P.D.E. v. Juvenile Officer

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: WD84899
• Parties: IN THE INTEREST OF: P.D.E., Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

IN THE INTEREST OF: P.D.E., Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent.

No. WD84899

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, First Division

November 22, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Callaway County, Missouri Honorable Sue Murvin Crane, Judge

Before Janet Sutton, P.J., Alok Ahuja and Karen King Mitchell, JJ.

Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge

P.D.E appeals a judgment of the Callaway County Circuit Court in which the court found P.D.E. delinquent for committing the offenses of burglary in the second degree, trespassing in the first degree, and two counts property damage in the second degree. P.D.E. contends that he did not "knowingly and voluntarily" admit to the conduct alleged in the Juvenile Officer's amended four-count petition. Because P.D.E.'s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we would ordinarily dismiss the appeal. However, because we recognize that there is a reasonable basis for disagreement as to when the disposition order is final for purposes of appeal, and this issue is of general interest or importance, we do not finally dismiss P.D.E.'s appeal, but instead, on our own motion transfer this case to the Supreme Court of Missouri for decision pursuant to Rule 83.02.

Factual and Procedural Background

In December 2020, the Juvenile Officer filed a petition alleging that P.D.E. committed the delinquency offenses of two counts of burglary in the second degree, one count of property damage in the first degree, and one count of property damage in the second degree. The Juvenile Officer's petition with an accompanying probable cause statement, alleged that in November 2020, P.D.E., along with other several others entered two different church buildings in Holts Summit Missouri, and destroyed church property at both locations.

The following month, on the day of P.D.E.'s scheduled adjudication hearing, the Juvenile Officer filed an amended petition, alleging that P.D.E. committed second-degree burglary, first-degree trespass, and two counts of second-degree property damage.^[1] The court adjudicated P.D.E. as delinquent and in need of care and treatment under section 211.031.1(3) on January 26, 2021.^[2] The court held P.D.E.'s disposition hearing on March 2, 2021.

The court issued P.D.E.'s disposition order the same day as his disposition hearing. In the disposition order, the court ordered that P.D.E. be made a ward of the court, placed P D.E. in his mother's custody under the Juvenile Officer's supervision, and listed conditions in the disposition order including, among other things, that P.D.E. was "to pay restitution in an amount to be determined."

Four months after the disposition order, the court held a restitution hearing on July 13, 2021, to determine the exact amount owed. Later, on October 6, 2021, in a docket entry, the court set P.D.E's restitution amount at $4,000.00. P.D.E. filed his notice of appeal on October 19, 2021, stating "[t]he trial court's order directing Appellant to pay $4000 in restitution is unlawful and unreasonable."^[3]

P.D.E. appeals the adjudication hearing and disposition order, arguing that he did not "knowingly and voluntarily" admit to the four amended counts in the Juvenile Officer's petition. The Juvenile Officer contends that because P.D.E. untimely filed his notice of appeal, we do not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Legal Analysis

Before considering the merits of an appeal, "'we must sua sponte determine whether we have authority to do so.'" Juv. Officer v. A.S.M., 423 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (quoting In re G.G.B. 394 S.W.3d 457, 461-62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)). The Missouri Constitution article V, section 5, empowers the legislature "'to set the requirements for the right to appeal.'" In re D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Goldsby v. Lombardi, 559 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Mo. banc 2018)). Thus, "[t]he right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d at 216; See also Rule 120.01.^[4]

"Chapter 211 . . . governs all proceedings brought in juvenile court." In re K.S.W., 454 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (citing In re A.R., 330 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). Under section 211.261.1, a notice of appeal must be "filed within thirty days after the final judgment, order or decree has been entered . . . ." That appeal time period is extended ten days by the application of Rule 81.04 ("notice of appeal shall be filed not later than ten days after the judgment, decree, or order appealed from becomes final[]") and Rule 81.05(a) ("[a] judgment becomes final at the expiration of thirty days after its entry if no timely authorized after-trial motion is filed."). See In re D.J.B., 704 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Mo. banc 1986) (holding Rules 81.04 and 81.05(a) apply and supersede any part of section 211.261 inconsistent with those rules).

