Ulla U. v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 21 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | SJC-12752 |
| Citation | 149 N.E.3d 713,485 Mass. 219 |
| Parties | ULLA U., a juvenile v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Michelle Menken (Ziyad S. Hopkins, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for the juvenile.
Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney (Michelle P. Slade, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.
Alison R. Bancroft, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
We take this opportunity to clarify certain procedural questions that have arisen in connection with the "transfer hearing" in the Juvenile Court afforded juveniles by G. L. c. 119, § 72A. That statute was enacted to close a gap in the statutory scheme as it concerned the treatment of those persons who had reached their nineteenth birthdays and were apprehended for acts allegedly committed when they had not yet reached their eighteenth birthdays. See St. 1996, c. 200, § 13A (establishing transfer hearings); St. 2013, c. 84, § 23 ().
Because the Juvenile Court has limited jurisdiction, ordinarily not including those over eighteen years of age, and because "adult" courts have no jurisdiction over those whose acts occurred while the individual was still a juvenile (i.e., under age eighteen), no court had jurisdiction in such circumstances. The Legislature remedied this state of affairs by creating the "transfer hearing," which was to take place in the Juvenile Court. There, a Juvenile Court judge would determine whether probable cause existed and, if so, whether the public interest would be served best by prosecuting the individual as an adult in the District Court, or by discharging the individual. See G. L. c. 119, § 72A ; Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 172, 40 N.E.3d 544 (2015) ( Mogelinski II ); Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 646 & n.11, 1 N.E.3d 237 (2013) ( Mogelinski I ).
There has been lingering uncertainty, however, about the proper procedures to follow, both in the Juvenile Court and in seeking appellate review, when what is at issue is whether the prosecutor improperly delayed bringing criminal charges until after a juvenile's nineteenth birthday. The merits of this juvenile's1 motion to dismiss on such grounds are not before us, and we express no view on that matter.
Rather, we direct our attention to a determination whether, as the juvenile maintains, her motion to dismiss should have been heard by the Juvenile Court judge prior to her arraignment, or whether, as the Commonwealth maintains, the matter should have been heard by the Juvenile Court judge after arraignment, as part of the transfer hearing itself.2 We conclude that a Juvenile Court judge has authority to hear such a motion to dismiss as a part of the transfer hearing after arraignment.3 As to whether a juvenile has an automatic right of appeal under G. L. c. 211, § 3, where the motion is denied, we conclude that he or she does not.
1. Background. Shortly after noon on October 14, 2016, officers of the Boston police department responded to a two-vehicle crash in the Roslindale section of Boston. They found one of the vehicles turned over onto the driver's side and identified the juvenile as the operator of the heavily damaged vehicle. A reconstruction of the accident later would reflect that she had been driving at approximately seventy miles per hour, forty miles per hour over the speed limit, when she lost control of the vehicle. At the time of the crash, she was seventeen years old. The juvenile was taken to a local hospital, where she was treated for injuries that were not life threatening. A rear seat passenger in the juvenile's vehicle was found unresponsive at the scene. The passenger also was transported for medical treatment, but was pronounced dead at the hospital.
In August of 2018, a detective with the Boston police department filed an application for a complaint against the juvenile. On August 16, 2018, an assistant clerk-magistrate issued a complaint charging the juvenile with multiple offenses related to the accident, including one count of involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13.4 By that time, the juvenile was nineteen years old.
The juvenile was summonsed to appear for arraignment in the Juvenile Court on September 21, 2018. The arraignment was postponed until October by agreement of the parties. On October 10, 2018, prior to arraignment, the juvenile filed a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial delay and lack of probable cause. In November 2018, a Juvenile Court judge determined that the complaint was supported by probable cause, and therefore denied the juvenile's motion on that ground. She also allowed the Commonwealth's motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of prosecutorial delay. Soon thereafter, however, the Commonwealth filed a motion to arraign the juvenile. In that motion, the Commonwealth argued that a Juvenile Court judge lacked the authority to hear the juvenile's motion to dismiss for inexcusable or bad faith delay prior to arraignment.
