

To this declaration the defendant filed three pleas to each count, the second plea being as follows, to-wit:

'And for a further plea, this defendant says that the Good Samaritan Hospital is an eleemosynary corporation and operates as a charitable institution and that being such it is not liable for a negligent act of an employee.'

A demurrer to this second plea was overruled, and upon the plaintiff's refusal to plead over, the court entered final judgment, from which judgment a writ of error was taken, the plaintiff assigning as error the overruling of his demurrer to the second plea above quoted.

The question presented by the record is whether or not a corporation, operating a hospital as a charitable institution, providing free hospitalization for those unable to pay but charging those who are able to pay, is liable for the negligent act of a nurse employed by it, whereby a paying patient is injured as a proximate result of such negligence.

Counsel for the respective parties are substantially in agreement that this is the question presented for decision. Thus we are dealing with this specific question of liability; not with the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained, or the method of such enforcement.

This is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction.

There are a large number of decisions by courts of last resort in other States involving actions by patients against charitable hospitals to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence of a servant of the charitable corporation. The authorities are numerous and conflicting, as to whether and under what circumstances a charitable corporation is liable in tort. It must be conceded that the numerical weight of authority lies with the defendant in favor of exempting charitable institutions from all liability for the torts of their servants. For a review of the authorities, see Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L.R.A.1915 D, 1167; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392, 14 A.L.R. 563, 572; Love v. Nashville Agricultural and Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304, 23 A.L.R.887; Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287, 23 A.L.R. 900; Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785, 23 A.L.R. 907, 923; Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751, 30 A.L.R. 448, 455; St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537, 33 A.L.R. 1361, 1369; Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539, 42 A.L.R. 955; St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22, 42 A.L.R. 964; Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318, 42 A.L.R. 968; Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W.2d 753, 62 A.L.R. 721, 724; Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137, 86 A.L.R. 487, 491; Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28, 109 A.L.R. 1197, 1199. The annotations accompanying the above cited cases are quite thorough. See also 13 R.C.L. 944-948; 11 C.J. 377, 14 C.J.S., Charities, § 75; 10 Am.Jur. 687 et seq.

It must also be conceded that the declaration, tested by the rules obtaining in ordinary cases not involving charitable institutions, shows a right of action; but the defendant seeks exemption from liability on the ground that it is engaged in the business of conducting a charitable hospital.

The arguments usually given for exempting charitable institutions from tort liability have been summed up by the Minnesota court as follows:

'That the funds of such institutions are held in trust for specific charitable purposes and should not be diverted to pay damages for negligence; that the better public policy is to hold them exempt; that they serve the same purpose as governmental agencies and should come under the same rule; that one who accepts benefits by becoming a patient, student, or beneficiary of the institution impliedly consents to hold it exempt or to waive any claim for negligence of its servants; that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to them; that their employees are not, in legal sense, servants of the organization.' Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 389, 393, 219 N.W. 463, 464, 62 A.L.R. 716.

The fact that many different courts reach the same conclusion on a given question is strong proof of the correctness of the decision, and any court may well pause and carefully consider before deciding any question contrary to the weight of authority, but a stronger precedent is established when many different courts use the same reasoning to reach the same conclusion, which is not the case with reference to the question now before us. This question was first presented to the English courts in the early part of the 16th century and has been continually before the courts of this country since the McDonald case was decided in 1876, wherein the doctrine of an English case was followed, which English case was subsequently departed from in the land of its birth. See McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am.Rep. 529. The diverse arguments quoted above, and the variety, and sometimes inconsistent, reasons advanced by the various courts to reach the same conclusion in regard to this question, indicate sincere attempts to rationalize a result which is not based upon any thoroughly satisfying legal principle.

The rule frequently relied upon for exempting charitable institutions from tort liability is that the funds of such institutions are held in trust for specific charitable purposes and should not be diverted to pay damages for negligence. If accepted, this 'trust fund theory' would logically exempt a charitable institution from all liability, either to a patient of the institution, an employee, or a stranger. But, as shown by the numerous cases cited in the annotation in 14 A.L.R. 575, the weight of authority holds that a charity is not exempt from liability for injuries negligently inflicted upon strangers. See also the annotation in 109 A.L.R. 1199, citing cases adhering to this view. Nor does the exemption apply when an employee of the institution is injured. The same annotation states that 'the weight of authority holds a charity liable for injury to a servant through negligence in the performance of some duty owing to him.' Also, the weight of authority is to the effect that a charitable institution is liable for its negligence in selecting its employees. It must use due care to employ competent servants. Thus the weakness of the trust fund theory is at once apparent. On principle, it would seem that a charitable trust is either exempt from liability for negligence in all cases or none. The Supreme Court of Nevada in Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798, 802, in a brilliant analysis, flatly repudiates the trust fund theory, stating in part:

'A flood of cases might be cited holding that a charitable institution is liable for its negligence in the selection of its employees, for the negligence of its employees to strangers, or for some other reason. ...