Ortiz v. New York City Housing Authority
| Citation | 22 F.Supp.2d 15 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-CV-4461 (FB).,93-CV-4461 (FB). |
| Parties | Hilda ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Third-party plaintiff, v. Lamont HENRIQUES, Third-party defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Richard Frank, New York City, for Plaintiff.
Nina Cangiano, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, New York City, for the Defendant/Third-party Plaintiff.
On December 26, 1992, plaintiff Hilda Ortiz ("Ortiz"), a 47-year old grandmother, was raped at gunpoint in the stairwell of her building in Brooklyn's low-income Cypress Hills housing project. Her attacker, Lamont Henriques ("Henriques"), was apprehended and pleaded guilty to the crime. Ortiz brought this lawsuit shortly after her attack, claiming, inter alia, that the failure of her landlord, defendant New York City Housing Authority ("Housing Authority"), to provide adequate security for her building, including the maintenance of a working lock on the outside door, was a proximate cause of Henriques' attack. Her claim was tried to a jury beginning on April 21, 1998. On April 29, 1998, the jury found that: (1) the Housing Authority failed to maintain the building in a reasonably safe condition; (2) this failure constituted negligence; and (3) the Housing Authority's negligence was a substantial factor in causing Ortiz's injuries. The jury also determined that the Housing Authority acted with reckless disregard for Ortiz's safety, and further determined that the Housing Authority was 60 percent responsible, and Henriques 40 percent responsible, for Ortiz's injuries. The jury awarded Ortiz $2 million as compensatory damages for her past pain and suffering and $1 million as compensatory damages for her future pain and suffering.
Pending before the Court are the following motions by the Housing Authority: (1) a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that Ortiz's proof was insufficient on the issue of proximate cause; (2) a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence and seriously erroneous, that the Court committed various errors during the trial, and that the jury's verdict was excessive; and (3) a motion for a stay of execution of the judgment with a waiver of the supersedeas bond required by Rule 62(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the reasons that follow, the Housing Authority's motions pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59(a) are denied in their entirety. However, the Housing Authority's motion for a stay of execution with a waiver of bond, which motion has not been opposed by Ortiz, is granted.
At the close of Ortiz's case, the Housing Authority moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that: (1) Ortiz had not met her burden of demonstrating that Henriques was an intruder in the building on the night of the attack, which, under New York law, is an element of proximate cause in negligent security cases; (2) Ortiz had failed to introduce expert testimony on the issue of whether Henriques would have been deterred from attacking Ortiz by the existence of an adequate door lock; and (3) the Housing Authority had satisfied its common law duty to provide a minimal level of security by implementing a tenant patrol. The Court denied the Housing Authority's motion.
At the close of all the evidence, the Housing Authority renewed its Rule 50(a) motion on the same grounds. Counsel also argued, for the first time, that the evidence established that Henriques was a stalker, and that his intentional conduct broke the chain of foreseeability under New York law, thereby absolving the Housing Authority of all liability for Ortiz's injuries. The Court reserved decision on this aspect of the Housing Authority's motion, and decided to send the entire case to the jury. After the jury returned its verdict, the Court denied the Housing Authority's Rule 50(a) motion in its entirety.
On its renewed motion pursuant to Rule 50(b), the Housing Authority now argues: (1) Ortiz failed to prove that Henriques was an intruder; and (2) Ortiz failed to prove that a functioning lock would have deterred Henriques' attack.
The same standard applies to a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law and a Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Raspente v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 111 F.3d 239, 241 n. 3 (2d Cir.1997). A motion under either section may be granted only if "the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in [her] favor." Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty and Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir.1998); see also Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 79 F.3d 272, 277 (2d Cir.1996). The Court will only grant the motion if "there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's finding could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or if the evidence is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair-minded persons could only have reached the opposite result." Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53-54 (2d Cir.1993); see also Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 289. The Court "must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and it may not itself weigh the credibility of witnesses or consider the weight of the evidence." Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 289 (citing Vasbinder v. Ambach, 926 F.2d 1333, 1339-40 (2d Cir.1991)).
A Rule 50(b) motion "`is limited to those grounds that were specifically raised in the prior [Rule 50(a) motion].'" Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 286 (); see Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(b); see also Holmes v. United States, 85 F.3d 956, 962 (2d Cir.1996); Lambert, 10 F.3d at 53-54. Pursuant to this specificity requirement, the Rule 50(a) motion "must at least identify the specific element that the defendant contends is insufficiently supported." Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 286. The purpose of the specificity requirement is "`so that the responding party may seek to correct any overlooked deficiencies in the proof.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 50 Advisory Committee Note (1991)). Because the Housing Authority's Rule 50(b) motion relies upon arguments raised in its Rule 50(a) motion, the specificity requirement is satisfied here.
Under New York law, a landowner has a common law duty "to make the public areas of his property reasonably safe for those who might enter." Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 519, 407 N.E.2d 451, 458, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (1980). "Under this standard, a landlord has a duty to maintain minimal security measures, related to a specific building itself, in the face of foreseeable criminal intrusion upon tenants." Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 513, 467 N.E.2d 493, 497, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 833 (1984); see also Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 293-94, 614 N.E.2d 723, 725, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (1993). The New York Court of Appeals has noted that "[w]hat safety precautions may reasonably be required of a landowner is almost always a question of fact for the jury." Nallan, 50 N.Y.2d at 520 n. 8, 407 N.E.2d at 458, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
It is a tragic sign of the times in which we live that Ortiz's case is by no means unique. Indeed, New York courts have seemingly been inundated with similar negligence actions against the Housing Authority brought by residents of housing projects who have been victims of violent crime premised upon the Housing Authority's alleged failure to maintain working door locks in the projects. In assessing the viability of such claims, the following rule has emerged: "Insofar as [a] plaintiff predicates her claim on a lack of security, based on an allegedly broken entrance door lock, it is incumbent upon her, on the issue of proximate cause, to demonstrate that the assailant was an intruder and not one of the building residents or a guest thereof." Wright v. New York City Housing Auth., 208 A.D.2d 327, 330, 624 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (1st Dep't 1995); see also Woodley v. New York City Housing Auth., 245 A.D.2d 502, 666 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (2d Dep't 1997); Melville v. New York City Housing Auth., 242 A.D.2d 244, 245, 661 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (1st Dep't 1997); Rivera v. New York City Housing Auth., 239 A.D.2d 114, 115, 657 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (1st Dep't 1997); Tolliver v. New York City Housing Auth., 238 A.D.2d 187, 188, 655 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (1st Dep't 1997); Folks v. New York City Housing Auth., 227 A.D.2d 520, 521, 643 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (2d Dep't 1996). Thus, "`the failure to provide locks on outer doors is only pertinent as an alleged proximate cause if there is evidence to support a finding that the assailant was an intruder ... with no right or privilege to be present there.'" Tolliver, 238 A.D.2d at 188, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 535 (quoting Dawson v. New York City Housing Auth., 203 A.D.2d 55, 610 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1st Dep't 1994)) (other internal quotations omitted).
The courts have also held that the plaintiff must provide proof as to how the assailant entered the premises. "`[A]bsent proof of how the perpetrator gained entry to the premises, any negligence claim premised on the theory that the defendant's inadequate security measures permitted the intruder to gain access to the premises necessarily involves speculation on the issue of proximate cause...." Tolliver, 238 A.D.2d at 187-88,...
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