Section 211.261 authorizes an appeal from "any final judgment, order or decree made under the provisions of this chapter[.]" But chapter 211 "contains no definition of 'final judgment[.]'" D.J.B., 704 S.W.2d at 218. A "final judgment" in a juvenile matter "differs from that under general civil law. The very nature of a juvenile proceeding entails an on-going case which does not result in a 'final' order, as that term is generally defined." In re N.D., 857 S.W.2d 835, 842 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993).^[5] The court's continuing authority over the juvenile's care and treatment, though, "does not defeat a right to appeal." Id.

Generally, a final judgment disposes of all issues in the case and leaves nothing for future determination. In re C.A.D., 995 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Mo. App. W.D.1999). However, the standard for a "final" judgment in a juvenile proceeding differs from this general standard. Id. The nature of a juvenile proceeding requires an on-going consideration, which does not result in "final" disposition of the issues as the term is traditionally defined. Id. Instead, once a disposition is made concerning the juvenile, even though post-dispositional hearings may continue to be held, all the issues before the court have been disposed of and nothing is left for determination. Id. Therefore, a dispositional order is final and appealable. Id.

In re M.P.R., 381 S.W.3d 392, 393 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (emphasis added); See also K.S.W., 454 S.W.3d at 427-28.

Section 211.181 dictates, after adjudication and at disposition, that the court shall make findings of fact upon which it exercises jurisdiction over the child. Rule 128.03 provides that the court shall enter an order determining both "the legal and physical custody of the juvenile" and what placement, treatment or care should be ordered. See also K.S.W., 454 S.W.3d at 426-27.

As part of the disposition, section 211.181.3(7)^[6] permits a court to order the juvenile to make "restitution or reparation for the damage or loss caused by [a juvenile's] offense." Not only may a court order restitution in the disposition order, but the court may hold a hearing "to ascertain the amount of damages." Section 211.181.3(7). Section 211.181 does not say, however, that the disposition order remains pending until the conclusion of the restitution hearing. Section 211.181 instead contemplates that the court may decree and order restitution with a separate process for later hearing on the specific amount owed.

Section 211.185, which governs the process for a court when entering a judgment of restitution against a parent and a juvenile, also contemplates a separate restitution hearing apart from a final, appealable disposition order. Section 211.185.6 permits a court to hold a restitution hearing "not later than thirty days after the disposition hearing and may be extended by the court for good cause." Neither statute alters the appealability of disposition orders.^[7]

The court entered its disposition order on March 2, 2021, and this constituted a final, appealable judgment. P.D.E.'s appeal was due, at the latest, by Monday, April 12, 2021, forty days after the disposition order.^[8] P.D.E. filed his notice of appeal on October 19, 2021, over six months late, making P.D.E.'s appeal untimely.

Though the court waited until July 2021 to hold a restitution hearing and did not order the final restitution amount until October 6, 2021, the earlier disposition order settled that P.D.E. would pay some amount to be determined. The disposition, ordered under section 211.181, contemplated restitution and stated, "[P.D.E.] to pay restitution in an amount to be determined." With restitution ordered, the disposition order was final on March 2, 2021.

The court's docket entry on October 6, 2021, was denominated an "order" and set forth the exact restitution amount that the court found P.D.E. should pay. This final order as to the restitution amount would constitute a separate appealable "order" under section 211.261.1. P.D.E., however, is not appealing the reasonableness of the specific restitution amount. Though P.D.E.'s notice of appeal stated he expected to raise the issue that "[t]he trial court's order directing [P.D.E.] to pay $4000 in restitution is unlawful and unreasonable[,]" neither P.D.E.'s brief nor his point relied on mention this issue. Since P.D.E. is appealing the substance of the adjudication and disposition hearings, P.D.E. should have brought his claims on appeal from the date of final judgment-the disposition order date.

Finally, we emphasize that the juvenile statutes and Missouri Supreme Court Rules do not solidify disposition orders once issued. Rather, both the legislature and the Missouri Supreme Court recognize that courts may amend or modify disposition orders at any time on either the court's own motion or a party's motion. § 211.251; Rule 119.03.

The dissent argues...