Following a nonevidentiary hearing in February 2019, the same judge denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial delay. The judge concluded that, as a result of the limited jurisdiction granted to the Juvenile Court under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, she lacked the authority to decide the merits of the juvenile's motion. The judge then determined that the juvenile's motion should be heard after the transfer hearing was complete and any subsequent complaint was issued in an adult court. The judge also declined to report questions of law regarding her authority under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, and allowed the Commonwealth's motion to arraign the juvenile.
In May 2019, the juvenile filed in the county court a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. In June 2019, the single justice denied the petition. The juvenile subsequently was arraigned; she pleaded not delinquent, and was released on personal recognizance.
In June 2019, the juvenile appealed to this court from the single justice's denial. We allowed the juvenile's appeal to proceed, notwithstanding that, ordinarily, a juvenile may not seek review of the denial of a motion to dismiss until after trial. While recognizing that the question of prearraignment dismissal was moot as to this juvenile,5 we noted that the issue was one of the proper procedure and timing of efforts to appeal, did not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss, was "important, likely to recur in similar circumstances, but also likely to evade review in the normal course," and that the juvenile had no other means by which to seek relief. See Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103, 725 N.E.2d 552 (2000).
Before us are the two questions raised in the juvenile's petition for extraordinary relief: the scope of a Juvenile Court judge's authority to hear a juvenile's motion to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable delay under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, and, if such a motion is denied, whether the juvenile has the right to an interlocutory appeal.
2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 167, 900 N.E.2d 834 (2009), quoting Youngworth v. Commonwealth, 436 Mass. 608, 611, 766 N.E.2d 834 (2002).
"To facilitate this determination, this court previously has exercised its power of review under { G. L.] c. 211, § 3, to examine the merits of the case presented to the trial judge." Commonwealth v. Nettis, 418 Mass. 715, 717, 640 N.E.2d 468 (1994), quoting Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 709 n.7, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (1990). Accordingly, we begin with the procedural issue presented to the Juvenile Court judge -- the scope of her authority to hear the juvenile's motion to dismiss prior to arraignment.
b. Judicial authority to hear motion to dismiss prior to arraignment. As the motion judge recognized, the authority of the Juvenile Court is limited by statute, and "must either be articulated expressly or be capable of being deduced by necessary and inevitable implication" (quotation and citation omitted). Johnson v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 712, 716, 569 N.E.2d 790 (1991). See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 792, 128 N.E.3d 581 (2019) ; Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at 645, 1 N.E.3d 237. To determine whether this authority extends to resolving a motion to dismiss for inexcusable or bad faith delay, we first must consider the role of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, in the broader statutory framework that defines the respective jurisdictions of the juvenile and adult courts.
i. Transfer hearings under G. L. c. 119, § 72A. General Laws c. 119, § 72A, provides:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Irvin I.
...in the Juvenile Court "serves the same function as a bind-over probable cause hearing in the District Court." Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219, 228, 149 N.E.3d 713 (2020), citing Nanny, 462 Mass. at 805, 971 N.E.2d 762. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 393 Mass. 523, 533, 471 N.E.2d 1321 (1......
-
Noah N. v. Commonwealth
...of cases is being manipulated to extend the time of commitment beyond what the Legislature intended. Cf. Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219, 224-225, 149 N.E.3d 713 (2020) (cautioning that intentionally delaying transfer hearing proceedings against juvenile so as to proceed against him ......
-
Commonwealth v. Joe J.
...hearing in the Juvenile Court ‘serves the same function as a bind-over probable cause hearing in the District Court.’ Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219, 228 (2020), citing [ Commonwealth v.] Nanny, 462 Mass. [798,] 805 [2012]." Irvin I., supra at 6. " ‘The probable cause to bind over s......