Ostergren v. Iowa Dist. Court for Muscatine Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1372.,14–1372. |
| Citation | 863 N.W.2d 294 |
| Parties | Muscatine County Attorney Alan R. OSTERGREN, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR MUSCATINE COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Alan R. Ostergren, Muscatine County Attorney, plaintiff pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey Thompson, Solicitor General, and Renner Walker, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
The district court for Muscatine County issued an administrative order allowing persons protected by no-contact orders to petition the district court to terminate or modify such orders. In this certiorari proceeding, we consider whether the district court exceeded its authority by issuing the administrative order. Because we find the order was within the district court's authority, we annul the writ.
Iowa Code chapter 664A governs no-contact orders and protective orders. See Iowa Code § 664A.2 (2013). Of particular relevance to this case, chapter 664A “applies to no-contact orders issued for violations or alleged violations of [code sections criminalizing domestic abuse assault, harassment, stalking, and sexual abuse], and any other public offense for which there is a victim.” Id. § 664A.2(1). Section 664A.3(1) sets forth the grounds for entering no-contact orders:
Id. § 664A.3(1)(a )-(b ). Thus, under this statute, a magistrate must issue a no-contact order if he or she makes the requisite findings. See id.
On July 22, 2014, the Muscatine County District Court issued an administrative order pertaining “to all requests to terminate or modify Orders of Protection entered in criminal proceedings in Muscatine County.” The order prescribes a formal procedure through which persons protected by such orders may seek to have them modified or terminated.1 The prescribed procedure requires a protected person seeking relief to deliver to the court a letter setting forth the reasons for their request. Upon receiving the letter, a judge reviews the letter and the underlying criminal case file. The court will not summarily grant a request to modify or terminate a no-contact order unless the State has waived notice and consented to such relief. If the protected person's request is not summarily granted, the court must set a hearing on the matter and give notice to the county attorney. After the hearing, the court determines whether the defendant still poses a threat to a protected person's safety. See Iowa Code § 664A.3(1)(b ).
On August 18, the Muscatine County Attorney (the County Attorney) initiated an original proceeding in this court seeking a writ of certiorari.2 See Iowa R.App. P. 6.107(1)(a )-(b ) (). In his petition, the County Attorney contended the July 22 administrative order exceeds the district court's authority because it allows victims in criminal cases to circumvent the County Attorney's office and directly seek a modification or termination of no-contact orders in criminal cases.
On August 26, we issued a writ of certiorari.
Certiorari proceedings are “leveled at the tribunal, board, or officer alleged to have exceeded the jurisdiction or authority conferred by law.” Tod v. Crisman, 123 Iowa 693, 702, 99 N.W. 686, 689 (1904) ; see also Linn Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 545 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1996). “Under a writ of certiorari, our review is for errors at law.” Crowell v. State Pub. Defender, 845 N.W.2d 676, 687 (Iowa 2014). When reviewing the district court's action, we Id. at 682.
A. The County Attorney. The County Attorney's position is based on separation-of-powers principles. He contends the district court's administrative order intruded upon duties delegated to the executive branch of government—specifically, the county attorney's authority to decide (1) which criminal cases to bring and (2) how to manage and prosecute those cases.
The County Attorney's statutory duties include protecting the community, enforcing criminal laws, and prosecuting criminal offenses. See generally Iowa Code § 331.756. The County Attorney asserts domestic abuse crimes are committed against the community as a whole, not just individual victims. Because no-contact orders entered under chapter 664A are part of the criminal law process and protect the community, the County Attorney asserts persons protected under such orders in criminal cases filed in Muscatine County should not be permitted to seek modification or termination of no-contact orders until after they have consulted with his office. A prehearing consultation is essential, the County Attorney contends, because victims of domestic abuse often face enormous pressure from defendants desiring termination of no-contact orders. The County Attorney maintains that he serves as an important buffer protecting victims who are often ill-equipped to protect themselves against manipulative pressure exerted by defendants. The County Attorney further asserts the district court lacked inherent authority to promulgate an administrative order authorizing victims to seek termination or modification of no-contact orders.
B. The State. The State urges several reasons for annulling the writ: (1) the County Attorney lacks standing to petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, (2) the County Attorney did not preserve error, (3) issuance of the order was not a judicial function subject to certiorari review, and (4) the district court acted within its authority when it issued the administrative order.
Although “any party” may seek certiorari, Iowa R.App. P. 6.107(1)(a ), “[t]his court has required standing in certiorari actions,” Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 2005). However, we will assume without deciding that the County Attorney has standing and preserved error—and that issuance of the administrative order involved a judicial function—because we conclude the district court had authority to issue the administrative order. Cf. State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Iowa 1998) (); State ex rel. Pillers v. Maniccia, 343 N.W.2d 834, 835–36 (Iowa 1984) ().
A. Protected Persons' Particularized Interests. Iowa Code section 664A.3(3) provides no-contact orders are in force “until ... modified or terminated by subsequent court action” or until the case reaches final resolution. Iowa Code § 664A.3(3). The County Attorney conceded at oral argument that this statute permits the district court to reconsider a no-contact order on its own motion, without a request from the defendant or from a protected person. However, he contends protected persons have no personal interest at stake in an underlying criminal prosecution and therefore cannot invoke the court's sua sponte authority to seek relief from protective orders.
The fact that a crime victim is not a party to the underlying criminal proceeding does not preclude him or her from asking the court for relief. In State v. West, the district court established a restitution fund paid by a criminal defendant, and ordered the money in the fund to be distributed “pursuant to the direction of the attorney general.” 320 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1982). Several individuals who were not included in the initial distribution plan “claim[ed] to be victims of West's criminal activity” and asserted they were entitled to share in the distribution. See id. at 571–72. They submitted formal claims to share in the restitution fund, but the district court denied the claims. Id. at 572. The claimants appealed, and we treated the appeal as an action for writ of certiorari. Id. at 573.
The State contended the claimants could not challenge the district court's ruling because they were not parties in the criminal proceeding in which the restitution fund was created and distributed. Id. We rejected the State's contention, however, because the claimants alleged they suffered pecuniary damages as a consequence of the defendant's criminal conduct and therefore had a sufficient particularized interest at stake. Id. Although we ultimately denied the relief the claimants sought, id. at 574–75, we nonetheless concluded they were allowed to seek it in the certiorari proceeding, id. at 573.
We conclude protected persons under no-contact orders in criminal cases have a particularized interest at stake entitling them to request relief from such orders. This interest is evidenced in part by the fact that protected persons may be held in contempt and jailed for aiding and abetting a defendant's violation of a no-contact order. See Henley v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 533 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1995) ; Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480 N.W.2d 260, 263–64 (Iowa 1992). The procedure implemented by the administrative order accommodates protected persons' important liberty interests by permitting such persons to seek termination or modification of no-contact orders in a criminal case...
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